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The subject of appeals by the Crown raises problems that lie
at the core of any study of double jeopardy.1 
I. INTRODUCTION
Around 6:00 p.m. on May 28, 2003, twenty-one-year-old Alan
McCullough left his mother’s house in Belfast, Northern Ireland, in a 
car, accompanied by three men.2  Eight days later his remains were 
discovered in a shallow grave near Mallusk, on the northern edge of
Belfast.3  He had been shot in the head.4  McCullough, the former 
1. MARTIN L. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 279 (1969) (pointing out that “[t]he
result of a successful appeal from an acquittal will usually involve a retrial of the 
accused”).
2. See DAVID LISTER & HUGH JORDAN, MAD DOG: THE RISE AND FALL OF JOHNNY
ADAIR AND “C COMPANY” 334 (2004); R v. Courtney, No. 03/039229, slip op. at [7], [8] 
(Belfast Crown Ct., Nov. 28, 2006) (summarizing the prosecution’s evidence in the 
defendant’s trial for the murder of McCullough (quoted in R v. Courtney, [2007] NICA
6, [3], [4], [2007] N.I. 178, 180, 181)).  See also IAN S. WOOD, CRIMES OF LOYALTY: A
HISTORY OF THE UDA 301–02 (2006). 
3. Appeals Judges Hear Bid to Have Murder Charge Re-Trial, BELFAST TELEGRAPH, 
Jan. 18, 2007, at 4, available at 2007 WLNR 1013636; Body Identified as Abducted
Loyalist, BELFAST TELEGRAPH, June 6, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 789301; Gerry
Moriarty, UDA Says It Murdered Adair Ally, IRISH TIMES, June 6, 2003, at 9, available at
6
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military commander of Johnny “Mad Dog” Adair’s “C Company,”5 a 
faction of the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), Northern Ireland’s
largest Loyalist paramilitary organization,6 previously had fled Northern
Ireland with other members of “C Company” following a feud with 
other sections of the UDA.7  He returned to Belfast in April or May of
2003 WLNR 4781701. Accord  LISTER & JORDAN, supra note 2, at 334; WOOD, supra
note 2, at 302 (stating that McCullough’s body was discovered “[a] week later”); Gemma
Murray, Body Found in Shallow Grave May Be Missing Man: Loyalist’s Murder “Just
Unfinished Business”—UDA, BELFAST NEWS LETTER, June 6, 2003, at 2, available at
2003 WLNR 10412738. See also Courtney, No. 03/039229, slip op. at [8] (stating that 
the prosecution’s evidence in the defendant’s trial for the murder of McCullough showed
that after McCullough left his mother’s house on May 28, 2003, he “was not seen alive 
again by any of his family or friends,” and that “[h]is body was found in a shallow grave 
. . . at a place known as Aughnabrack Road, just over one week later” (quoted in 
Courtney, [2007] NICA (Crim) 6, [3], [2007] N.I. at 180)). 
4. LISTER & JORDAN, supra note 2, at 334; Appeals Judges Hear Bid to Have 
Murder Charge Re-Trial, supra note 3; Joe Gorrod, Alan McCullough was Three Months 
Old When His Dad was Killed by the INLA. Yesterday His Coffin Paused at a Mural
Paying Tribute to the Loyalist Godfather, MIRROR (U.K.), June 17, 2003, at 5, available 
at 2003 WLNR 13093374. See also WOOD, supra note 2, at 302 (“He had been shot 
several times.”); Courtney, No. 03/039229, slip op. at [8] (stating that the prosecution’s
evidence showed that McCullough “had been shot several times” (quoted in Courtney, 
[2007] NICA (Crim) 6, [3], [2007] N.I. at 180)).
5. LISTER & JORDAN, supra note 2, at 328; David Lister, Police Search Lake for 
Latest Victim of Loyalist Feud, TIMES (London), May 31, 2003, at 4, available at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article1137790.ece. During the late 1980s
and early 1990s, “C Company” “hunted down and killed republicans as well as ordinary
Catholics.” Henry McDonald, “I’m No Threat to Anyone.” Why the War is Over for
Mad Dog Adair, OBSERVER (U.K.), Feb. 19, 2006, at 24, available at http:// www.
guardian.co.uk/politics/2006/feb/19/northernireland.northernireland.  For a history of “C
Company” and its leader, Johnny Adair, see LISTER & JORDAN, supra note 2.
 6. Lister, supra note 5. The UDA is an outlawed organization.  Terrorism Act,
2000, c. 11, § 3, sch. 2 (Eng.).  For a history of the UDA, see WOOD, supra note 2.
7. See WOOD, supra note 2, at 291–92, 301; Joe Gorrod, Killers Lure UDA
Fugitive to His Death: Adair Pal Promised Pardon by Gang, MIRROR (U.K.), May 31,
2003, at 8, available at 2003 WLNR 13145256; Grasping Nettle of Loyalist Terrorism, 
BELFAST NEWS LETTER, May 31, 2003, at 8, available at 2003 WLNR 10235863; Lister,
supra note 5; Moriarty, supra note 3; Murray, supra note 3. See also Courtney, No.
03/039229, slip op. at [5] (summarizing the prosecution’s case in the defendant’s trial for 
the murder of McCullough (quoted in Courtney, [2007] NICA (Crim) 6, [3], [2007] N.I. 
at 179)); R v. Courtney, [2007] NICC 11, [3] (N. Ir.) (discussing the written text
submitted by the prosecution at the defendant’s sentencing hearing following his plea of
guilty to the manslaughter of McCullough). 
Alan McCullough, the son of William “Bucky” McCullough, a UDA commander who
was shot and killed by the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) outside his Belfast 
home in October 1981, LISTER & JORDAN, supra note 2, at 335; WOOD, supra note 2, at 
301–02, was one of the members of “C Company” blamed for killing a UDA leader, 
John “Grug” Gregg, in February of 2003.  Lister, supra note 5.  See also  LISTER &
JORDAN, supra note 2, at 326–27 (describing the murders of Gregg and a UDA
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2003,8 apparently after receiving assurances from UDA leaders he would 
not be harmed.9 
colleague, Robert “Rab” Carson, on Feb. 1, 2003, as they were sitting in a taxi at a traffic 
light near the Belfast docks after returning from a football match in Scotland); Courtney, 
No. 03/03229, slip op. at [5] (stating that the prosecution’s evidence in the defendant’s 
trial for the murder of McCullough showed that in February of 2003 two men were 
murdered as they left a Belfast ferry terminal and that blame for these murders fell upon
“C Company” (quoted in Courtney, [2007] NICA (Crim) 6, [3], [2007] N.I. at 179)); 
Courtney, [2007] NICC 11, [3] (at the defendant’s sentencing hearing following his plea 
of guilty to the manslaughter of McCullough, the prosecution stated that McCullough’s 
killing occurred after “C Company” killed two UDA members, John Gregg and Robert 
Carson, in February of 2003). 
For a brief history of the 2003 feud, see LISTER & JORDAN, supra note 2, at 307–32;
WOOD, supra note 2, at 226–59, 263–93, 297–303. 
8. The precise date McCullough returned to Belfast is not clear.  He may have
returned in early April 2003, see Courtney, [2007] NICC 11, [3], although it appears
more likely he did not return until May of that year.  LISTER & JORDAN, supra note 2, at 
334 (stating McCullough had been led away from his mother’s house three weeks after
his return from England); Lister, supra note 5 (first stating McCullough “went missing . .
. days after returning to Northern Ireland from England,” and then saying McCullough
had returned to Belfast the Friday before his disappearance).  McCullough appears to
have still been living in England on April 30, 2003, for on that date, as an act of good
faith to rival UDA leaders, he shot up the house in Bolton, England, in which Adair’s
wife and their children were living.  Gorrod, supra note 7. See also LISTER & JORDAN, 
supra note 2, at 334–35 (asserting McCullough helped organize a drive-by shooting of 
Adair’s wife’s house on April 30, 2003). 
9. See WOOD, supra note 2, at 302 (noting, however, that “some press reports 
suggested he might have been prepared for a punishment beating or even a shooting for
his alleged involvement in John Gregg’s murder”); see Gorrod, supra note 4; Gorrod, 
supra note 7; Moriarty, supra note 3; Murray, supra note 3; Ted Oliver, Mad Dog’s 
Missing Pal Found Dead, SUN (U.K.), June 6, 2003, at 2.
McCullough became anxious to return to Belfast after his girlfriend, who had fled with
him, Courtney, No. 03/039229, slip op. at [5] (quoted in Courtney, [2007] NICA (Crim)
6, [3], [2007] N.I. at 179); Courtney, [2007] NICC 11 [3] (discussing the written text
submitted by the prosecution at the defendant’s sentencing hearing following his plea of
guilty to the manslaughter of McCullough), moved back to Belfast.  Lister, supra note 5. 
See also  LISTER & JORDAN, supra note 2, at 334–35 (asserting that four months after 
fleeing England, McCullough had been “desperate to return home to his girlfriend and
young daughter”).  Although McCullough’s mother apparently had sought guarantees 
from the UDA that her son would not be harmed if he returned to Belfast, Lister, supra
note 5, it does not appear she received any such assurances.  See Courtney, No.
03/039229, slip op. at [5]–[7] (indicating McCullough’s mother had not received such
assurances before her son’s return and negotiations concerning his safety were taking
place shortly before his disappearance and death (quoted in Courtney, [2007] NICA
(Crim) 6, [3], [2007] N.I. at 179–80)); Courtney, [2007] NICC 11, [3] (the prosecution’s 
written statement at the defendant’s sentencing hearing indicated McCullough’s mother 
had not received such assurances before her son’s return and that, after his return, she
approached “a considerable number of persons” “with a view to trying to render 
acceptable to the leaders of the UDA [her son’s] return”). See also Lister, supra note 5 
(“[I]t was not clear . . . whether the UDA leadership had guaranteed his safety before his 
return . . . .”).  After McCullough’s murder, police speculated that members of other
sections of the UDA lured him back to Northern Ireland to be executed.  Gorrod, supra
note 7. See also  WOOD, supra note 2, at 302 (stating the mainstream UDA “led 
[McCullough] to believe he could return unharmed”). 
8
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In June of 2003, William “Mo” Courtney, a leading Loyalist and
member of the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), a branch of the UDA,10 
was charged with the murder of McCullough,11 and in September of
2006 his trial commenced in Belfast Crown Court12 before Mr. Justice 
Richard McLaughlin, sitting without a jury.13  At the close of the
prosecution’s case, in November 2006, defense counsel submitted that 
his client had “no case to answer,”14 that is, the prosecution’s evidence 
was insufficient to prove the defendant’s guilt.15  Mr. Justice McLaughlin 
acceded to the submission for a direction that a verdict of not guilty be 
entered,16 thereby acquitting Courtney.17  The judge stated that in light of
At the trial of William Courtney for the murder of McCullough, see infra text
accompanying notes 10–23, the prosecution contended that McCullough had requested 
to meet with members of a paramilitary organization—presumably the UDA—in the 
hope of facilitating his remaining in Northern Ireland, and that on May 28, 2003, after
receiving a telephone call from William Courtney, he left his mother’s home in a car 
belonging to Courtney.  Courtney, [2007] NICC 11, [3].
10. In his book on the UDA, Ian S. Wood asserts that in May or June of 1973, the 
organization’s killers began operating under the name Ulster Freedom Fighters.  WOOD, 
supra note 2, at 21. See also  LISTER & JORDAN, supra note 2, at 52 (asserting that
military operations of the UDA were carried out “under the cover name of the Ulster
Freedom Fighters”); Joe Gorrod, Tortured and Slain: UFF Admits Executing Adair Pal 
McCullough, MIRROR (U.K.), June 6, 2003, at 1, available at 2003 WLNR 13060421 
(calling the UFF “a cover name for the UDA”).  Like its parent organization, the UDA,
see supra note 6, the UFF is an outlawed organization.  Terrorism Act, 2000, § 3, sch. 2.
Courtney, who joined the UDA when he was fifteen years old, had been the military
commander of C Company before being replaced by McCullough in early 2003.  LISTER 
& JORDAN, supra note 2, at 56, 328. 
11. Courtney, [2007] NICC 11, [5].
The indictment also charged Courtney with being a member of two proscribed terrorist
organizations, the UDA and the UFF.  Courtney, No. 03/039299, slip op. at [1].
12. Courtney, [2007] NICC 11, [5].
13. Courtney, [2007] NICA (Crim) 6, [1], [2007] N.I. at 179.
Because of the political situation in Northern Ireland, indictments charging certain
offenses, including murder, are tried by a judge without a jury.  Terrorism Act, 2000, §§ 
65(1), 75(1), sch. 9, pt. 1, para. 1.  Such a trial generally must “be held only at the Crown 
Court sitting in Belfast.” Id. § 74(1).
14. Courtney, [2007] NICA (Crim) 6, [1], [2007] N.I. at 179. 
15. See R v. N. Ltd., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1223, [15], [2009] 1 Crim. App. 3, at 
61 (Eng.).  See also ARCHBOLD: CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE § 4-293 
(J.P. Richardson ed., 2011) [hereinafter ARCHBOLD] (“A submission of no case should be 
allowed when there is no evidence upon which, if the evidence adduced were accepted, a 
reasonable jury, properly directed, could convict.”).  For a more detailed discussion of a
submission of no case to answer, see infra text accompanying notes 45–70. 
16. Courtney, No. 03/039299, slip op. at [17] (quoted in Courtney, [2007] NICA
(Crim) 6, [1], [4], [2007] N.I. at 179, 183). 
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the “inherent weaknesses”18 in the testimony of McCullough’s family
relating to the alleged collection of the deceased at his mother’s house, 
and in the testimony of Witness A (a private citizen who discovered
McCullough’s body19) concerning the alleged presence on 28 May
200320 of Courtney’s car at the place where Witness A discovered
McCullough’s body eight days later,21 he “could not properly convict the 
accused of the murder of Alan McCullough.”22  The judge also concluded 
that “the prosecution case is highly deficient in establishing that the
defendant was part of a common design to kill the deceased.”23 
Prior to 2005, Courtney’s acquittal of murder would have been final:24 
The judge also concluded that Courtney had no case to answer on the two charges, see 
supra note 11, of being a member of a proscribed terrorist organization. Courtney, 
[2007] NICA (Crim) 6, [1], [4], [2007] N.I. at 179. 
A submission of no case to answer typically involves a request that the trial judge
direct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF
CRIMINAL LAW 44 (2d ed. 1983).  See also  JOHN SPRACK, A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 20.48 (13th ed. 2011). When a trial judge decides a submission
of no case to answer in a case being tried without a jury, he must undertake “precisely
the same type of approach” as in a case involving a jury.  Chief Constable v. L.O., 
[2006] NICA (Crim) 3, [13], [2006] N.I. 261, 266.  Accord Courtney, [2007] NICA 
(Crim) 6, [19], [2007] N.I. at 189. 
17. Courtney, [2007] NICC 11, [5] (“The 2006 trial ended with the acquittal of the 
accused . . . .”).
18. Courtney, No. 03/039299, slip op. at [17] (quoted in Courtney, [2007] NICA
(Crim) 6, [4], [2007] N.I. at 182). 
19. Id. at [11] (quoted in Courtney, [2007] NICA (Crim) 6, [3], [2007] N.I. at 
181); Courtney, [2007] NICC 11, [4].
20. The trial judge was satisfied, on a prima facie basis, that McCullough “died 
very shortly after he was taken away in the car on 28 May.”  Courtney, No. 03/039299, 
slip op. at [9] (quoted in Courtney, [2007] NICA (Crim) 6, [3], [2007] N.I. at 180). 
21. About a week after McCullough’s disappearance on May 28, 2003, the Irish 
News published a photograph of the automobile used in a police reconstruction of the
events surrounding the disappearance, and it gave details about the vehicle involved in
the disappearance.  Witness A claimed he had been driving along Aughnabrack Road on
28 May 2003 when his progress was halted by a car that was parked at the entrance to a 
laneway.  According to Witness A, the car matched the description of the vehicle 
allegedly involved in McCullough’s disappearance.  Witness A read the Irish News 
article on the date of its publication and “immediately put two and two together but, 
curiously, instead of telephoning the police and reporting his suspicions he . . . went to
the Aughnabrack Road, walked the laneway [in question,] and ultimately discovered the 
body of the deceased.”  After hearing Witness A’s testimony at trial, however, the trial
judge concluded “it was impossible to disentangle what [Witness A] could remember of 
events as they actually took place on 28 May and those details which he gathered upon
reading the article in the Irish News.”  Courtney, [2007] NICA (Crim) 6, [3], [2007] N.I.
at 181. 
22. Courtney, [2007] NICA (Crim) 6, [4], [2007] N.I. at 181. 
23. Id. For Mr. Justice McLaughlin’s detailed reasoning for acceding to 
Courtney’s submission of no case to answer, see Courtney, No. 03/039299, slip op. at 
[14]–[17] (quoted in Courtney, [2007] NICA (Crim) 6, [4], [2007] N.I. at 181–83). 
24. As an eighteenth century English defense attorney put it: “[W]henever, and by
whatever means, there is an acquittal in a criminal prosecution, the scene is closed and 
the curtain drops.”  Duchess of Kingston, 20 How. St. Tr. 355, 528 (1776). 
10
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the prosecution could not have appealed the trial judge’s decision
because such appeals by the prosecution were not permissible,25 and the 
25. Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act, 1980, c. 47 (Eng.) (not providing for 
an appeal by the prosecution of an acquittal).
According to the English Law Commission, “[t]he position in Northern Ireland
[governing prosecution appeals] is very similar to that in England and Wales.”  LAW
COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158: PROSECUTION APPEALS AGAINST JUDGES’
RULINGS para. 1.13 (2000) [hereinafter ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO.
158].  In England, prior to 2005, the prosecution had no right to appeal an acquittal in a
trial upon an indictment.  Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, c. 19 (Eng.) (making no provision 
for an appeal by the prosecution of an acquittal in a trial on an indictment); LAW
COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156: DOUBLE JEOPARDY paras. 2.11–.13 (1999)
[hereinafter ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156] (“In general the 
prosecution has no right of appeal against an acquittal; but there are two exceptions to 
this rule.  First, in the case of a summary acquittal, the prosecution may appeal to the
Divisional Court on the ground that the decision ‘is wrong in law or is in excess of
jurisdiction.’ . . .  [Second,] [w]here the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal 
quashes a conviction, the prosecution can [under certain circumstances] appeal to the 
House of Lords . . . .”); LAW COMMISSION, REPORT NO. 267: DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND
PROSECUTION APPEALS para. 2.38 (2001) [hereinafter ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 
267] (“[T]he main business of the Crown Court, trying cases on indictment, is subject to 
a defence right of appeal only . . . .” (emphasis added)); Criminal Justice Bill, 2002, [Bill
8] Explanatory Notes para.  36 (Eng.) (“Under current legislation, . . . the prosecution
has no . . .  right of appeal against a judicial decision to stop the trial.”), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmbills/008/en/03008x--.htm;
Statement of the Attorney General, 654 Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th ser.) 1782 (2003) (“It is a 
matter of serious concern that defendants have had a right of appeal against their 
conviction for almost a century while the prosecution has had no right to challenge a 
judge-ordered acquittal, no matter how manifestly unjust such a ruling may be on rare 
occasions.”); FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 279 (“English law has generally refused to 
permit an appeal from an acquittal. . . .  At the present time the Court [of Criminal 
Appeal] has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal only from a conviction.  No provision was 
made in the Criminal Appeal Act of 1907 to permit an appeal from an acquittal . . . .”);
IAN MCLEAN, CRIMINAL APPEALS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO APPEALS TO AND FROM THE 
CROWN COURT 59 (1980) (“No appeal lies against an acquittal on indictment.”); id. at 98
n.27 (“There is no right of appeal to the Criminal Division against an acquittal on 
indictment.”). See also  ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra, paras. 2.29-.53 
(briefly setting forth “the main forms of prosecution appeal or review in the current law 
of England and Wales,” but not mentioning a prosecution appeal from an acquittal 
rendered in a trial on an indictment); ENG. LAWCOMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158, 
supra, para. 1.13 (not mentioning a right of the prosecution to appeal an acquittal).
Although both in England and Northern Ireland the Attorney General can refer a point of
law to the Court of Appeal, such a reference does “not affect the trial in relation to which 
the reference is made or any acquittal in that trial.”  Criminal Justice Act, 1972, c. 71, §
36(1), (7) (Eng.); Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act, 1980, c. 47, § 15 (Eng.). 
The English Law Commission, whose work product is cited in the previous paragraph
and later in this Article, is a body of five Commissioners appointed by the Lord
Chancellor. Law Commissions Act, 1965, c. 22, § 1(1) (Eng.).  Parliament established
the Law Commission in 1965 “[f]or the purpose of promoting the reform of the law [of 
England and Wales].”  Id.  The Law Commission is charged with
 11












   
  
 









   
 












plea of autrefois acquit26 (a former acquittal) would have effectively 
precluded the prosecution from bringing a new charge for either murder
or manslaughter against Courtney in connection with the death of
McCullough.27  However, pursuant to an Order in Council applicable to
Northern Ireland that took effect in 2005,28 the prosecution sought leave 
tak[ing] and keep[ing] under review all the law . . . with a view to its 
systematic development and reform, including in particular the codification of 
such law, the elimination of anomalies, the repeal of obsolete and unnecessary
enactments, the reduction of the number of separate enactments and generally
the simplification and modernisation of the law . . . .
Id. § 3(1). 
26. The plea, expressed in Norman-French, is spelled in various ways, including
autrefoits acquit, e.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *335, and auterfoits 
acquit, e.g., Connelly v. DPP, [1964] A.C. 1254 (H.L.) 1306–07 (Lord Morris of Borth-
y-Gest) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).  In this Article, the Author will use the spelling
autrefois acquit, except when quoting from material using a different spelling. 
27. The plea of autrefois acquit (a former acquittal) is a special plea in bar that
“give[s] a rea[s]on why the prisoner ought not to an[s]wer [the indictment] at all, nor put 
himself upon his trial for the crime alleged.”  4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *335. 
The plea not only can be raised to an indictment for the same offense of which an 
individual previously has been acquitted, but also to an indictment for an offense in
respect of which the individual, on a previous indictment, could have been convicted. 
Connelly, [1964] A.C. at 1305 (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest); ENG. LAW REPORT NO. 
267, supra note 25, para. 2.2.  Thus, Courtney could have pleaded autrefois acquit to a
subsequent indictment charging him with manslaughter in connection with the death of
McCullough. Connelly, [1964] A.C. at 1305 (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest). See also id.
at 1298–99 (when an appellant’s conviction for murder is set aside on appeal, “[t]he
result is that the appellant can validly assert that he has been acquitted of the charge of
murder–with the consequential result that he has also been acquitted of manslaughter”); 
Id. at 1307 (“Hale . . . point[ed] out . . . that if a man is acquitted generally on an 
indictment of murder, auterfoits acquit would  be a good plea to an indictment of 
manslaughter of the same person.  It would be the same death: the fact would be the 
same. The charges of murder and manslaughter only differ in degree.”); id. at 1312
(“[A]n acquittal upon an indictment for murder may be pleaded in bar of another 
indictment for manslaughter.” (quoting HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL
MAXIMS 257–58 (2d ed. 1848))); SPRACK, supra note 16, § 17.46, at 288 (“[A]n acquittal
on a count of murdering X entitles the accused to raise autrefois if he is subsequently
indicted for the manslaughter of X.”). In practice, however, second prosecutions are not 
brought and so do not reach court.  See  SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOME AFFAIRS, THIRD
REPORT, THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULE para. 6 (2000), available at http://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmhaff/190/19002.htm [hereinafter
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOME AFFAIRS, THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULE]; SPRACK, supra
note 16, § 17.43 (“[I]t is rare in practice for the defence to be forced to have recourse to 
[the plea of autrefois acquit]. . . .  If [a previous prosecution] ended in [an individual’s] 
being . . . acquitted . . . he would not be prosecuted again for the same offence.”).  See 
also Pearce v The Queen, (1998) 194 CLR 610, 645 (Austl.) (Kirby, J.) (“Except for
accidental oversight or lack of coordination between prosecuting authorities, it is
virtually unthinkable that an accused would ever be charged with exactly the same
offence twice.” (footnote omitted)).  For a more detailed discussion of the plea of
autrefois acquit, see infra text accompanying notes 130–31, 135–47. 
28. Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order, 2004, SI 2004/1500 (N. Ir. 9) arts. 
16–20, 26–31.  The Order came into operation on April 18, 2005.  See id. (Commencement 
No. 2) Order 2005 (No. 243 (c. 17)) para. 2. 
12
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to appeal Mr. Justice McLaughlin’s ruling to the Court of Appeal.29  In
January of 2007, the Court of Appeal granted leave30 and allowed the 
appeal.31  The court concluded 
that if the [trial] judge had taken all [the] evidence into account on an all-
encompassing basis he would have found that there was sufficient evidence to
raise a prima facie case against the defendant, notwithstanding the frailties of the
testimony of the McCulloughs and [another witness allegedly present when
McCullough left his mother’s house on May 28, 2003]32 
and that “the failure to approach the case in this way constituted . . . 
an error both in law and principle.”33 
It then found that “it is in the interests of justice that the defendant be 
tried again,”34 and directed Courtney to “stand trial again on the charge
of the murder of Alan McCullough.”35  In March of 2007, following his
re-arraignment on the murder charge,36 Courtney, with the agreement of
This Order was “made . . . for purposes corresponding to the purposes of the 
provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44),” Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland)
Order, 2004, SI 2004/1500 (N. Ir. 9) Explanatory Note para. 1, and tracks the provisions 
of that statute dealing with, inter alia, prosecution appeals.  For a more detailed
discussion of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, see infra text accompanying notes 71–109. 
29. R v. Courtney, [2007] NICA (Crim) 6, [1]-[2], [2007] N.I. 178, 179. 
The prosecution initially sought leave to appeal from Mr. Justice McLaughlin, but he 
denied the application.  Id. at [2], [2007] N.I. at 179. 
30. Id. at [35], [2007] N.I. at 193. 
31. Id., [2007] N.I. at 193. 
32. Id. at [33], [2007] N.I. at 193 (emphasis added). 
33. Id., [2007] N.I. at 193. 
Like the Criminal Justice Act 2003, Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 67 (Eng.), the 
Order in Council provides: 
The Court of Appeal may not reverse a ruling on an appeal . . . unless it is 
satisfied–(a) that the ruling was wrong in law; (b) that the ruling involved an
error of law or principle; or (c) that the ruling was a ruling that it was not 
reasonable for the judge to have made. 
Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order, 2004, SI 2004/1500 (N. Ir. 9) art. 26. 
34. Courtney, [2007] NICA (Crim) 6, [34], [2007] N.I. at 193. 
At the time, the Order in Council provided that the Court of Appeal could not order
either the resumption of the defendant’s trial or a fresh trial “unless it consider[ed] it 
necessary in the interests of justice to do so.”  Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order,
2004, SI 2004/1500 (N. Ir. 9) art. 20(5).  The provision has since been changed to
provide that the Court of Appeal cannot order the acquittal of the defendant “unless it
considers that the defendant could not receive a fair trial if an order were made [to 
resume his trial or that a fresh trial take place].”  Criminal Justice and Immigration Act, 
2008, c. 4, § 45 (Eng.).  The same change was made to the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
Id. § 44. 
35. Courtney, [2007] NICA (Crim) 6, [35], [2007] N.I. at 193. 
36. R v. Courtney, [2007] NICC 11, [1] (N. Ir.). 
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the prosecution, pleaded guilty to manslaughter in connection with the 
death of McCullough,37 on the theory that “he was a secondary figure
not a principal in [the] crime.”38 The trial judge then sentenced him to 
a term of eight years’ imprisonment.39 
The Order in Council permitting the prosecution appeal of “Mo” 
Courtney’s acquittal and allowing him to be retried for the same offense 
of which he had previously been acquitted stems from the Criminal
Justice Act 2003.40  That Act, which applies in England and Wales,41 
grants the government the right to appeal certain rulings by the trial 
judge in criminal prosecutions on an indictment, including a ruling that 
there is no case to answer, i.e., a directed verdict of acquittal,42 and if the
appeal is successful, allows the reviewing court to order that the 
acquitted defendant’s trial be resumed or that the acquitted defendant be 
tried a second time for the same offense.43  This Article analyzes
Parliament’s decision to permit such appeals and to allow the government to
haul a previously-acquitted individual back into court and force him to 
defend himself a second time for the same offense.44 
37. Id.
38. Id. at [9]. 
The prosecution accepted Courtney’s claim that when he drove McCullough to meet 
with members of a paramilitary organization (presumably the UDA), he “contemplated 
that Alan McCullough would be subjected to harm on [the] occasion which might 
include a punishment shooting in the form of a kneecapping,” but that “he did not intend
nor wish such an outcome and in particular that he never contemplated that these other 
persons would go outside the scope of such harm by actually shooting Alan McCullough
to death.”  Id. at [3].  In sentencing Courtney for manslaughter, the trial judge stated that 
“the prosecution have made the decision to accept this plea of manslaughter on the basis 
that [Courtney] brought the deceased to the scene of the fatal shooting . . . but that he did 
not shoot him.” Id.
39. Id. at [10]. 
40. See Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order, 2004, SI 2004/1500 (N. Ir. 9)
Explanatory Note para. 1; Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 334 (Eng.).
41. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 337 (Eng.). 
Although England and Wales are two separate countries, see Interpretation Act, 1978, 
c. 30, sch. 1, para. 1 (Eng.), for the sake of convenience the Author henceforth will use 
the word “England” to encompass both England and Wales. 
42. See infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
43. See infra text accompanying notes 104–05.  For a detailed discussion of the 
provisions of the Act, see infra text accompanying notes 71–109. 
44. The provision allowing government appeals of a trial judge’s ruling of no case
to answer is one of several provisions enacted by Parliament in recent years allowing the 
government to retry a previously-acquitted individual.  Another part of the Criminal
Justice Act 2003, see Criminal Justice Act, 2003, §§ 75–86, allows the government, 
under certain circumstances, to retry a previously-acquitted individual for certain serious 
offenses when “there is new and compelling evidence against the acquitted person,” Id.
§ 78, e.g., R v. Dobson, [2011] EWCA (Crim) 1256, [2011] 2 Crim. App. 8 (Eng.) 
(quashing an individual’s acquittal of murder and allowing his retrial for that crime); R 
v. Dunlop, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 1354, [2007] 1 Crim. App. 8 (Eng.) (same), and the 
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 permits retrial of a previously-acquitted
14
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II. “NO CASE TO ANSWER” 
At the close of the prosecution’s case45 in a criminal trial in England, 
defendant when the initial acquittal was “tainted.”  Criminal Procedure and Investigations 
Act, 1996, c. 25, §§ 54–57 (Eng.).  The Author previously has written about these two 
provisions. See David S. Rudstein, Retrying the Acquitted in England, Part I: The 
Exception to the Rule Against Double Jeopardy for “New and Compelling Evidence,” 8 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 387 (2007) [hereinafter Rudstein, Retrying the Acquitted in 
England, Part I]; David S. Rudstein, Retrying the Acquitted in England, Part II: The 
Exception to the Rule Against Double Jeopardy for “Tainted Acquittals,” 9 SAN DIEGO 
INT’L L.J. 217 (2008) [hereinafter Rudstein, Retrying the Acquitted in England, Part II].
In addition to the appeals permitted by section 58 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the 
prosecution can appeal an acquittal in two other circumstances in England.  First, the
Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 allows the government to appeal an acquittal rendered in a 
magistrates’ court by way of case stated (and if successful, to retry the individual for the
same offense), but such an appeal is limited to a claim that the verdict was either “wrong 
in law” or “in excess of jurisdiction.” Magistrates’ Court Act, 1980, c. 43, § 111(1)
(Eng.); e.g., DPP v. Milton, [2006] EWHC (Admin) 242, [65]–[66], [73], 2006 R.T.R.
21, at 279 (Q.B.) (Eng.) (allowing the government’s appeal of a police officer’s acquittal
for driving dangerously, and remitting the case to the Magistrates’ Court for a rehearing 
by a differently constituted tribunal).  See generally  SPRACK, supra note 16, §§ 27.15– 
.29.  Second, the Administration of Justice Act 1960 allows an applicant in an application for
committal or attachment to appeal “from any order or decision of a court in the exercise 
of jurisdiction to punish for [criminal] contempt of court.”  Administration of Justice 
Act, 1960, c. 65, § 13(1) (Eng.). See also Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, c. 19, § 18A 
(Eng.). In addition to the aforementioned provisions, when a defendant successfully
appeals a conviction to the Court of Appeal and that court enters an order quashing the 
conviction and directing the trial court to enter an acquittal, see Criminal Appeal Act,
1968, § 2(2)–(3), the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 permits the prosecution to appeal to that 
order to the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom.  Id. § 33. 
45. Although such a submission normally ought to be made at the close of the 
prosecution case, “in an exceptional case a judge can consider a submission of no case to 
answer . . . as late as the close of the defence case.”  R v. C., [2007] EWCA (Crim) 854, 
[47] (Eng.) (quoting R v. Speechley, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 3067, [53] (Eng.)). Accord R 
v. Brown, [2001] EWCA (Crim) 961, [8]–[12], [2002] 1 Crim. App. 5, 48–49 (Eng.) 
(reviewing several unreported cases, albeit stating that the power of a judge to rule there 
is no case to answer at the close of all the evidence “should be very sparingly
exercised”); R v. AG’s Reference (No. 2 of 2000), [2001] 1 Crim. App. 36, [21] (Eng.) 
(“A trial judge is not precluded from entertaining and ruling on a submission of no case 
to answer, at the close of the defence case . . . .”). E.g., R v. P., [2007] EWCA (Crim)
3483, [2] (Eng.) (trial judge acceded to defense counsel’s submission of no case to 
answer made at the close of the defense case); R v. Gilbert, [2006] EWCA 3276, [1], [3] 
(Eng.) (same). See also  ARCHBOLD, supra note 15, § 4-292 (reviewing cases).  On the
other hand, a judge may not rule there is no case to answer before the jury has been 
sworn, R v. N. Ltd., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1223, [1], [29], [2009] 1 Crim. App. 3, 58, 67
(Eng.); but see R v. H., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 483, [2]–[3] (Eng.) (stating that upon a 
submission made by the defendant before the jury was sworn, the trial judge concluded
that had the jury been sworn and the prosecution’s evidence been adduced in its then
form, she would have directed verdicts of not guilty, following which the prosecution, at 
the invitation of the judge, offered no evidence and verdicts of not guilty were entered), 
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the defendant can make a submission to the court that he or she has no
case to answer,46 that is, the defendant can make “an application for a 
directed verdict [of not guilty]”47 on the ground the prosecution’s evidence 
is insufficient to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.48 In a case tried by a jury, a submission of no case to answer
normally is made outside the presence of the jury.49  If the trial judge
finds “there is no evidence that the crime alleged has been committed by 
and once the jury is sworn, the judge should not direct a verdict of not guilty before the 
close of the prosecution’s case. N. Ltd., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1223, [1], [26]–[29],
[2009] 1 Crim. App. 3, at 58, 65–67.  See also AG’s Reference (No. 2 of 2000), [2001] 1
Crim. App. 36, at [3], [26]–[27] (holding that “in a prosecution which otherwise ha[s] 
been properly brought and where there is evidence fit to go before a jury, a trial judge
[does not have] power to prevent the prosecution from calling evidence and [cannot]
direct the jury to acquit on the basis that he thinks a conviction is unlikely”). 
46. See  ARCHBOLD, supra note 15, § 4-292; SPRACK, supra note 16, § 20.48; 
WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 44. 
47. WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 44. Accord SPRACK, supra note 16, § 20.52. 
If the defendant fails to make a submission of no case to answer, the trial judge can 
“decide of his own motion that there is no case to answer.”  R v. C., [2007] EWCA 
(Crim) 854, [47] (Eng.) (quoting Speechley, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 3067, [53]).  Accord
Hoang Hai Viet v. R, [1997] H.K.L.R.D. 203, 205 (P.C.) (implying that the trial judge 
has the power to “stop[] the case of his own volition”); SPRACK, supra note 16, § 20.48
(“If the accused is unrepresented, or even if he is but counsel apparently is not going to 
make a submission when one is called for, the judge can raise the matter on his own
initiative.”); WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 47 (stating that if “there is no successful 
submission of no case and the trial runs on,” the trial judge has discretion to “afterwards 
stop the case on his own initiative” “at any time after the close of the prosecution case–
even after all the evidence is in.”). See also  ARCHBOLD, supra note 15, § 7–79
(reviewing cases). 
48. See N. Ltd., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1223, [15], [2009] 1 Crim. App. 3, at 58. 
See also  ARCHBOLD, supra note 15, § 4-293 (“A submission of no case should be 
allowed when there is no evidence upon which, if the evidence adduced were accepted, a 
reasonable jury, properly directed, could convict.”). 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the standard of proof in a criminal case in England. 
Woolmington v. DPP, [1935] A.C. 462 (H.L.) 481-82 (Viscount Sankey) (appeal taken
from Eng.); WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 42–43. 
49. R v. Falconer-Atlee, [1974] 58 Crim. App. 348, 354 (Eng.) (emphasizing that a 
submission of no case to answer “should, as a general rule, be made in the absence of the 
jury and not in their presence,” because the danger exists that “the judge may express a 
view on a matter of fact, which is within the province of the jury,” and because “[t]he
presence of the jury may hamper freedom of discussion between counsel and judge”). 
See also ARCHBOLD, supra note 15, § 4-292 (“Submissions of no case should be made in 
the absence of the jury.”); SPRACK, supra note 16, § 20.52 (explaining that the absence 
of the jury allows “counsel and the judge [to] comment freely upon the quality and 
significance of the evidence without the risk of the jury being influenced by what is
said”). Moreover, because the prosecution can now appeal a trial judge’s ruling of no
case to answer, see infra text accompanying notes 73–79, a trial judge who rules the 
defendant has no case to answer should not immediately tell the jury about that ruling so 
it is possible for the trial to be resumed, e.g., R v. H., [2007] EWCA (Crim) 2056, [2],
[32], [35] (Eng.), if the prosecution successfully appeals the trial judge’s ruling. See R v.
Gilbert, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 3276, [16] (Eng.). 
16
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the defendant,”50 for example, because the prosecution did not introduce 
any evidence relating to an essential element of the offense,51 or if the 
judge concludes “that the prosecution evidence, taken at its highest, is
such that a jury properly directed could not properly convict upon it,”52 
the judge should allow the submission and direct the jury to acquit the
accused.53  On the other hand, if the evidence introduced by the prosecution 
“is such that its strength or weakness depends on the view to be taken of 
a witness’s reliability, or other matters which are generally within the 
province of the jury,”54 and if “on one possible view of the facts there is
50. R v. Galbraith, [1981] 73 Crim. App. 124, 127 (Eng.). 
51. SPRACK, supra note 16, § 20.49 (explaining that this may come about because 
a prosecution witness failed to testify as the government anticipated, or because the 
prosecution relied upon circumstantial evidence to establish an element of the offense
“but the inferences they ask the jury to draw from the evidence cannot reasonably be
drawn”). See also  ENG. LAW COMM’N, REP. NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 7.50 n.30
(stating “[t]his includes the case where there is evidence of some elements of the
offence, but no evidence of one or more other essential elements.”).
52. Galbraith, [1981] 73 Crim. App. at 127. 
Somewhat different rules apply in cases turning on eyewitness identification. As 
explained by the English Law Commission, “where the evidence of identification is 
poor, the judge should look for supporting evidence.  If there is none, he or she should 
allow a submission of no case to answer.” ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER
NO. 158, supra note 25, para. 6.13.   In determining whether the identification evidence 
is “poor,” the judge should examine various factors, such as the length of time the 
witness observed the perpetrator and the lighting conditions.  Id.  Moreover, a judge is 
under a duty, “even in the absence of a defence submission, to act on his or her own 
initiative to withdraw a case from the jury if he or she forms the view that it is
appropriate to do so.”  Id.  In addition, the judge must be satisfied “after the defence case
that the quality of the identification evidence remains sufficient to go to the jury.” Id.
See also ARCHBOLD, supra note 15, §§ 14–12, 14–13; SPRACK, supra note 16, § 20.54. 
53. N. Ltd., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1223, [15], [2009] 1 Crim. App. 3, at 58; R v. 
AG’s Reference (No. 2 of 2000), [2001] 1 Crim. App. 36, [21] (Eng.); ENG. LAW 
COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 7.50; SPRACK, supra note 16, §§ 20.48, 
20.52; WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 44.  See also ARCHBOLD, supra note 15, § 4-293 (“In 
such a case, a directed verdict must be taken from the jury.”).
If the indictment on which the defendant is being tried contains multiple counts and 
the trial judge decides “there is no case to answer on one or more counts, but there is a
case to answer on other counts,” the judge will tell the jury that at the conclusion of the
trial he will direct them to return a verdict of not guilty on those counts for which there is 
no case to answer and that therefore, “for the remainder of the trial, they should ignore 
those counts.” SPRACK, supra note 16, § 20.52.  Once the trial judge has ruled in favor 
of a submission of no case to answer on one count of a multi-count indictment, he cannot 
“change his mind [on that ruling] as a result of further evidence which is called [during 
the trial of the remaining counts].”  R v. Livesey, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 3344, [18], 
[2007] 1 Crim. App. 35, 468 (Eng.) (interpreting the holding in R v. Plain, [1967] 51
Crim. App. 91 (Eng.)). 
54. Galbraith, [1981] 73 Crim. App. at 127. 
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evidence upon which a jury could properly come to the conclusion that 
the defendant is guilty, then the judge should the allow the matter to be 
tried by the jury.”55 
Although a submission of no case to answer is normally made in a 
case being tried by a jury, it can also be made in a summary trial in a 
Magistrates’ Court56 and in a trial on an indictment in those rare
instances in which the judge is the trier of fact.57  When a trial judge
decides a submission of no case to answer in a case being tried without a
jury, she must undertake “precisely the same type of approach”58 as in a
case involving a jury.59
 55. Id.
For more detailed discussions of the submission of no case to answer, see ARCHBOLD, 
supra note 15, §§ 4-292–302, SPRACK, supra note 16, §§ 20.48–.55, and WILLIAMS, 
supra note 16, at 44–49. 
56. Summary trials are conducted in a Magistrates’ Court without a jury.  See 
generally SPRACK, supra note 16, §§ 10.01–.76.  A submission of no case to answer can
be made in such a trial.  ARCHBOLD, supra note 15, § 4-296; SPRACK, supra note 16,  
§ 10.60. E.g., McMillan v. CPS, [2008] EWHC (Admin) 1457, [5] (Eng.); Alabusheva
v. DPP, [2007] EWHC (Admin) 264, [1] (Eng.); R ex rel. DPP v. Humphrey, [2005] 
EWHC (Admin) 822, [2] (Eng.).  See also Chief Constable v. L.O., [2006] NICA (Crim)
3, [1], [2006] N.I. 261, 263. 
57. Historically, a trial on an indictment in England has been by a jury.  SPRACK, 
supra note 16, § 19.01. See also  WHITE PAPER, JUSTICE FOR ALL para. 4.27 (2002) 
[hereinafter JUSTICE FOR ALL], available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/
jfawhitepaper.pdf (stating that the Labour Government would introduce legislation to 
grant defendants in trials on indictment “the right to apply to the court for trial by a judge 
sitting alone”).  Under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, however, a judge may order that a 
trial take place without a jury in serious or complex fraud cases, Criminal Justice Act, 
2003, c. 44, § 43 (Eng.), or when there is evidence that jury tampering will take, or has
taken, place. Id. §§ 44, 46.  In addition, because of the political situation in Northern 
Ireland, indictments charging certain offenses are tried there by a judge sitting without a 
jury.  Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, §§ 65(1), 75(1), sch. 9, pt. 1 (Eng.). E.g., R v. Courtney, 
[2007] NICA (Crim) 6, [19], [2007] N.I. 178. 
58. L.O., [2006] NICA (Crim) 3, [13], [2006] N.I. at 266. Accord Courtney, 
[2007] NICA (Crim) 6, [19], [2007] N.I. at 189.  See also CPS v. S., [2007] EWHC
(Admin) 3313, [11]–[12] (Eng.) (“Whether a submission of no case to answer is made in
the Crown Court or in the Magistrates’ Court, it falls to be dealt with by reference to the 
well-known test in Galbraith. . . .  [M]agistrates who are both judges of the law and the 
tribunal of fact.  However, it remains important that they deal with a submission of no
case to answer as the judges of the law, applying the Galbraith test, to the circumstances
in which they find themselves.”); Moran v. DPP, [2002] EWHC (Admin) 89, [16] (Eng.)
(“[I]f, on applying the Galbraith test, [the magistrates] conclude that there is no case to
answer in respect of a particular allegation, the defendant should there and then be 
acquitted of that allegation . . . .”).
59. The only modification is “that the judge is not required to assess whether a 
properly directed jury could not properly convict on the evidence as it stood at the time” 
the submission was made, 
because, being in effect the jury, the judge can address the issue in terms of 
whether he could ever be convinced of the accused’s guilt.  Where there is 
evidence against the accused, the only basis on which a judge [can] stop the
trial at the direction stage is where he . . . conclude[s] that the evidence was so
discredited or so intrinsically weak that it could not properly support a 
18
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A ruling by the trial judge that the defendant has no case to answer, 
whether in a jury trial or a non-jury trial, results in the defendant’s acquittal
and, traditionally, terminated the prosecution because the government
could neither appeal the ruling60 nor, because of the existence of the plea 
of autrefois acquit (a former acquittal), effectively bring a new prosecution
against the acquitted individual for the same offense.61 
The ability of an accused to submit that he or she has no case to 
answer constitutes “an important safeguard”62 for the accused because it 
“protects him or her from a perverse verdict of guilty by the jury,”63 that 
is, a guilty verdict “contrary to the evidence”64–one “where there was 
nothing in the trial process, save the result, that could raise a ground of
appeal.”65  This safeguard is especially important in cases in which the 
defendant belongs to an unpopular group or to one that is subject to 
discrimination,66 and in cases in which the defendant raises an
“unsavoury”67 defense,68 as well as in cases hinging on eyewitness
conviction.  It is confined to those exceptional cases where the judge can say . . .
that there was no possibility of his being convinced to the requisite standard by
the evidence given for the prosecution. 
L.O., [2006] NICA (Crim) 3, [13], [2006] N.I at 266–67 (quoted in Courtney, [2007] 
NICA (Crim) 6, [19], [2007] N.I. at 178).  In such cases, “the judge should not ask
himself the question, at the close of the prosecution case, ‘do I have a reasonable 
doubt?’.”  Rather, 
[t]he question that he should ask is whether he is convinced that there are no 
circumstances in which he could properly convict.  Where evidence of the
offence charged has been given, the judge [can] only reach that conclusion
where the evidence was so weak or so discredited that it could not conceivably 
support a guilty verdict. 
Id. at [19], [2006] N.I. at 267 (quoted in Courtney, [2007] NICA (Crim) 6, [19], [2007] 
N.I. at 178). 
60. See supra note 25. 
If the trial judge rules in favor of a submission of no case to answer on one count of a 
multi-count indictment, he cannot subsequently “change his mind [on that ruling] as a 
result of further evidence which is called [during the trial of the remaining counts].”  R v.
Livesey, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 3344, [18], [2007] 1 Crim. App. 35, at 468 (Eng.) 
(interpreting the holding in R v. Plain, [1967] 51 Crim. App. 91 (Eng.)). 
61. See supra note 27 and infra text accompanying notes 130–31, 135–47. 
62. ENG. LAWCOMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158, supra note 25, para. 6.14. 
63. Id.
 64. BLACK’S LAWDICTIONARY 1697 (9th ed. 2009) [hereinafter BLACK’S].
65. ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 25, para. 4.5
(stating that a “perverse verdict of guilty” is “a case which would fall only into the 
category formerly described as ‘lurking doubt’ cases . . . .”).



























   
       
  







identification, for “experience has shown that juries may easily be persuaded
by honest but mistaken witnesses.”69  At the core of the protection afforded
an accused by the ability to make a submission of no case to answer “lies 
the burden of proof.  It is for the prosecution to prove guilt, not for the 
defense to prove innocence. The case should not continue if there is no
evidence, or not enough to demand a response.”70 
III. CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 2003
In 2003, Parliament enacted the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (the Act), a 
wide-ranging statute that introduced “radical innovations into English
criminal procedure”71 as part of the Labour Government’s attempt “to
rebalance the criminal justice system in favour of the victim and the
community so as to reduce crime and bring more offenders to justice.”72 
The Act, among other things, grants the prosecution in a trial upon an 
indictment73 the right to appeal74 to the Court of Appeal,75 after 
obtaining leave to do so,76 certain rulings of the trial judge.77  Although 
69. Id.
 70. Id.
The ability of the defendant to submit he has no case to answer also helps to protect 
him at earlier stages of the criminal process, because 
Prosecution decision-makers know from the outset that they must have 
sufficient evidence of each and every element of the offence, or the case will
not get to the jury at all, however persuasive their evidence on another part of 
the case is.  They cannot rely on the defendant proving the case for them.
Id.
 71. Ian Dennis, Prosecution Appeals and Retrials for Serious Offences, [2004]
CRIM. L. REV. 619, 619. 
The Act resulted from the Criminal Justice Bill, which the Government introduced into
the House of Commons in November 2002 as part of its “overall package to reform the 
criminal justice system in England and Wales.”  ANDREWKEOGH, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 
2003: A GUIDE TO THE NEWLAW § 1.1 (2004). 
72. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 57, at 14. 
73. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, §§ 57(1), 58(1) (Eng.). 
A trial on an indictment takes place in the Crown Court, Supreme Court Act, 1981,
c. 003, § 46(1) (Eng.); references to a “judge” in the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 now under discussion are “to a judge of the Crown Court.” Criminal Justice Act, 
2003, § 74(2). 
74. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, §§ 571(1), 58(2). 
75. Id. § 57(3). 
76. The prosecution may bring an appeal only with the leave of the trial judge or
the Court of Appeal.  Id. § 57(4).  Although the prosecution is not required to seek leave 
to appeal from the trial judge, R v. F., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1639, [79] (Eng.), “the 
usual good practice is to apply first to the judge.” Id. at [80]. 
Under the Criminal Procedure Rules adopted pursuant to the Act, see Criminal Justice 
Act, 2003, § 73(1), (2)(a), if the prosecution seeks leave to appeal from the trial judge, it 
must do so by either “apply[ing] orally, with reasons, immediately after the ruling 
against which [it] wants to appeal,”  Criminal Procedure Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709, 
67.5(1)(a) (Eng.), or, if it receives an adjournment to consider whether to appeal, see 
20
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the Act does not list the types of rulings that may be appealed,78 it is
clear the prosecution can appeal a judge’s ruling that there is no case to
answer.79  The prosecution can appeal such a ruling under the Act only
infra text accompanying notes 82–85, by “apply[ing] in writing” following the
adjournment. Criminal Procedure Rules, S.I. 2011/1709, 67.5(1)(b) (Eng.). 
When the prosecution seeks leave to appeal from the trial judge, the trial judge must
decide whether to give permission to appeal “on the day that the application for 
permission is made.”  Criminal Procedure Rules, S.I. 2011/1709, 67.5(4) (Eng.).  In 
deciding whether to allow leave to appeal, the Court of Appeal must “look rather more
widely at the interests of justice than simply . . . ask [itself] whether an appeal has a
realistic prospect of success, or some other test directed solely at the merits of the
appeal.”  R v. Bowers, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2186, [8], [2009] 1 Crim. App. 21, at 283 
(Eng.).  Presumably, the same standard applies to the trial judge when deciding an
application for leave to appeal.
77. The provisions of the Act allowing the prosecution to appeal certain rulings of 
the trial judge took effect on April 4, 2005.  Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Commencement 
No. 8 and Transitional and Saving Provisions) Order 2005, S.I. 2005/950, art. 2(1), sch.
1(4) (Eng.). 
The right of the prosecution to appeal against judicial decisions directing an acquittal
before the jury considers the evidence was “introduced to balance the defendant’s right 
of appeal against both conviction and sentence.”  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, 
Explanatory Notes para. 1(5). 
In addition to the Order in Council granting the prosecution the same right to appeal 
judges’ rulings in criminal prosecutions in Northern Ireland, see supra note 28 and
accompanying text, an order by the Secretary of State, see Armed Forces Act, 2001, c. 
19, § 31 (Eng.), allows the prosecution the identical right to appeal to the Courts-Martial
Appeal Court rulings made by the judge advocate in a trial by court-martial.  Courts-
Martial (Prosecution Appeals) Order, S.I. 2006/1786, art. 3 (Eng.).
78. The Act merely provides that “[t]he prosecution may appeal in respect of,” 
Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(2), “a ruling [made by] a judge . . . in relation to a trial 
on indictment at an applicable time [where] the ruling relates to one or more offences
included in the indictment,” id. § 58(1), and that a “‘ruling’ includes a decision,
determination, direction, finding, notice, order, refusal, rejection or requirement.”  Id. §
74(1). The “applicable time” is “any time . . . before the start of the judge’s summing-up
to the jury,” id. § 58(13), or, if the judge has made an order that the trial is to be 
conducted without a jury because of evidence that jury tampering would take, or has 
taken, place, see id. §§ 44, 46, “the time when the judge would start his summing-up if 
there were a jury.” Id. § 54(4).  In Northern Ireland, when a trial is conducted without a 
jury, see supra note 13, the “applicable time” “includes the time when the judge would
start his summing-up if there were a jury.”  Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order,
2004, SI 2004/1500 (N. Ir. 9) art. 17(14). 
The Act states that the prosecution has no right of appeal under its provisions in
respect of “a ruling that a jury be discharged,” Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 57(2)(a), or
“a ruling from which an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal by virtue of any other
enactment.”  Id. § 57(2)(b). 
79. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(7) (providing that if “the ruling [being
appealed by the prosecution is] a ruling that there is no case to answer,” the prosecution
also can appeal other rulings made by the trial judge relating to the offense or offenses 
that are the subject of the appeal); id. § 61(6)–(8) (dealing with situations in which “the
 21






















   

















if, “immediately after the ruling,”80 it “informs the court that it intends to 
appeal relates to a ruling that there is no case to answer and one or more other rulings”);
id. Explanatory Notes para. 1(276) (explaining that § 58 of the Act “sets out the
procedure that must be followed when the prosecution wishes to appeal against a 
terminating ruling” (emphasis added)); R v. Q., [2011] EWCA (Crim) 1584, [1], [20],
[2011] 2 Crim. App. 25, at 365, 369 (Eng.) (considering and dismissing the prosecution’s 
appeal of a ruling of no case to answer on charges of violating the Protection from 
Eviction Act 1977); R v. P., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 2895, [1], [32] (Wales) (considering
and dismissing the prosecution’s appeal of a ruling of no case to answer on charges of
causing grievous bodily harm); R v. W., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 927, [1], [42] (no jur. 
given) (allowing the prosecution’s appeal of a ruling of no case to answer on charges of
knowingly permitting the deposit of controlled waste and disposing or keeping of
controlled waste); R v. M., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2848, [1], [26] (Eng.) (considering and
dismissing the prosecution’s appeal of rulings of no case to answer on charges of
murder); R v. Thomas, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1682, [1], [46] (Eng.) (allowing the
prosecution leave to appeal the trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer on charges of
murder, but upholding the trial judge’s decision and dismissing the appeal); R v. M.K.,
[2009] EWCA (Crim) 952, [1], [8], [21], [27], [30], [33] (Eng.) (allowing the 
prosecution’s appeal of a ruling of no case to answer on charges of entering into or
becoming concerned in a money laundering arrangement, and ordering a fresh trial); R v.
R., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 683, [1], [18] (Eng.) (allowing the prosecution’s appeal of a 
ruling of no case to answer on a charge of conspiracy to rob, and ordering a fresh trial);
R v. Robson, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 619, [2], [13]–[14], [2008] 2 Crim. App. 38, 559, 
562–63 (Eng.) (allowing the prosecution’s appeal of a ruling of no case to answer and
ordering the respondent’s trial for arranging or facilitating the commission of a child sex
offense to resume on the theory that he could be liable for attempting to commit the
charged offense); R v. P., [2007] EWCA (Crim) 3484, [1], [13] (Eng.) (allowing the 
prosecution’s appeal of a ruling of no case to answer and ordering the respondent’s trial 
for conspiracy to produce cannabis to resume); R v. A., [2007] EWCA (Crim) 2868, [1],
[21] (Eng.) (considering and dismissing the prosecution’s appeal of a ruling of no case to 
answer on charges of concealing or disguising proceeds of criminal conduct and
converting or illegally transferring proceeds of criminal conduct); R v. C., [2007] EWCA 
(Crim) 1862, [1], [42], [60] (Wales) (allowing the prosecution’s appeal of a ruling of no
case to answer on a charge of causing death by dangerous driving, and ordering a fresh
trial).  See also Crown Prosecution Service, Prosecution Rights of Appeal, Part I, Law 
and Procedure, The General Right of Appeal, available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/ 
a_to_c/appeal_prosecution_rights/index.html (“[T]he intention of the 2003 Act is to 
restrict the right of appeal to terminating rulings, such as . . . a ruling of no case to
answer . . . .”); KEOGH, supra note 71, § 9.2.1 (“Appeals will . . . be confined to those
rulings that have the effect of stopping the prosecution and resulting in an acquittal,
effectively rulings of no case to answer, and rulings that have the effect of staying an
indictment.”).
The original bill introduced into the House of Commons provided that “[t]he
prosecution is to have the right of appeal . . . in respect of a terminating ruling– . . . (c)
which is a ruling that there is no case to answer.”  Criminal Justice Bill, 2002, H.C. Bill 
[8] § 50(1)(c) (Eng.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/ 
cmbills/008/2003008.htm.  As enacted, however, the Act does not use the word
“terminating.” Courts nonetheless frequently state that the Act gives the prosecution the 
right to appeal a “terminating ruling.”  E.g., R v. B., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 99, [3], [20]
(Eng.); R v. A., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2186, [1]–[2], [9], [2009] 1 Crim. App. 21,  281, 
283 (Eng.).
80. Criminal Procedure Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709, 67.2(1)(a) (Eng.). Accord R 
v. N.T., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 711, [13], [2010] 2 Crim. App. 12, 89 (Eng.) (dictum) 
(stating that the provision of the criminal procedure rule “plainly represent[s] a correct 
interpretation of” the statutory provision);  CPS v. C., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2614, [42]
22
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appeal,”81 or, alternatively, “immediately after the ruling”82 it requests an
adjournment,83 and if one is granted,84 it “informs the court following the
adjournment that it intends to appeal.”85  However, the prosecution may 
(Eng.) (dictum); R v. A.T., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 668, [7]–[8] (Eng.) (refusing to
consider “whether the Act and the Rules allow for any flexibility in more meritorious 
cases than this one”); R v. Arnold, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1034, [23], [2008] 2 Crim.
App. 37, at 552 (Eng.) (interpreting the identical provision in Courts-Martial (Prosecution
Appeals) Order 2006/1786 (Eng.) to require such notice “immediately following the 
ruling”).
81. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(4)(a)(i), (b).
82. Criminal Procedure Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709, 67.2(2)(a) (Eng.).  Accord
N.T., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 711, [13], [2010] 2 Crim. App. 12, at 89 (dictum) (stating
that the provision of the criminal procedure rule “plainly represent[s] a correct
interpretation of” the statutory provision). 
In R v. Grindy, [2006] NICA (Crim) 10, [2006] N.I. 290, the Northern Ireland Court of
Appeal held that in determining whether the prosecution’s application for an
adjournment was made “immediately following the making of [the] ruling,” the “crucial
factor . . . is not the period of time that . . . elapsed between the ruling and the application 
but the occurrence of a decisive intermediate event,” id. at [24], [2006] N.I. at 297, that 
“frustrate[d] the implementation of the . . . statutory scheme,” id. at [22], [2006] N.I. at 
297, such as the discharge of the jury which precludes the defendant from seeking an 
expedited hearing of the appeal so that, if the trial judge’s ruling is reversed, the trial can
be resumed. Id. at [24], [2006] N.I. at 297. Nevertheless, the court in Grindy also
concluded “that the prosecution is not precluded from applying for leave to appeal solely
because it has failed to comply with the requirement that it either apply immediately for
an adjournment to consider whether to appeal or inform the judge immediately of its 
intention to appeal.” Id. at [27], [2006] N.I. at 298 (emphasis added). 
83. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(4)(a)(ii). 
84. See id. § 58(5) (“If the prosecution requests an adjournment . . . , the judge 
may grant such an adjournment.”).  The applicable criminal procedure rule indicates that 
the judge normally should grant a request for an adjournment.  Criminal Procedure 
Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709, 67.2(2)(b) (Eng.) (“[T]he general rule is that the judge must
not require the appellant to decide there and then [whether he wants to appeal].”) It also 
indicates that the adjournment generally should be only “until the next business day.” 
Criminal Procedure Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709, 67.2(2)(b) (Eng.).  But see R v. H., 
[2008] EWCA (Crim) 483, [10]–[12] (Eng.) (holding that the court has the power to 
grant a greater extension of time than “until the next business day”).  The original
version of the rule was more specific on these points.  It provided that “[t]he judge of the
court shall grant the request [for an adjournment] unless it is in the interests of justice for
the prosecutor to indicate immediately whether or not he intends to seek leave to 
appeal,” and that “[t]he adjournment shall be until the next business day after the day on
which the ruling was given, unless the interests of justice require a longer adjournment.” 
Criminal Procedure Rules, 2005, S.I. 2005/384, 66.2 (Eng.) (superseded) (emphasis 
added).
85. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(4)(b). 
When the judge’s ruling relates to two or more offenses, any “of those offences may
be the subject of the appeal,” id. § 58(6)(a), but “if the prosecution informs the court . . . 
that it intends to appeal, it must at the same time inform the court of the offence or
offences which are the subject of the appeal.” Id. § 58(6)(b). 
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not inform the court it intends to appeal “unless, at or before that time,”86 
it further informs the court that it concurs that the defendant should be 
acquitted of the offense in question if either leave to appeal is not 
obtained or the prosecution abandons its appeal before the Court of Appeal
determines it.87 
When “the prosecution informs the court . . . that it intends to appeal, the
[trial] judge must decide whether . . . the appeal should be expedited.”88 
If the prosecution informs the court that it intends to appeal a ruling of no case to
answer, it may also appeal one or more other rulings made by the trial judge relating to
the offense or offenses that are the subject of the appeal. Id. § 58(7) (provided the 
prosecution identifies the other ruling or rulings at the same time it informs the judge of 
its intention to appeal the ruling of no case to answer). 
Lord Goldsmith, the Attorney General, justified this provision in the House of Lords, 
stating:
[A] ruling of no case to answer . . . may well be preceded by a number of 
earlier rulings, each of them incrementally weakening the prosecution case.
The effect of some or all of those earlier rulings might contribute significantly
to the judge’s eventual decision to make the ruling of no case to answer. 
For that reason, where the prosecution appeals against a ruling of no case to 
answer, we consider that it should be able to nominate such earlier rulings as it 
specifies for the Court of Appeal to review at the same time all as part of the
same appeal.  It seems to us that it is only sensible and logical that where the
prosecution appeals against a ruling of no case to answer there should be 
arrangements for the Court of Appeal to examine formally those earlier rulings 
which led up to the eventual ruling of no case.  In that way the Court of Appeal 
will have a better grasp of the case and as a whole will be able to review more
effectively the judge’s terminating ruling.
654 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2003) 444. 
If “the prosecution informs the court . . . that it intends to appeal [a ruling, the] 
[p]roceedings may . . . continue[] in respect of any offense [that] is not the subject of the 
appeal.”  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 60. 
86. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(8). 
87. Id. § 58(8)–(9). 
The prosecution’s agreement to this effect has been labeled an “acquittal agreement.” 
See R v. N.T., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 711, [9], [15], [2010] 2 Crim. App. 12, at 87, 89
(Eng.); CPS v. C., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2614, [35] (Eng.); R v. L., [2008] EWCA 
(Crim) 1970, [7], [2009] 1 Crim. App. 16, at 233 (Eng.); R v. N. Ltd., [2008] EWCA 
(Crim) 1223, [27], [2009] 1 Crim. App. 3, at 66 (Eng.); R v. Arnold, [2008] EWCA 
(Crim) 1034, [1], [24], [2008] 2 Crim. App. 37, at 546, 552 (Eng.); R v. R., [2008] 
EWCA (Crim) 370, [19] (Eng.). See also R v. B., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 99, [14], [23]
(Eng.) (“acquittal undertaking”).  In such an agreement, the prosecution’s undertaking 
must be clear. See R v. Jamison, [2008] NICA 32, [4], [8] (holding insufficient the 
prosecution’s statement that “the prosecution are well aware of the rest of the provisions 
of th[e] article [allowing the prosecution in Northern Ireland to appeal], in particular, 
clause (8) and (9),” which set forth the requirement of an acquittal agreement).  If the 
prosecution does not give an “acquittal agreement” “at or before” the time it informs the
court it intends to appeal a ruling, the prosecution cannot appeal. N.T., [2010] EWCA 
(Crim) 711, [18], [2010] 2 Crim. App. 12, at 90; C., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2614, [40]– 
[41]; Arnold, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1034, [24], [26], [40], [2008] 2 Crim. App. 37, at 
552, 553, 557 (under the military-law equivalent of § 58(8)); Jamison, [2008] NICA 
(Crim) 32, [8]–[9], [13], [15] (under the Northern Ireland equivalent of § 58(8)).
88. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 59(1). 
24
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If the judge concludes that the appeal should be expedited, he or she can
order an adjournment of the trial.89  If, on the other hand, the judge
determines the appeal should not be expedited, he can either order an
adjournment of the trial90 or discharge the jury, if one has been empaneled.91 
A ruling by the trial judge has no effect during the period in which the 
prosecution can inform the court it intends to appeal that ruling,92 nor
during the pendency of any appeal it decides to pursue.93  In addition,  
“any consequences of the ruling . . . also . . . have no effect,”94 and “the
[trial] judge may not take any steps in consequence of the ruling.”95 
However, if the judge does take any steps, those steps are also to have no
effect.96 
On appeal,97 “the Court of Appeal may confirm, reverse or vary [the
trial judge’s] ruling.”98  It may not, however, reverse a ruling “unless it
If the prosecution wants the judge to expedite the appeal, it must request the judge to 
do so, giving reasons, when it informs the judge that it intends to appeal. Criminal
Procedure Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709, 67.6(1) (Eng.). 
89. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 59(2). 
If the trial judge decides the appeal should be expedited, he or the Court of Appeal, 
can subsequently reverse that decision.  If it is reversed, the trial judge can either order
an adjournment of the trial or discharge the jury if one has been empanelled. Id. § 59(4). 
90. Id. § 59(3)(a).
91. Id. § 59(3)(b). 
92. Id. § 58(3)–(4). 
93. Id. § 58(10). 
94. Id. § 58(11)(a).
95. Id. § 58(11)(b). 
96. Id. § 58(11)(c).
According to one commentator, sections 58(11)(b) and (c) mean, among other things,
that the trial judge, as a consequence of the ruling of no case to answer, cannot release 
the acquitted defendant on bail pending the appeal, “if that decision flowed from the 
judge’s view that there was no evidence against the defendant.”  KEOGH, supra note 71, 
§ 9.2.5. The case involving William “Mo” Courtney, see supra text accompanying notes 
10–39, is not inconsistent with this view.  Although Courtney was on bail following the 
trial judge’s ruling in his murder trial that he had no case to answer, see R v. Courtney, 
[2007] NICC 11, [8] (N. Ir.) (noting that Courtney “has been on bail . . . since November
2006,” which was when the trial judge ruled he had no case to answer),  and the Order in 
Council concerning prosecution appeals in Northern Ireland contains provisions identical 
to those contained in sections 58(11)(b) and (c) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, see
Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order, 2004, SI 2004/1500 (N. Ir. 9) art. 17(11)(b), 
(c), Courtney’s release on bail was not a consequence of the trial judge’s ruling of no 
case to answer.  For Courtney had been free on bail prior to his trial for murder. 
Courtney, [2007] NICC 11, [5], [8] (noting that Courtney was released on bail in May
2005, pending his murder trial). 
97. If the prosecution does not obtain leave to appeal, or if it abandons the appeal
before the Court of Appeal determines it, the defendant must be acquitted of the offense 
in question. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(12) (Eng.).
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is satisfied”99 that the ruling either “was wrong in law,”100 “involved an
error of law or principle,”101 or “was a ruling that was not reasonable for
the judge to have made.”102  If the Court of Appeal confirms the ruling,
it must order the defendant acquitted of the offense or offenses in
question.103  Conversely, if the court “reverses or varies the ruling, it must,”
with respect to each offense in question, “order that proceedings for [the] 
offence may be resumed”104 or “that a fresh trial may take place . . . for 
[the same] offence,”105 or, if the court determines the defendant could
not receive a fair trial if the trial were resumed or at a new trial,106 it 
must order that the defendant be acquitted of the offense in question.107 
The decision of the Court of Appeal can, with leave,108 be appealed to
the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom by either the defendant or the 
prosecutor.109 
98. Id. § 61(1). 
99. Id. § 67. 
100. Id. § 67(a). 
101. Id. § 67(b). 
102. Id. § 67(c). 
103. Id. § 61(3), (6)–(7). 
104. Id. § 61(4)(a).  See also id. § 61(6), (8) (dealing with the situation in which the
prosecution is appealing additional rulings by the trial judge).
105. Id. § 61(4)(b). See also id. § 61(6), (8) (dealing with the situation in which the 
prosecution is appealing additional rulings by the trial judge).
106. Id. § 61(5). 
107. Id. § 61(4)(c). See also id. § 61(8) (dealing with the situation in which 
additional rulings by the trial judge are being appealed).
The Act also prohibits a publication from including a report of various actions taken
pursuant to the Act, Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 71, including an appeal by the
prosecution. Id. § 71(1)(b). The Act does, however, permit the trial judge, the Court of
Appeal, and the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom to order that some or all of these 
prohibitions not apply, or not apply to a specified extent.  Id. § 71(2)–(4). For purposes 
of the restrictions on reporting, “‘publication’ includes any speech, writing, relevant 
programme [i.e., a programme included in a programme service as defined in the 
Broadcasting Act 1990, Broadcasting Act, 1990, c. 42, § 201 (Eng.)] or other communication
in whatever form, which is addressed to the public at large or any section of the public.” 
Id. § 71(11).  A violation of any restrictions imposed on reporting constitutes a criminal 
offense, punishable by a fine. Id. § 72. 
108. Leave to appeal must be obtained from either the Court of Appeal or the 
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom.  Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, c. 19, § 33(2) 
(Eng.). Such leave shall not be granted unless it is certified by the Court of Appeal that a 
point of law of general public importance is involved in the decision,” id., and in 
addition, “it appears to the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court (as the case may be)
that the point is one which ought to be considered by the Supreme Court.”  Id. 
109. Id. § 33(1), as amended by Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 68(1). 
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IV. PROSECUTION APPEALS AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY
A. The Double Jeopardy Principle 
The principle that a person should not be tried twice for the same 
offense—what in Anglo-American legal systems is called the rule
against “double jeopardy”110—is accepted throughout the world.111  In  
110. E.g., Connelly v. DPP, [1964] A.C. 1254 (H.L.) 1346, 1348 (Lord Devlin) 
(appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.); In re D., [2006] EWCA (Crim) 828, [4], [2006] 2 Crim. 
App. 18, at 289 (Eng.); Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 466 (2005); Crist v. Bretz, 
437 U.S. 28, 32–33 (1978); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957); Criminal 
Justice Act, 2003, Explanatory Notes para. 1(40); ARCHBOLD, supra note 15, § 4-157.
See also  SPRACK, supra note 16, § 17.42.  But see  SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION,
DISCUSSION PAPER ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY (Discussion Paper No. 141) paras. 1.3, 1.10
(2009) [hereinafter SCOTTISH LAW COMM’N, DOUBLE JEOPARDY] (stating that “‘[d]ouble 
jeopardy’ is not a technical term of Scots law,” but that “Scots law speaks of a principle 
that a person shall not be made to thole an assize more than once,” which “translates 
directly to a rule against successive trials or, in other words, double jeopardy”). 
English legal scholar Glanville Williams stated that because the doctrine applies in 
England only when there has been an acquittal or a conviction, see infra note 130, “the 
expression ‘double jeopardy’ . . . is misleading for English law,” because “[t]he defence 
is not given to a person merely because he was previously at risk of being convicted.”
WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 164. 
The Scottish Law Commission, whose work product is cited in this and a subsequent 
note, is a body of not more than five Commissioners appointed by the Scottish Ministers. 
Law Commissions Act, 1965, c. 22, § 2(1) (Eng.).  Parliament established the Law 
Commission in 1965, at the same time it established the English Law Commission, see 
supra note 25, “[f]or the purpose of promoting the reform of the law of Scotland.”  Law 
Commissions Act, 1965, c. 22, § 2(1) (Eng.).  Its charge is identical to that of the English
Law Commission. Id. § 3(1).  For the charge of the Commissions, see supra note 25. 
111. MODEL CRIMINAL CODE OFFICERS’ COMM. OF THE STANDING COMM. OF THE
ATTORNEYS-GENERAL, MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER, CHAPTER 2, ISSUE 
ESTOPPEL, DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND PROSECUTION APPEALS AGAINST ACQUITTALS 1 n.5
(2003) [hereinafter AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER] (noting 
that the double jeopardy “principle stands in constitutional status in over 50 countries”); 
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying 
International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National 
Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 235, 289, & n.262 (1993) (asserting that 
“[t]he right to protection from double jeopardy and non bis in idem  [see infra note 115
and text accompanying notes 115–16] are found in over fifty national constitutions,” and 
listing those constitutional provisions). See also Gerald Conway, Ne Bis in Idem in 
International Law, 3 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 217, 217 (2003) (stating that “the maxim ne bis 
in idem” [see infra notes 115–16 and accompanying text], or “the rule against double 
jeopardy, is prevalent among the legal systems of the world”). 
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: “7. No 
one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already
been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of 
each country.”  United Nations Convention for the Protection of Civil and Political
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the United States, for example, the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution 
guarantees that “[n]o person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb,”112 while in Canada, the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms states that “[a]ny person charged with an
offence has the right . . . if finally acquitted of the offence, not to be tried
for it again, and if finally found guilty and punished for the offence, not 
to be tried or punished for it again.”113  Similarly, the Constitution of
India provides: “No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the 
same offence more than once.”114  Most, if not all, countries on the
European continent recognize the principle of ne bis in idem,115 which 
provides that a person should not be prosecuted more than once for the 
same offense.116 
Rights, art. 14, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force
Mar. 12, 1976). 
For brief histories of the protection of double jeopardy, see DAVID S. RUDSTEIN,
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 1–15 (2004); JAY A. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 1–21 (1969); GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE
JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, THE LAW 72–84 (1998); and David S. Rudstein, A Brief 
History of the Fifth Amendment Guarantee Against Double Jeopardy, 14 Wm. & Mary
Bill Rts. J. 193, 196–232 (2005). 
112. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
113. Constitution Act, 1982, pt. I, § 11(h) (U.K.). 
114. INDIA CONST. art. 20, § 2. See also New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990,
§ 26(2) (“No one who has been finally acquitted or convicted of, or pardoned for, an 
offence shall be tried or punished for it again.”); Crimes Act 1961, § 357(1) (N.Z.) (“The 
following special pleas . . . may be pleaded according to the provisions hereinafter 
contained—that is to say, a plea of previous acquittal, a plea of previous conviction, and
a plea of pardon.”); S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 35(3)(m) (“Every accused person has a right 
to a fair trial, which includes the right not to be tried for an offence in respect of an act or 
omission for which that person has previously been either acquitted or convicted . . . .”); 
ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 25, app. B (setting forth 
the law of double jeopardy in a variety of countries). 
115. Maria Fletcher, Some Developments to the ne bis in idem Principle in the
European Union: Criminal Proceedings Against Hüseyn Gözütok and Klaus Brügge, 66 
M.L.R. 769, 770 (2003) (asserting that the ne bis  idem “rule is recognized in some form
within the domestic legal systems of all the European Economic Area Member States”); 
Dietrich Oehler, Recognition of Foreign Penal Judgements: The European System, in 2 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 607, 613 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999)
(asserting that in Europe “every state founded on constitutional principles acknowledges 
the principle of ne bis idem [sic] as a national maxim”).  See generally id. at 613–18. 
The principle is sometimes stated as non bis in idem. SCOTTISH LAW COMM’N, DOUBLE
JEOPARDY, supra note 110, para. 1.10; e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 111, at 288. 
116. Conway, supra note 111, at 217 (stating that the maxim ne bis in idem
expresses “[t]he principle that a person should not be prosecuted more than once for the 
same criminal conduct”); Fletcher, supra note 115, at 770 (“The ne bis in idem rule . . .
states that no-one shall be prosecuted or tried twice for the same acts and for the same
criminal behaviour.”); ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 1.13 
n.15 (translating ne bis in idem as: “A person may not be prosecuted twice for the same 
thing.”). See also BLACK’S, supra note 64, at 1853 (defining non (ne) bis in idem as 
“[n]ot twice for the same thing, [t]hat is, a person shall not be twice tried for the same
28
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Barring the government117 from prosecuting an individual a second 
time for the same offense following his trial and acquittal serves a 
number of related and often overlapping interests, of both the individual 
and society as a whole.118 First, it implements the “public policy that
there should be finality in litigation.”119  Second, it minimizes the “distress
and trauma of the trial process.”120  Third, it reduces the risk of erroneously
crime”).  The maxim sometimes is translated as “nobody should be punished more than 
once for the same offense.” E.g., Oehler, supra note 115, at 613. 
Conway explains that “[t]he phrase is derived from the Roman law maxim nemo 
(debet) bis vexari pro una et eadam causa (a man shall not be twice vexed or tried for
the same cause).” Conway, supra note 111, at 217 n.1, 221.  See also BLACK’S, supra
note 64, at 1849 (translating the maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa
as: “No one ought to be twice troubled for one and the same cause.”). 
117. For the sake of convenience, the Author will discuss the rule against double 
jeopardy in terms of a limitation upon the government.  The Author recognizes that, at 
least in England, a private individual can bring a prosecution, see Prosecution of 
Offences Act, 1985, c. 23, §§ 1, 6 (establishing a prosecuting service for England and 
Wales, but expressly reserving, with certain exceptions, the right of a private individual 
to institute and conduct criminal proceedings); WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 5; e.g., 
Hayter v. L., [1998] W.L.R. 854, 855–56, 858–59 (Q.B.D.) (allowing a private
prosecution of two youths for the offenses of affray and assault occasioning actual bodily
harm to proceed), and that the autrefois rule, see supra note 27, and infra text
accompanying notes 130–31, 135–47, applies to such private prosecutions.  E.g., Sir 
William Macpherson of Cluny, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS, 
para. 2.3 (1999), http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm42/4262/
4262.htm (“Three of the prime suspects [in the unlawful killing of Stephen Lawrence]
were taken to trial in 1996 in a private prosecution [for murder] which failed because of
the absence of any firm and sustainable evidence.  The trial resulted in the acquittal of all 
three accused.  They can never be tried again in any circumstances in the present state of 
the law.” (emphasis deleted)); id.at para. 43.47 (“The result of the unsuccessful [private] 
prosecution was that the three men who were acquitted can never be tried again . . . .”).
See also 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *335 (stating that “an acquittal on an appeal [a 
form of private prosecution] is a good bar to an indictment on the same offence” “[a]nd
so, also, was an acquittal on an indictment a good bar to an appeal by the common law”).
Such prosecutions are relatively rare, however. See SPRACK, supra note 16, § 4.20. 
118. The discussion in the text is limited to those policies relating to the prohibition 
against trying an individual following his previous acquittal for the same offense. 
119. DPP v. Humphrys, [1977] A.C. 1 (H.L.) 27 (Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone)
(appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (quoting Mills v. Cooper [1967] 2 Q.B. 459, 469 
(Eng.)).  Accord  ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, paras. 4.11–.13,
4.16–.19; ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 25, para. 4.8
(“[T]he public interest requires finality of litigation, including criminal litigation.”); ENG.
LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 25, para. 4.8 (“[T]he public 
interest requires finality of litigation, including criminal litigation . . . .” (footnote
omitted); United States v. Di Francesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128 (1980) (“It has been said that
‘a’ . . . ‘primary purpose’ of the [guarantee against double jeopardy is] ‘to preserve the 
finality of judgments’ . . . .” (quoting Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978)). 
120. ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 25, para 4.7. 
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convicting an innocent person.121  Fourth, it protects the power of the
jury, acting as representatives of the community,122 to acquit an 
individual against the evidence, that is, to find the individual not guilty 
even though sufficient evidence of his guilt exists.123  Fifth, it “encourage[s]
efficient investigation”124 of crimes by the police and efficient prosecution 
of individuals charged with crimes.125  Sixth, it helps to conserve scarce
prosecutorial and judicial resources.126  Seventh, it helps to prevent police
and prosecutors from using the criminal process to harass an individual 
who has been tried and acquitted.127  Finally, it helps to maintain the
public’s respect for, and confidence in, the legal system.128 
Accord Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957) (stating that one of the 
underlying concerns of the protection against double jeopardy “is that the State with all 
its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and 
ordeal”).
121. ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 156, supra note 25, para. 4.5; Green, 355 
U.S. at 187–88. 
122. Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double 
Jeopardy, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 130. 
123. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 130 n.11 (quoting Peter Westen, The Three Faces of
Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH.
L. REV. 1001, 1012, 1063 (1980)).
124. ENG. LAWCOMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 4.3. 
125. Ian Dennis, Rethinking Double Jeopardy: Justice and Finality in Criminal 
Process, 2000 CRIM. L. REV. 933, 941 (Eng.).  See also  FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 4 
(“It is to the first trial . . . that [the] efforts [of the prosecutor] should be directed.”). 
126. FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 4.
127. Id. at 3–4; AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER supra note 
111, at 2; ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 4.14; NEWZEALAND
LAW COMMISSION, REPORT 70: ACQUITTAL FOLLOWING PERVERSION OF THE COURSE OF
JUSTICE para. 12 (2001) [hereinafter N.Z. LAWCOMM’N, REPORT 70]. 
The New Zealand Law Commission, whose work product is cited in this and 
subsequent notes in this Article, is a body comprising no fewer than three, and no more
than six, members, established by the New Zealand Parliament in 1985.  Law Commission 
Act 1985, § 9(1) (N.Z.).  Its members are appointed by the Governor-General on the 
recommendation of the Cabinet.  E-mail from Margaret Thompson, Special Projects 
Advisor, N.Z. Law Comm’n, to David S. Rudstein, Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent 
Coll. of Law (Feb. 14, 2007, 20:18 CST) (on file with author). The principal functions 
of the Commission are—
(a) to take and keep under review in a systematic way the law of New 
Zealand: 
(b)  to make recommendations for the reform and development of the law of
New Zealand: 
(c) to advise on the review of any aspect of the law of New Zealand conducted by
any Government department or organisation . . . and on proposals made as 
a result of the review: 
(d) to advise the Minister of Justice and the responsible Minister on ways in 
which the law of New Zealand can be made as understandable and accessible
as practicable.
Law Commission Act 1985, § 5(1) (N.Z.). 
128. FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 4; Connelly v. DPP, [1964] A.C. 1254 (H.L.) 
1353 (Lord Devlin) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). 
30
RUDSTEIN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2012 9:10 AM      
 






     
 
 

























[VOL. 13:  5, 2011] Retrying the Acquitted in England 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
B. English Double Jeopardy Law 
The precise scope of the protection against double jeopardy may differ 
from country to country.129  In England, the protection against double
129. For example, in England, the protection afforded by the autrefois rule, see 
infra text accompanying notes 130–31, 135–47, applies only following an acquittal or a 
conviction. ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 2.6 (“For a plea
of autrefois to succeed there must previously have been a valid acquittal or conviction.” 
(emphasis deleted)); id. at para. 6.8 (“The double jeopardy rule . . . does not apply if the 
proceedings come to an end without the defendant being finally pronounced either guilty
or not guilty.”); ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 25, para. 
3.34 (“There are a number of ways in which an English court’s consideration of an 
alleged offence can end without the defendant being acquitted or convicted, with the 
result that he or she can be prosecuted again for the same offence.”); WILLIAMS, supra
note 16, at 164 (“The defence[s] [of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict are] not given
to a person merely because he was previously at risk of being convicted.  The earlier
proceedings must have gone to their conclusion.”).  In the United States, however, a 
person is placed in “jeopardy” (i.e., jeopardy “attaches”) at that point in a proceeding 
when she is “put to trial before the trier of the facts,” Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 
377, 388 (1975) (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality
opinion)), so that under some circumstances the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a 
second trial of an individual for the same offense even though her first trial ended
prematurely without a judgment of either conviction or acquittal, e.g., Jorn, 400 U.S. at 
487 (plurality opinion) (concluding that the double jeopardy provision prohibited retrial 
following the trial judge’s sua sponte declaration of a mistrial to allow several
government witnesses the opportunity to consult with attorneys about their privilege
against self-incrimination); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 737–38 (1963) 
(holding that the double jeopardy provision prohibited retrial following the trial judge’s 
declaration of a mistrial, at the prosecutor’s request and over the defendant’s objection,
because of the absence of a key government witness). See generally RUDSTEIN, supra
note 111, at 43–73.  Similarly, in the United States the principle of collateral estoppel, 
see Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970), more recently called issue preclusion, 
see, e.g., Yeager v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2360, 2367 n.4 (2009); Bobby v. Bies, 129 
S. Ct. 2145, 2149 n.1 (2009), applies in criminal cases, e.g., Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444–46 
(holding that the rule of collateral estoppel “is embodied in the Fifth Amendment 
guarantee against double jeopardy” and that therefore an individual’s acquittal for 
robbing one participant in a poker game, in a trial in which the only issue was the 
identity of the robber, barred a subsequent prosecution of the same individual for robbing
a second participant in the poker game); see generally  RUDSTEIN, supra note 111, at 
126–32; whereas in England it does not.  DPP v. Humphrys, [1977] A.C. 1 (H.L.) 21
(Viscount Dilhorne) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.); id. at 43–44 (Lord Salmon); id. at
48 (Lord Edmund-Davies); id. at 58 (Lord Fraser of Tullybelton); but see infra text 
accompanying notes 132–34.  On the other hand, a person charged with an offense in
England can plead autrefois acquit or autrefois convict based upon a former acquittal or
a former conviction, as the case may be, in another country, Treacy v. DPP, [1971] A.C.
537 (H.L. 1970) 562 (Lord Diplock) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (“[T]he common
law doctrine of autrefois convict and autrefois acquit . . . has always applied whether the 
previous conviction or acquittal based on the same facts was by an English court or by a 
foreign court . . . .” (italics added)); ARCHBOLD, supra note 15, § 4-145a; ENG. LAW 
COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 2.6 n.9, while in the United States, two 
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jeopardy comprises the pleas of autrefois acquit (a former acquittal) and 
autrefois convict (a former conviction)130—together which form “the
autrefois rule”131—and “a special application of the abuse of process 
rules,”132 under which the trial judge has “the discretion to stay proceedings
which would be an abuse of the process of the court”133 when the
“defendant has already been acquitted or convicted on the same or 
substantially the same facts.”134 
separate sovereigns (i.e., two states; the federal government and a state; or the federal 
government and a foreign country) can each prosecute an individual for the same
conduct.  E.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 83–84, 86–87 (1985) (holding that the 
State of Alabama could try an individual for the capital offense of murder during a 
kidnaping even though the State of Georgia had previously tried and convicted him of 
murder based upon the same homicide); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 187–89, 
196 (1959) (holding that an individual’s trial and conviction in an Illinois state court for
conspiring to injure or destroy property of another did not bar his subsequent prosecution 
by the United States for conspiring to destroy property of a telephone company, even
though both prosecutions were based upon the same conduct); United States v. Rezaq, 
134 F.3d 1121, 1127–28 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that an individual’s prosecution and
conviction in Malta for murder, attempted murder, and hostage-taking did not bar his 
subsequent prosecution by the United States for air piracy, even though both
prosecutions arose from the same incident).  See generally RUDSTEIN, supra note 111, at 
84–92. 
130. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, Explanatory Notes para. 1(40) (Eng.);
ARCHBOLD, supra note 15, §§ 4-114, 4-116 to –119, 4-131 to –135, 4-157; ENG. LAW 
COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 1.14 & n.16; SPRACK, supra note 16,  
§§ 17.42–.43.  See also 3 EDWARD COKE, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
213–14 (London, W. Lee & D. Parkman 1644); 2 MATTHEW HALE, [HISTORIA PLACITORIUM
CORONAE] THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN *240–*55; 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS,
A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 368–79 (Arno Press 1972) (2d ed. corrected
1726).
131. ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 2.1 (italics added 
and internal quotation marks deleted).  See infra text accompanying notes 135–47. 
132. ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 2.14. See infra text 
accompanying notes 148–55. 
The Law Commission explained:
The general principles of abuse of process as they are now understood cover
cases in which it is not possible for the defendant to receive a fair trial, and
cases in which, although the defendant could be fairly tried, it is unfair to put 
him or her on trial.  In the first category are cases in which there has been a
delay between the commission of the offence and the trial, where potential
evidence has been lost or destroyed, or there has been prejudicial pre-trial
publicity.  The second category includes cases in which the prosecution has 
gone back on promises not to prosecute or to discontinue proceedings, or
where the defendant has been brought within the jurisdiction in unlawful or 
unconscionable ways. 
ENG. LAWCOMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 2.14 (footnotes omitted). 
133. ENG. LAWCOMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 2.1. 
134. Id. Accord Connelly v. DPP, [1964] A.C. 1254 (H.L.) 1347, 1350–54, 1356–
60 (Lord Devlin) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.); id. at 1296 (Lord Reid); id. at 1362– 
68 (Lord Pearce); Criminal Justice Act, 2003, Explanatory Notes para. 1(40) (“[T]he
courts may consider it an abuse of process for additional charges to be brought, 
following an acquittal or conviction, for different offences which arose from the same
32
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The autrefois rule provides “that no-one may be put in peril twice for
the same offence,”135 so if “a person has previously been acquitted[136] or 
convicted (or could, by an alternate verdict, have been convicted of an 
offence) and is later charged on indictment with the same offence, a plea
of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict, as the case may be,] will bar the 
prosecution.”137  As Blackstone explained over two hundred years ago,
these special pleas in bar “give a reason why the prisoner ought not to 
answer [the indictment] at all, nor put himself upon his trial for the crime 
alleged.”138  Both pleas, he explained, are based upon the “universal
behaviour or facts.” (emphasis deleted)). See also  ARCHBOLD, supra note 15, § 4-48 
(discussing Connelly).
135. ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 2.2.  See also
SPRACK, supra note 16, § 17.42 (“It is a vital constitutional principle that no one should
be prosecuted twice to acquittal or conviction for the same offence.”). 
136. Neither the discharge of an individual by the examining justices at a committal 
proceeding to determine whether the individual should be sent to the Crown Court for 
tial, R v. Manchester City Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Snelson, [1978] 66 Crim. 
App. 44, 45 (Div. Ct.) (Eng.), nor the quashing of indictment, see In re Smalley, [1985] 
A.C. 622 (H.L.) 641 (Lord Bridge of Harwich) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (“The
quashing of an indictment is not a judgment of acquittal . . . .”  (quoting R v. Chairman 
of London Country Quarter Sessions ex parte Downes, [1953] 37 Crim. App. 148, 153, 
[1954] 1 Q.B. 1, 7 (Eng.))), constitutes an “acquittal” for purposes of the plea of
autrefois acquit. On the other hand, when a convicted defendant successfully appeals 
her conviction to the Court of Appeal, unless the court exercises its power to order the 
defendant be retried, see Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, c. 19, § 7 (Eng.), an order of that 
court quashing the conviction “operate[s] as a direction to the court of trial to enter . . . a 
judgment and verdict of acquittal.”  Id. § 2(3).  See also Connelly, [1964] A.C. at 1298-
99 (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest) (“The result [of the Court of Appeal’s setting aside the 
appellant’s conviction of murder and not ordering a retrial] is that the appellant can
validly assert that he has been acquitted of the charge of murder . . . .”).
137. ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 2.2 (italics added). 
Accord Connelly, [1964] A.C. at 1305 (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest); ARCHBOLD, supra
note 15, § 4-117; SPRACK, supra note 16, §§ 17.43, 17.46.  See also ENG. LAW COMM’N,
REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 2.1 (“[T]he ‘autrefois’ rule . . . states that a 
defendant who has been finally convicted or acquitted may not be tried again for the 
same offence . . . .”); Criminal Justice Act, 2003, Explanatory Notes para. 1(40) (“The[] 
principles [of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict] provide a bar to [a second] trial, in 
respect of the same offence, of a person who has previously been either acquitted or 
convicted of that offence.”). 
The principle underlying the autrefois rule—i.e., that a person should not be 
prosecuted twice for the same offense—also applies in summary trials in magistrates’ 
courts, although the pleas in bar themselves do not.  Connelly, [1964] A.C. at 1306 (Lord 
Morris of Borth-y-Gest); ARCHBOLD, supra note 15, § 4-118; ENG. LAW COMM’N,
REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, paras. 1.14 n.16, 2.2; SPRACK, supra note 16,
§ 17.46(g).  In such trials the defendant raises the issue on a plea of not guilty. Id.
 138. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *335. 
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maxim of the common law of England”139  that “no man is to be brought
into jeopardy of his life, more than once for the same offence.”140 
For the autrefois rule to apply, “[t]he offence with which the
defendant is now charged must be identical to the offence of which she 
was previously acquitted or convicted,”141 “both in fact and in law.”142 
Moreover, the previous acquittal or conviction must have been “in a 
139. Id.
140. Id.
With respect to the plea of autrefois convict, Blackstone wrote that that plea is
grounded upon the principle that “no man ought to be twice brought in danger of his life 
for one and the same crime.”  Id. at *336 (footnote omitted). 
Blackstone concluded that “when a man is once fairly found not guilty upon any
indictment, or other prosecution, before any court having competent jurisdiction of the
offence, he may plead such acquittal in bar of any subsequent accusation for the same
crime,” id. at *335, and similarly, when a person is convicted of a crime, he can plead
that conviction in bar of any subsequent accusation “for the same identical crime.” Id. at
*336. When Blackstone wrote these words, a statute allowed the wife or male heir of a 
homicide victim to bring a private prosecution, known as an “appeal,” against the alleged
killer despite that individual’s previous acquittal in a prosecution brought by the King for 
the same killing.  1487, 3 Hen. 7, c. 1 (Eng.). The statute was of little practical significance, 
however, because by the early part of the eighteenth century prosecution by appeal was
“all but practically obsolete.”  1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW OF ENGLAND 247 (London, MacMillan 1883). See also 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 
26, at *312 (stating that prosecution by appeal is “very little in use”).  Parliament 
formally abolished prosecution by appeal in 1819.  1819, 59 Geo. 3, c. 46 (Eng.). 
Today, an individual whose previous acquittal was quashed pursuant to the provisions 
of either the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 relating to “tainted” 
acquittals, Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, §§ 54–57 (Eng.), 
discussed supra note 44, or the Criminal Justice Act 2003 relating to “new and 
compelling evidence,” Criminal Justice Act, 2003, §§ 75–86, discussed supra note 44, 
cannot plead autrefois acquit; nor can one who is being retried after the reversal, upon an 
appeal by the prosecution, of the trial judge’s ruling that she had no case to answer in a 
trial on an indictment, Criminal Justice Act, 2003, §§ 57–61, 67–68, see supra text 
accompanying notes 71–109, or under the provisions of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 
1980, c. 43, § 111 (Eng.), see supra note 44. 
141. ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 2.3.  See also
ARCHBOLD, supra note 15, § 4-119; 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *336. 
142. Connelly, [1964] A.C. at 1339–40 (Lord Devlin) (also stating that “[t]he word
‘offence’ embraces both the facts which constitute the crime and the legal characteristics 
which make it an offence”).  Accord id. at 1295 (Lord Reid); id. at 1368 (Lord Pearce)
(agreeing with Lord Devlin’s speech on this point); R v. Beedie, [1998] Q.B. 356, 360, 
361, [1997] 2 Crim. App. 167, 170 (Eng.) (quoting Lord Devlin’s speech in Connelly); 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *336 (“It is to be observed, that the pleas of autrefoits 
acquit and autrefoits convict, or a former acquittal, and former conviction, must be upon
a prosecution for the same identical act and crime.”); ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 
267, supra note 25, para. 2.3 (quoting Lord Devlin’s speech in Connelly); SPRACK, supra
note 16, § 17.46(d). 
Despite the statement by Lord Devlin that is quoted in the text, it appears “[t]he facts
need only be substantially the same.”  ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 
25, para. 2.5 (emphasis added) (relying upon and quoting Lord Devlin’s later statement 
in Connelly, [1964] A.C. at 1340, that “I have no difficulty about the idea that one set of
facts may be substantially but not exactly the same as another.”).
34
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court of competent jurisdiction;”143 otherwise the proceedings that 
resulted in the “acquittal” or “conviction” were “in fact a nullity.”144 
Thus, for example, an individual “acquitted” of an offense in a court
lacking jurisdiction of either the offense or the person cannot plead 
autrefois acquit to a subsequent indictment for the same offense.145  In  
addition, the proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction “must not 
have been ultra vires.”146  When a defendant pleads autrefois acquit or
autrefois convict, the judge, not the jury, decides the issue.147
 143. ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 2.6. Accord
ARCHBOLD, supra note 15, § 4-118; 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *335 (“[W]hen a 
man is once fairly found not guilty upon any indictment, or other prosecution, before any 
court having competent jurisdiction of the offence, he may plead such acquittal in bar  of 
any subsequent accusation for the same crime .” (emphasis added)); 2 HAWKINS, supra
note 130, at 372 (“I take it to be settled . . .  That an Acquittal in any Court whatsoever, 
which has Jurisdiction of the Cause, is as good a Bar of any subsequent Prosecution for 
the same Crime, as an Acquittal in the Highest Court.”); SPRACK, supra note 16, § 17.48 
(“[F]or the pleas to apply, the court trying the case must have been acting within its 
jurisdiction.”).
144. R v. West, [1962] 46 Crim. App. 296, 308, [1964] 1 Q.B. 15, 25 (1962) (Eng.). 
145. Id., [1964] 1 Q.B. at 25 (holding that the defendant’s acquittal in a summary
trial in a Magistrates’ Court of a charge of being an accessory after the fact to a larceny,
over which that court lacked summary jurisdiction, did not preclude his subsequent trial 
on an indictment charging him with the same offense). 
146. ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 2.6 (italics added). 
E.g., R v. Kent Justices, [1952] 36 Crim. App. 23, 28–29, [1952], 2 Q.B. 355, 360–61 
(Eng.) (quashing the defendant’s convictions, following a summary trial, for larceny and
obtaining credit by fraud, and his committal to quarter sessions for sentencing, because 
he was not warned when consenting to a summary trial that, if convicted, he could be 
committed to quarter sessions for sentencing, but nevertheless holding the defendant
could be “tried over again” for the offenses because he “ha[d] never been technically in
peril”).
Likewise, a purported acquittal or conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction does 
not preclude a subsequent prosecution for the same offense “if the proceedings were so 
irregular as to be a nullity.” ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 
2.6 (citing as examples In re Harrington, [1984] A.C. 743 (H.L.) 753-53 (Lord Roskill) 
(appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.), in which the House of Lords held that an individual’s
“acquittal” in a Magistrates’ Court was a “nullity” because the magistrates did not give 
the prosecution an opportunity to adduce evidence, and Crane v. DPP, [1921] 2 A.C. 299 
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.), in which the House of Lords held the 
defendant’s conviction for receiving stolen goods, obtained in a trial in which he was 
improperly tried with another individual, was “without authority,” id. at 330 (Lord 
Sumner), and obtained in proceedings that were a “nullity,” id. at 321 (Lord Atkinson);
id. at 336 (Lord Parmoor), and therefore the defendant, after his successful appeal, could 
be tried again for the same offense under the original indictment, id. at 330 (Lord
Atkinson); id. at 334–35 (Lord Sumner); id. at 337–38 (Lord Parmoor)). 
147. Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 122 (Eng.). 
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In addition to the autrefois rule, a special application of the “abuse of
process” rules provides protection against double jeopardy in England.148 
Lord Devlin articulated the applicable principle in Connelly v. DPP:149 
As a general rule a judge should stay an indictment (that is, order that it 
remain on file not to be proceeded with) when he is satisfied that the charges
therein are founded on the same facts as the charges in a previous indictment on 
which the accused has been tried, or form or are a part of a series of offences of
the same or a similar character as the offences charged in the previous
indictment.  He will do this because as a general rule it is oppressive to an
accused for the prosecution not to [join the charges for trial in a single
proceeding] where it can properly [do so].  But a second trial on the same or
similar facts is not always and necessarily oppressive, and there may in a
particular case be special circumstances which make it just and convenient in
that case.  The judge must then, in all the circumstances of the particular case, 
exercise his discretion as to whether or not he applies the general rule.150 
For example, in Regina v. Beedie,151 the Court of Appeal held that a
landlord who previously had pleaded guilty in a Magistrates’ Court to
summary offenses under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974152 
arising from a defective gas fire on his premises could not plead
autrefois convict in a subsequent prosecution for manslaughter based
upon the death of a resident of those premises from carbon monoxide
poisoning caused by the use of the defective gas fire.153  Nevertheless, 
the Court of Appeal concluded the manslaughter prosecution should 
148. Connelly, [1964] A.C. at 1347–60 (Lord Devlin); id. at 1296 (Lord Reid); id. at 
1362–68 (Lord Pearce); Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, Explanatory Notes para. 1(40)
(Eng.); ARCHBOLD, supra note 15, § 4-48; ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra
note 25, paras. 2.1, 2.14.  See generally  ANDREW L-T. CHOO, ABUSE OF PROCESS AND 
JUDICIAL STAYS OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (2d ed. 2008). 
149. [1964] A.C. 1254 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). 
150. Id. at 1359–60 (Lord Devlin). 
Lord Devlin reasoned: 
First, a general power, taking various specific forms, to prevent unfairness to 
the accused has always been a part of the English criminal law . . . .  Secondly,
if the power of the prosecutor to spread his case over any number of 
indictments were unrestrained there could be grave injustice to defendants.
Thirdly, a controlling power of this character is well established in the civil 
law.
Id. at 1347. See also id. at 1296 (Lord Reid) (“[T]he general rule must be that the 
prosecutor should combine in one indictment all the charges which he intends to prefer
. . . .  That will avoid any general question as to the extent of the discretion of the court
to prevent a trial from taking place.  But I think that there must always be a residual
discretion to prevent anything which savours of abuse of process.”). 
The English Law Commission has explained that the approach articulated by Justice
Devlin in Connelly reverses the burden of proof normally applied in abuse of process 
cases, shifting it from the defendant to the prosecution.  ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 
267, supra note 25, paras. 2.15–.16. 
151. [1997] 2 Crim. App. 167, [1998] Q.B. 356 (Eng.). 
152. Health and Safety at Work etc. Act, 1974, c. 37, § 33 (Eng.). 
153. Beedie, [1997] 2 Crim. App. at 170–71, [1998] Q.B. at 360–61. 
36
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have been stayed because it “was based on substantially the same facts
as the earlier summary prosecutions”154 and “no special circumstances” 
existed.155 
154. Id. at 176, [1998] Q.B. at 366. 
The court in Beedie also relied, in part, upon the so-called “Elrington principle,” under
which an individual who is charged with a minor offense and who is either acquitted or
convicted of that offense “shall not be charged again on the same facts in a more 
aggravated form.” R v. Elrington, 121 Eng. Rep. 870, 873 (K.B. 1861) (holding, on
statutory grounds, that an individual who had been acquitted of assault could not
subsequently be tried for causing grievous bodily harm on the basis of the same assault). 
According to the English Law Commission, the Beedie court’s reliance on this principle
means that “the Elrington principle has the effect that the presumption in favour of a stay
is even stronger where the second charge does not merely arise out of the same facts but
is an aggravated form of the first.”  ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, 
para. 2.20.  A majority in Connelly approved the Elrington principle. Connelly, [1964] 
A.C. at 1332 (Lord Hodson) (labeling the principle the “ascending scale principle” and
viewing it as an “extension of the narrow principle of autrefois”); id. at 1357–58 (Lord
Devlin) (stating that the principle “goes beyond the principle of autrefois” and that it
gives the defendant “only a qualified right [to relief]”); id. at 1367 (Lord Pearce)
(“agree[ing] with the general principle”). See also id. at 1316–16 (Lord Morris of Borth-
y-Gest) (treating the principle as part of the autrefois rule); SPRACK, supra note 16,  
§ 17.46(e) (same).  An exception to the Elrington principle allows an individual who has 
been convicted of an offense to be prosecuted for an aggravated form of the same
offense if the facts constituting the aggravating factor did not exist at the time of the
initial conviction. ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 2.21.  See 
also Connelly, [1964] A.C. at 1305 (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest) (articulating a broader
autrefois rule than the majority, but recognizing that that rule would not include the
situation in which “the offence charged in the second indictment had [not] in fact been
committed at the same time of the first charge”); ARCHBOLD, supra note 15, § 4-118
(“For the [autrefois] rule to apply, the offence charged in the second indictment must
have been committed at the time of the first charge.”).  Thus, an individual convicted of 
assault or wounding with intent to murder can later be tried for murder or manslaughter 
if the victim of the assault or wounding subsequently dies from the injuries he sustained 
in that assault.  ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 2.21 SPRACK, 
supra note 16, § 17.46(e).  See also Connelly, [1964] A.C. at 1332 (Lord Hodson) 
(recognizing the exception); id. at 1306 (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest) (stating that even 
under his broader view of the autrefois rule, “if there is an assault and a prosecution and
conviction in respect of it there is no bar to a charge of murder if the assaulted person
later dies”); id. at 1318–19 (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest) (discussing cases); ARCHBOLD,
supra note 15, § 4-118 (“[A] conviction or acquittal for assault will not bar a charge of
murder if the assaulted person later dies.”).
155. Beedie, [1997] 2 Crim. App. at 176, [1998] Q.B. at 366. 
The Court of Appeal added that it could
see no reason why, prior to institution of the summary proceedings, the C.P.S.
[Crown Prosecution Service] should not have been alerted by the police, the 
Health and Safety Executive, or the Local Authority to the inquiry which was 
being undertaken into the circumstances leading to the death of [the resident].
Had this been done, it should have been possible for a sensible joint decision to
be reached as to what charges could, and should, have been properly brought 
 37





   
 









   
 
 
   
 
      
  
   
 
 
      
 





C. Prosecution Appeals and Double Jeopardy in England 
The rules relating to double jeopardy in England—that is, the autrefois
rule and the special application of the abuse of process rules articulated 
in Connelly156—merely “prevent a final acquittal or conviction from being
re-opened.”157 The English Law Commission, in its 2000 consultation
paper on prosecution appeals, concluded that because an acquittal 
entered by a trial judge before the jury has considered the evidence is not 
yet final, an appeal of such an acquittal “involves no breach of the 
double jeopardy rules.”158  The Law Commission explained: 
A prosecution right of appeal [of such an acquittal is] exercised when the
prosecution consider[s] that the judge . . . made an error in a ruling . . . during the
trial. In contrast to the double jeopardy exceptions [for “tainted acquittals” and
compelling new evidence159] the prosecution [is] asserting at the time that the
course of the trial was flawed and should be corrected by the appellate court.160 
against the [landlord], and no doubt manslaughter would have been among
them.
Id. at 177, [1998] Q.B. at 366. 
In Connelly, Lord Devlin did not attempt a comprehensive definition of what 
constitutes “special circumstances” not to stay an indictment in a particular case.  He did, 
however, provide the following example: 
If the prosecution considers that there ought to be two or more trials [for 
offenses it could have included in one indictment], it can make its choice plain 
by preferring two or more indictments.  In many cases this may be to the 
advantage of the defence. If the defence accepts the choice without complaint 
and avails itself of any advantage that may flow from it, I should regard that as
a special circumstance; for where the defence considers that a single trial of 
two indictments is desirable, it can apply to the judge for an order [to that 
effect].
Connelly, [1964] A.C. at 1360 (Lord Devlin).  The “discovery of new evidence” after the 
defendant’s first trial may also constitute a “special circumstance.”  ENG. LAW COMM’N,
REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, paras. 2.18–.19 (discussing AG for Gibraltar v. Leoni, 
Criminal Appeal No. 4 of 1998 (Mar. 19, 1999), an unreported case decided by three 
former judges of the Court of Appeal sitting as the Court of Appeal for Gibraltar). 
156. See supra text accompanying notes 130–55 and supra note 129. 
157. ENG. LAWCOMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158, supra note 25, para. 1.8. 
Today, of course, exceptions to this rule exist when an acquittal was “tainted,” see
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, §§ 54–57 (Eng.), discussed supra
note 44, and, in some situations, when the prosecution discovers “new and compelling
evidence” following an acquittal.  See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, §§ 75–86 
(Eng.), discussed supra note 44. 
158. ENG. LAWCOMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158, supra note 25, para. 1.9.
The English Law Commission certainly intended its statement to encompass an 
acquittal based upon a trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer. 
159. See supra note 44. 
160. ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158, supra note 25, para. 1.9.
Accord  ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 2.9 (“[A] retrial 
following the prosecution successfully appealing a summary acquittal [in a Magistrates’ 
Court] by way of a case stated . . . [is] not [a] genuine exception[] to the autrefois rule. 
This is because an acquittal . . . which is subject to appeal is not a final acquittal until the 
38
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This position is not unique.  “Prosecution appeals . . . are a general feature 
of continental European jurisdictions,”161 despite their recognition of the 
principle of double jeopardy.162  For example, in Germany, a prosecutor 
can appeal an acquittal on a question of law,163 and in France, the
prosecution can appeal an acquittal rendered by a cour d’assises (Assize
Court),164 the court that tries crimes,165 or by a  tribunal correctionnel
(correctional court),166 the court with jurisdiction to try délits (delicts).167 
appellate process has been concluded or the time allowed for appeal has expired.” 
(footnote omitted)).
161. ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158, supra note 25, para. 1.11. 
Accord  ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 1.17 (“Allowing the 
prosecution to challenge an acquittal by way of appeal . . . [is] common on the 
Continent.”).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 115–16. 
163. Strafprozeßordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure] Apr. 7, 1987, 
Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I] 1074, as amended, §§ 296, 333–58.  See also id. §§ 296, 
312–332 (allowing the prosecution to appeal an acquittal in the Amtsgericht, the court 
having jurisdiction over less serious offenses, on the basis of both fact and law). 
164. Richard S. Frase, France, in  CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY
201, 236 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter A WORLDWIDE STUDY] (the
Attorney General may appeal an acquittal to the Appellate Assize Court for a trial de 
novo on all issues of fact or law raised by the appeal). Accord Valérie Dervieux, revised 
by Mikaël Benillouche & Olivier Bachelet, The French System, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURES 218, 274 (Mireille Delmas-Marty & J.R. Spencer eds. 2002) [hereinafter
EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES] (“[A]cquittals given by the cour d’ assises may be 
the subject of an appeal on the merits.”).
165. Frase, supra note 164, at 219. Accord Dervieux, supra note 164, at 231. 
Crimes are the most serious offenses, such as murder, rape, and armed robbery.  Frase, 
supra note 164, at 202. 
166. Frase, supra note 164, at 235–36 (the prosecuting attorney or the attorney
general for the appellate district may appeal an acquittal to the regional cour d’appel
(Court of Appeals) for what could potentially be a trial de novo on all issues of fact or
law raised by the appeal). Accord Dervieux, supra note 164, at 274 (“Any decision by
the tribunal correctionnel . . . may be the subject of an appeal on the merits. . . .  Appeals 
against . . . acquittals recorded by the tribunal correctionnel are handled by the local 
cour d’appel . . . .”). 
167. Frase, supra note 164, at 219, 231. Accord Dervieux, supra note 164, at 230. 
Délits are offenses that in the United States would be less serious felonies, such as 
aggravated assault, burglary, grand larceny, and drug offenses, as well as many offenses 
that would be misdemeanors.  Frase, supra note 164, at 202. 
Among the other European countries that apparently allow the prosecution to appeal 
an acquittal in a case involving a serious offense are: Belgium, Brigitte Pesquié, revised 
by Yves Cartuyvels, The Belgian System, in  EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES, supra
note 164, at 81, 98, 99–100, 130–31, 131 (an acquittal of a délit can be appealed to the 
local cour d’appel; a decision in the cour d’assises, which tries crimes, can be reviewed
in the Cour de cassation, but only on a point of law, following a definitive judgment, i.e., 
“one that puts an end to the proceedings by conviction, acquittal or absolute discharge of
the case”); see also  THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
 39







    
 
    
  
   
   
 
 
   






















   
 
 
Indeed, the European Convention on Human Rights recognizes the rule 
against double jeopardy yet permits the prosecution to have rights of
appeal. Article 4(1) of that Convention provides: “No one shall be liable 
to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction
of the same State for an offence for which he has already been finally
acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of
that State.”168 Countries in other parts of the world, such as Argentina,169 
SYSTEMS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS paras. 3.29, 3.45 (1993) [hereinafter ROYAL COMM’N 
ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE]; Italy, Antoinette Perrodet, revised by Elena Ricci, The Italian
System, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES, supra note 164, at 348, 399 (“In principle, 
appeals may be brought against convictions or acquittals.”); id. at 400 (“[T]he corti di
assise di appello decides appeals against convictions or acquittals by the corte di assise,”
the court that has jurisdiction over the most serious offenses); Rachel A. Van Cleave, 
Italy, in A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 164, at 303, 330, 330–31, 348 (“[T]he public 
prosecutor . . . may appeal [to the corte di assise di appello] a judgment” of the Corte di 
assise, the court that “has jurisdiction over the most serious crimes,” and to the Corte di 
appello a judgment of the tribunale, the court that has jurisdiction over less serious 
crimes); see also  ROYAL COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra, para. 10.44; The 
Netherlands, id. at para. 11.32 (“The . . . prosecutor can appeal as of right against 
judgments of the district courts, to one of the five courts of appeal.”); A.H.J. Swart, The
Netherlands, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 279, 314
(Christine Van Den Wyngaert ed. 1993) (“Appeal involves a complete retrial by another, 
higher, judicial authority.  If the accused was acquitted at the first trial he may not be
convicted in appeal unless the court’s decision is unanimous.”); Russia, Catherine 
Newcombe, Russia, in A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 164, at 397, 461 (“The court 
hearing [an] appeal [from a Justice of the Peace Court] may reverse an acquittal . . .
pursuant to a representation [by the prosecutor] . . . arguing that the acquittal was not
well-founded.”); id. at 462–63 (“[A] court of cassation may reverse an acquittal [by a 
District Court] . . . pursuant to petitions for review from the prosecutor”; however, “a 
jury acquittal may only be reversed if there were violations of criminal procedure law 
that interfered with the right of the prosecutor . . . to present evidence or affected the
content of the juror questionnaire and the answers thereto.”); Spain, ROYAL COMM’N ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra, para. 13.52 (“There is no appeal from the Provincial Criminal
Court [the court that tries serious offenses] on the grounds that the Court decided the 
facts of the case wrongly. The only appeal from this Court is when (1) the court has 
misapplied the law; or (2) the court has made an error in procedure.  All parties to the
proceedings have the right to appeal, including the prosecution.”); and Sweden, RICHARD
J. TERRILL, WORLD CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: A SURVEY 333 (5th ed. 2003) (“[O]nce a
trial is concluded, the parties have an opportunity to appeal the court’s judgment to a 
court of appeal. . . .  [B]oth the defendant and the prosecutor have the right to appeal.  In
the petition for appeal, the appellant must state the factual or legal grounds for the
appeal.”).
168. Protocol 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 4, Nov. 22, 1984 (emphasis added). 
The Explanatory Report to Article 4 provides: “The principle established in this 
provision applies only after the person has been finally acquitted or convicted in
accordance with the law and penal procedure of the State concerned.  This means that 
there must have been a final decision . . . .” Id. Explanatory Report para. 29.  The 
Explanatory Report further provides that “a decision is final ‘if, according to the 
traditional expression, it has acquired the force of res judicata. This is the case when it
is irrevocable, that is to say when no further ordinary remedies are available or when the 
parties have exhausted such remedies or have permitted the time-limit to expire without 
availing themselves of them.’”  Id. Explanatory Report para. 22 (quoting European
40
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Israel,170  Mexico,171 and South Africa,172 also allow the prosecution to 
appeal acquittals, despite recognizing the principle of double jeopardy.
The view that the guarantee against double jeopardy does not prohibit
the prosecution from appealing an acquittal is not limited to countries 
whose legal systems are based in whole or in part on the civil law.  The
eminent jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes, while an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, espoused this position in his
Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments, Explanatory Note, 
Commentary on Article 1(a), May 28, 1970).  See also ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 
267, supra note 25, para. 1.13 (asserting the Convention permits the prosecution to have 
rights of appeal); id. § 1.17 (“Allowing the prosecution to challenge an acquittal by way
of appeal . . . (that is, before it becomes final), does not in principle present any
difficulty in terms of compliance with the ECHR [European Convention on Human
Rights].”). 
169. Alejandro D. Carrió & Alejandro M. Garro, Argentina, in A  WORLDWIDE
STUDY, supra note 164, at 3, 51–52 (“[A] judgment rendered by a trial court is subject to
an appeal only on points of law. . . .  [T]he right to appeal is given not only to the
defendant but to the prosecutor as well, in [a] case where there is an acquittal. . . .  The
Supreme Court has held that to permit the appeal of an acquittal by the prosecution does 
not violate due process nor constitute[] a double jeopardy violation.” (footnote omitted)). 
170. Rinat Kitai-Sangero, Israel, in A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 164, at 273, 
298–99 (“The prosecution . . . may submit an appeal against the judgment–both the 
verdict and the sentence.  A defendant may not raise a claim of double jeopardy against 
an appeal submitted by the prosecution. . . .  An appeal may be submitted against
determinations of both law and fact.” (footnote omitted)).  See also Anne Bowen Poulin, 
Double Jeopardy and Judicial Accountability: When is an Acquittal Not an Acquittal?, 
27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 953 (1995) (discussing a case in which the Supreme Court of 
Israel, in response to a government appeal, reversed a trial court’s acquittal of four
defendants charged with rape). 
171. Miguel Sarré & Ian Perlin, Mexico, in A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 164, 
at 351, 389–90 (“Both the prosecution and the defense may appeal [a trial verdict]. . . . 
The appeals court may review whether or not the appropriate law was applied, and 
whether it was applied correctly.  The appeals court decides whether the lower court
violated the ruling principles for evaluating evidence, the facts were altered, or indeed, if
the decision was based on sufficient facts and the relevant law correctly applied. . . . 
Appeals of a verdict . . . also permit the presentation of new evidence, which means the
appeals judge may review both the law and the facts, and indeed find and hear new 
evidence and determine additional facts.”).  Article 23 of the Mexican Constitution
provides: “No person, whether acquitted or convicted, can be tried twice for the same
offense.”  CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS [CONST.] art. 23,
5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.). 
172. P.J. Schwikkard & S.E. van der Merwe, South Africa in AWORLDWIDE STUDY, 
supra note 164, at 471, 515 (“The prosecution has no right to appeal against an acquittal 
on the facts.  It does, however, have a right to appeal against a court’s decision on law . . 
. .”).  Section 35(3)(m) of the South African Constitution provides that “[e]very accused 
person has the right to a fair trial, which includes the right not to be tried for an offence 
in respect of an act or omission for which that person has previously been either 
acquitted or convicted.”  S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 35(3)(m). 
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dissenting opinion in Kepner v. United States.173  He cogently argued:
[I]t seems to me that logically and rationally a man cannot be said to be more 
than once in jeopardy in the same cause, however often he may be tried.  The 
jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy, from its beginning to the end of the cause. 
Everybody agrees that the [double jeopardy] principle in its origin was a rule 
forbidding a trial in a new and independent case where a man already had been
tried once.  But there is no rule that a man may not be tried twice in the same
case. It has been decided by this court that he may be tried a second time, even
for his life, if the jury disagree, or, notwithstanding their agreement and verdict,
if the verdict is set aside on the prisoner’s exceptions for error in the trial. . . .
If a statute should give the right to take exceptions to the government, I
believe it would be impossible to maintain that the prisoner would be protected 
by the Constitution from being tried again. He no more would be put in
jeopardy a second time when retried because of a mistake of law in his favor,
than he would be when retried for a mistake that did him harm. . . .174 
Indeed, many common law jurisdictions other than England—all of 
which recognize the basic rule against double jeopardy to some extent 
allow prosecution appeals of acquittals in cases involving serious 
offenses. In Canada,175 for instance, a statute permits the prosecution to 
“appeal to the court of appeal . . . against a judgment or verdict of 
acquittal . . . in proceedings by indictment on any ground of appeal that
involves a question of law alone,”176 a provision encompassing a trial 
173. 195 U.S. 100 (1904). 
174. Id. at 134–35 (citations omitted). 
As the Supreme Court has pointed out, however, “Mr. Justice Holmes’ concept of 
continuing jeopardy . . . has never been accepted by a majority of this Court.” United 
States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 90 n.6 (1978).  Accord Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184, 192 (1957) (“[Justice Holmes’s] view was rejected by the Court.”). 
175. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides:  “Any person charged 
with an offence has the right . . . if finally acquitted of the offence, not to be tried for it 
again, and if finally found guilty and punished for the offence, not to be tried or punished
for it again . . . .”  Constitution Act, 1982, pt. I, § 11(h) (U.K.).  In addition, the Canadian 
Criminal Code permits an accused to “plead the special pleas of (a) autrefois acquit
[and] (b) autrefois convict . . . .” Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 607(1) (1985)
(Can.). See also id. §§ 609–10 (setting forth the scope of a plea of autrefois acquit or 
autrefois convict).
176. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 676(1)(a) (1985) (Can.).  E.g., Graveline v.
The Queen, 2006 SCC 16, [14], [18]–[19], [2006] 1 S.C.R. 609, 614, 615–16 (Can.) (but 
concluding that the Crown failed to meets its “very heavy” burden of showing “that the 
error (or errors) of the trial judge might reasonably be thought . . . to have had a material 
bearing on the [jury’s] acquittal” of the defendant on a charge of second-degree murder);
see also cases cited infra note 179. 
The use of the expression “question of law alone” in section 676(1)(a) means that the 
prosecution “has a right of appeal from an acquittal only on a question of law,” as 
opposed to questions of fact and questions of mixed fact and law.  R. v. Biniaris, 2000
SCC 15, [30], [2000] 1 S.C.R. 381, 401 (Can.) (rejecting the possible interpretation that 
there exists such a thing as a “question of law alone” that is distinct from a “question of 
law”). Under this provision, the prosecution cannot appeal an acquittal by a trial judge 
sitting without a jury on the ground that it was not supported by the evidence. R. v.
Poirier, 147 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 195, 200 (P.E.I. App. Div. 1997) (Can.) (Mitchell, J., with 
Carruthers, C.J., agreeing) (“[A] claim [that] the trial judge’s verdict was unreasonable 
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judge’s directed verdict of acquittal.177  If the Court of Appeal allows the
prosecution’s appeal, it can set aside the acquittal and order a new
trial,178 or if the acquittal were rendered by the judge in a bench trial,
“enter a verdict of guilty with respect to the offence of which, in its 
opinion, the accused should have been found guilty but for the error in 
law.”179 
and not supported by the evidence . . . is not an appealable issue.  The Crown’s right of 
appeal in respect of an acquittal is restricted to grounds that involve questions of law
alone. . . .  If a trial judge errs in finding that the onus of proving guilt has not been 
satisfied, that is an error of fact, not law.  The sufficiency of the evidence, and whether 
the guilt of an accused should be inferred from it, is a question of fact within the
province of the trial judge.” (citation omitted)). See also Walker v. The Queen, 2008 
SCC 34, [27], [2008] 2 S.C.R. 245, 260 (Can.) (concluding that the trial judge’s orally-
stated reasons for acquitting the defendant of second-degree murder in a bench trial—
while convicting him of manslaughter—“were not so inadequate that the Crown’s 
limited right of appeal was impaired” and that “[t]here was thus no error of law and no 
basis on which the Crown could properly succeed in bringing itself within the limited 
Crown appeal provisions of § 676(1)(a) of the Cr[iminal] C[ode].”); Lampard v. The 
Queen, [1969] 1 S.C.R. 373, 380–81 (Can.) (“In the case at bar the onus was, of course, 
upon the Crown to prove that the appellant did the acts complained of with the 
[necessary] guilty intention . . .  If the learned trial Judge erred in finding that that onus 
had not been satisfied, his error was one of fact, certainly not one of law in the strict
sense.”).
177. Rowbotham v. The Queen, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 463, 474–75 (Can.). See also
Greyeyes v. The Queen, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 825, 843 (Can.) (Cory, J.) (“[T]he legal effect 
of undisputed facts is a question of law.”); Morin v. The Queen, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 286, 
294 (Can.) (“If a trial judge finds all the facts necessary to reach a conclusion in law, and 
in order to reach that conclusion the facts can simply be accepted as found, a Court of 
Appeal can disagree with the conclusion reached without trespassing on the fact-finding 
function of the trial judge.  The disagreement is with respect to the law and not the facts
nor inferences to be drawn from the facts.”). 
178. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 686(4)(b)(i) (Can.). 
179. Id. § 686(4)(b)(ii); e.g., R. v. Larue, 2003 SCC 22, [1], [5], [2003] 1 S.C.R. 
277–79 (Can.) (entering a verdict of guilty of aggravated sexual assault after setting 
aside the trial judge’s acquittal of the defendant on that charge in a bench trial); 
Greyeyes, [1997] 2 S.C.R. at 843, 844 (Cory, J.) (upholding the conviction of the
defendant for trafficking in cocaine that had been imposed by the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal upon an appeal by the prosecution following the trial judge’s acquittal of the 
defendant in a bench trial for that offense); id. at 833 (L’Heureux-Dubé, J.) (“dispos[ing] 
of the appeal as proposed by Cory, J.”). 
If the Court of Appeal enters a verdict of guilty, it may either pass a sentence that is 
warranted in law, or remit the matter to the trial court and direct the trial court to impose
a sentence that is warranted in law. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 686(4)(b)(ii)
(Can.).
If the Court of Appeal sets aside an individual’s acquittal, the individual “may appeal 
to the Supreme Court of Canada (a) on any question of law on which a judge of the court 
of appeal dissents; (b) on any question of law, if the Court of Appeal enters a verdict of
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New Zealand180 allows the prosecution generally to seek review in the 
Court of Appeal of questions of law arising at the trial,181 even if the trial 
resulted in the defendant’s acquittal.182  In addition, it specifically provides a
procedure under which the prosecution can seek review of a question of 
law arising out of a trial judge’s decision during the trial to discharge,183 
i.e., acquit,184 a defendant.185  Such a discharge can be based upon the
judge’s conclusion that the defendant had no case to answer.186  If the
Court of Appeal finds that the trial judge’s “ruling was erroneous, and . . .
that the accused [was] wrongfully discharged,”187 it may “direct a new
trial.”188 
guilty against the person; or (c) on any question of law, if leave to appeal is granted by
the Supreme Court of Canada.” Id. § 691. 
180. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 provides: “No one who has been 
finally acquitted or convicted of, or pardoned for, an offence shall be tried or punished 
for it again.”  Bill of Rights Act 1990, § 26(2) (N.Z.).  In addition, the Crimes Act 1961
recognizes “a plea of previous acquittal, a plea of previous conviction, and a plea of 
pardon.” Crimes Act 1961, § 357(1) (N.Z.).   See also id. §§ 358–59 (setting forth the 
scope of a plea of a previous acquittal or conviction).
181. Crimes Act 1961, § 380 (N.Z.) (permitting the parties to apply to the trial
judge to reserve for the opinion of the Court of Appeal a question of law).  See also id. §
381 (allowing the prosecutor to seek leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal if the trial 
judge refuses an application to reserve a question of law for the opinion of the Court of
Appeal).
182. Id. § 380(4) (“If the result of the trial is acquittal the accused shall be 
discharged, subject to being again arrested if the Court of Appeal orders a new trial.”). 
183. Id. § 347(3) (“The Judge may in his discretion, at any stage of any trial, 
whether before or after verdict, direct that the accused be discharged.”). 
184. Id. § 347(4) (“A discharge under this section shall be deemed an acquittal.”).
185. Id. § 381A(1) (“A Judge who directs that an accused be discharged under
section 347 [see supra note 183] . . . may, on the application of the prosecutor, refer for
the opinion of the Court of Appeal any question of law arising out of that direction.”). 
See also Crimes Act 1961, § 381A(5) (N.Z.) (allowing the prosecutor to seek leave to 
appeal from the Court of Appeal if the trial judge refuses the prosecutor’s application to
refer a question of law to the Court of Appeal).
186. See Gordon-Smith v. The Queen, [2008] NZSC 56, [3] (noting that during the 
appellant’s trial the judge had discharged three of the appellant’s co-defendants pursuant
to section 347 of the Crimes Act 1961, Crimes Act 1961, § 347 (N.Z.), “on the basis that 
they had no case to answer”).
187. Crimes Act 1961, § 382(2)(b) (N.Z.). 
188. Id.
This section includes the proviso that “no conviction or acquittal shall be set aside, nor 
any new trial directed, although it appears that some evidence was improperly admitted
or rejected, or that something not according to law was done at the trial, or some
misdirection given, unless in the opinion of the Court of Appeal some substantial wrong
or miscarriage of justice was thereby occasioned on the trial.” Id. 
Section 381A(3) of the Crimes Act 1961 provides that “[w]hen a question is referred
to the Court of Appeal, the accused who has been discharged . . . is subject to again 
being arrested or summoned to appear if the Court of Appeal orders a new trial.  Id. 
§ 381A(3). 
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The Australian states of Tasmania, Western Australia, and New South 
Wales also grant the prosecution a limited right to appeal some acquittals.189 
In Tasmania,190 a statute provides that the Attorney General, with the 
leave of the Court of Criminal Appeal or upon the certificate of the trial 
judge that it is a fit case for appeal, can appeal to the Court of Criminal
Appeal “against an acquittal on a question of law” in a trial upon an
indictment,191 a provision encompassing a directed verdict of acquittal.192 
189. For a discussion of the rule against double jeopardy by the High Court of 
Australia, see Pearce v The Queen, (1998) 194 CLR 610 (Austl.) (concluding (1) the 
pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict apply only when the elements of the two 
offenses in question are identical or when all the elements of one offense are wholly
included in the other offense; (2) a court possesses the inherent power to stay
proceedings against an individual to prevent abuse of its process and such an abuse of 
process can arise from the repeated prosecution of an individual in circumstances in 
which he or she cannot plead autrefois acquit or autrefois convict; and (3) when an 
individual is convicted of two offenses containing common elements, absent a contrary
legislative intent, it is wrong to punish the individual twice for the commission of the 
common elements).
190. Tasmania recognizes the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict. 
Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) § 358 (Austl.) (“In a plea that the accused person has 
already been acquitted or convicted, it is sufficient to state that he has been lawfully
acquitted or convicted, as the case may be, of the crime charged in the indictment, or of
the other offence of which he alleges that he has been acquitted or convicted, and, in the 
latter case, to describe the offence by any term by which it is commonly known.”). 
In addition, a Justice of the Supreme Court of Tasmania adopted the approach, see 
supra text accompanying note 150, set forth by Lord Devlin in DPP v. Connelly, [1964]
A.C. 1254 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). R v. Hutton, [1994] 3 Tas R 225, 
228-29 (Austl.) (rejecting a defendant’s request to stay his prosecution. 
191. Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) § 401(2) (Austl.). E.g., DPP v Cook, [2006]
TASSC 75, [47], [49] (Tas. Crim. App.) (Austl.) (Crawford, J.) (granting the
prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal an individual’s acquittal by a jury on a
charge of attempted rape); id. at [91], [93]–[94] (Blow, J.) (same); id. at [150] (Tennent, 
J.) (same).
A question of law excludes questions of mixed fact and law. Williams v The Queen, 
(1986) 161 CLR 278, 286-87 (Austl.) (Gibbs, C.J.) (concluding that the claim that the 
trial court erroneously excluded from evidence confessions allegedly made by the 
defendant raised questions of mixed fact and law and therefore the Tasmanian Court of 
Criminal Appeal improperly granted the prosecution leave to appeal the defendant’s 
directed acquittal); id. at 301–02 (Mason & Brennan, JJ.) (same); id. at 314 (Wilson & 
Dawson, JJ.) (same); R v Jenkins, [1970] Tas SR 13, 14-5 (Crim. App.) (Austl.). 
Although both Williams and Jenkins involved the now-amended statutory phrase “a
question of law alone,” the removal of the word “alone” does not seem significant.  For 
the same word was also removed from the previous subsection of the statute dealing with 
the right of a convicted defendant to appeal a conviction, and that provision expressly
distinguishes between “a question of law,” Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) § 401(2) 
(Austl.), “a mixed question of fact and law,” id. § 401(1)(b)(ii), and “a question of fact 
alone” id. § 401(1)(b)(i).  See  NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMMISSION, DISCUSSION 
PAPER 37, DIRECTED VERDICTS OF ACQUITTAL § 3.10 (1995) [hereinafter N.S.W. LAW 
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If the Court of Appeal finds the verdict of the jury was unreasonable or
cannot be supported having regard to the evidence, or the trial court 
reached the wrong decision on a question of law, or there was a
miscarriage of justice, it can set aside the verdict or judgment, allow the 
appeal,193 and either enter a conviction194 or order a new trial.195 
In Western Australia,196 the prosecution, “in relation to a charge of an 
indictable offence,”197  and with the leave of the Court of Appeal,198 can 
appeal “a judgment of acquittal . . . entered after a jury’s verdict of not 
guilty of a [serious offense199], but only on the grounds that before or
during the trial the judge made an error of fact or law in relation to the 
charge,”200 as well as “a judgment of acquittal . . . entered in a trial by 
the judge alone”201 or “entered after a decision by the judge that the accused 
has no case to answer on the charge.”202  If the Court of Appeal finds in
favor of the prosecution, it can set aside the acquittal and order a new 
trial.203 
REFORM COMM’N, DISCUSSION PAPER 37].  For information concerning the New South 
Wales Law Reform Commission, see infra note 207. 
192. See R v Pirimona, [1998] TASSC 136 (Tas) (Austl.) (upholding the Attorney
General’s appeal of a “verdict of acquittal entered by direction of the . . . trial judge”). 
See also Jenkins, [1970] Tas. S.R. at 14–15 (indicating the statute clearly allowed the 
prosecution to appeal a directed verdict of acquittal).
193. Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) § 401(2) (Austl.). 
194. Id. § 402(5)(b). 
195. Id. § 402(5)(c). E.g., Pirimona, [1998] TASSC 136 (ordering a retrial after 
upholding the Attorney General’s appeal of a “verdict of acquittal entered by direction of 
the . . . trial judge” and setting aside that verdict); Jenkins, [1970] Tas. S.R. at 24 (Crisp, 
J.) (allowing the prosecution’s appeal, setting aside the defendant’s acquittal, and
ordering a new trial because of the erroneous exclusion of evidence); id. at 27 (Neasey,
J.) (same); id. at 30 (Chambers, J.) (same). 
196. The Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 recognizes the pleas of former 
conviction and former acquittal. Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) § 17
(“It is a defence to a charge of any offence to show that the accused person has already 
been tried, and convicted or acquitted upon an indictment or prosecution notice on which
he might have been convicted of the offence with which he is charged, or has already
been convicted or acquitted of an offence of which he might be convicted upon the 
indictment or prosecution notice on which he is charged.”). 
197. Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) § 24(2). 
198. Id. § 27(1). 
199. The verdict of not guilty must be “of a charge the statutory penalty for which is 
or includes imprisonment for 14 years or more or life.” Id. § 24(2)(da). 
200. Id.
201. Id. § 24(2)(e).
202. Id. § 24(2)(e)(i). 
Judgments of acquittal “on account of unsoundness of mind” are specifically excluded 
from section 24. Id. § 24(2)(da), (e).  Such judgments of acquittal are governed by a 
separate provision in the statute. See id. § 25. 
203. Id. § 33(1), (2)(a). E.g., State v Tilbrook, [2007] WASCA 4, [1], [40]–[42] 
(WA) (ordering a new trial after setting aside the judgments of acquittal on charges of 
knowingly making false statements to a police officer that had been entered by the trial 
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The prosecution’s right to appeal an acquittal is more limited in New 
South Wales than in either Tasmania or Western Australia.  In New
South Wales204 the prosecution can appeal only an acquittal by a jury at
the direction of the trial judge205 or an acquittal by the judge sitting 
without a jury in a trial of an indictable offense.206  Moreover, such an 
appeal is restricted to a “ground that involves a question of law 
alone.”207  If the Court of Appeal finds the trial judge committed error, it 
judge at the conclusion of the defendants’ trial based upon her findings that none of the 
defendants had a case to answer).
204. New South Wales recognizes the pleas of autrefois convict and autrefois 
acquit. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) § 156(1) (Austl.) (“In any plea of autrefois
convict, or of autrefois acquit, it is sufficient for the accused person to allege that he or
she has been lawfully convicted or acquitted, as the case may be, of the offence charged 
in the indictment, without specifying the time or place of the previous conviction or
acquittal.”).
205. Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) § 107(1)(a), (2) (Austl.). E.g., R 
v R.K., [2008] NSWCCA 338, [1]–[2], [70], [73]–[75], [77]–[79], [2008] 73 NSWLR 80, 
82, 94] (NSW Crim. App.) (Austl.) (but upholding the trial judge’s decision at the end of 
the prosecution’s case to direct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty on the ground
that the offense charged in the indictment was not an offense known to law). 
206. Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) § 107(1)(b), (2) (Austl.). 
207. Id. § 107(2). 
Prior to the enactment of these provisions, the New South Wales Law Reform
Commission, in its report examining whether the prosecution should be allowed to 
appeal a directed verdict of acquittal, recommended that “[a] Crown right of appeal from 
a directed verdict of acquittal should not be introduced in New South Wales.” NEW
SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77: DIRECTED VERDICTS OF ACQUITTAL
§ 3 (1996) [hereinafter N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77].  In exploring the
scope of the rule against double jeopardy, the Commission stated: “The development of 
the principle [of double jeopardy] has gone beyond prohibiting multiple punishment for
the same offence, to adopting practices to prevent undue prolongation of the criminal 
process. To allow otherwise is to risk harassment of an accused, who is, after all 
presumed innocent.” Id. § 2.8. 
The Law Reform Commission of New South Wales was established by the Law
Reform Commission Act 1967, Law Reform Commission Act 1967 (NSW) (Austl.).  It
comprises a Chairman and at least two other members, all appointed by the Governor. 
Id. § 3(2).  Its purpose is, with references made to it,
to consider the law, enacted or promulgated by the Legislature of New South 
Wales . . . with a view to, or for the purpose of: (i) eliminating defects and 
anachronisms in the law, (ii) repealing obsolete or unnecessary enactments,
(iii) consolidating, codifying or revising the law, (iv) simplifying or 
modernising the law by bringing it into accord with current conditions, (v)
adopting new or more effective methods for the administration of the law and 
the dispensation of justice, (vi) systematically developing and reforming the
law.
Id. § 10(a), and to “consider proposals relating to matters in respect of which it is
competent for the Legislature of New South Wales . . . to enact or promulgate laws.”  Id.
§ 10(b). 
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may quash the acquittal208 and order a new trial.209 
In the United States, however, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment210 accords “absolute finality”211 to an acquittal212 and 
208. Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) § 107(5) (Austl.).
209. Id. § 107(6). 
The court, however, may neither convict or sentence the individual for the offense 
charged, nor direct the court conducting the new trial to do so.  Id. § 107(6)–(7). 
210. See supra text accompanying note 112. 
211. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978).  Accord Bullington v. Missouri, 
451 U.S. 430, 445 (1981); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980). 
212. See also Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467 (2005) (“[T]he Double
Jeopardy Clause . . . prohibits reexamination of a court-decreed acquittal to the same
extent it prohibits reexamination of an acquittal by a jury. . . .  [F]urther proceedings to 
secure [a conviction] are impermissible.”); Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 64 
(1978) (“That ‘[a] verdict of acquittal . . . [may] not be reviewed . . . without putting [the 
defendant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution’ has recently been
described as ‘the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy
jurisprudence.’” (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 
(1977)) (some internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 
345 (1975) (“[A] verdict of acquittal at the hands of the jury [is] not subject to review by
motion for rehearing [or] appeal . . . .”); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 
(1962) (per curiam) (“The verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed . . . 
without putting [the petitioners] twice in jeopardy and thereby violating the constitution.”
(quoting United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896) (bracketed material inserted by
the Court)). 
In a bench trial, or when the judge intervenes in a jury trial, what constitutes an
“acquittal” for purposes of the double jeopardy provision “is not controlled by the form 
of the judge’s action,” Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 571; accord United States v. 
Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 96 (1978); rather, a trial judge’s ruling constitutes an “acquittal” only
when “the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, in the 
defendant’s favor, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense
charged.” Id. at 97 (quoting Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 571 (brackets
deleted)).  “[A] ruling that as a matter of law the [prosecution’s] evidence is insufficient 
to establish [the defendant’s] factual guilt” constitutes “an acquittal under the Double 
Jeopardy Clause.”  Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 144 (1986).  See also Smith, 
543 U.S. at 467–68 (holding that an order by the trial judge entering a required finding of
not guilty in a jury trial, pursuant to a state rule of criminal procedure, meets the
definition of an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes); Smalis, 476 U.S. at 144 (“The
category of acquittals includes ‘judgment[s] . . . by the court that the evidence is
insufficient to convict.” (quoting Scott, 437 U.S. at 91 (alterations by the Court)); Martin 
Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 571–72 (“There can be no question that the judgments of 
acquittal entered here by the District Court were ‘acquittals’ in substance as well as 
form.”).
Before the Supreme Court held the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
see Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969), a few states had enacted statutes
allowing the prosecution to appeal an acquittal.  See, e.g., State v. Lee, 30 A. 1110,
1113–14 (Conn. 1894) (rejecting the claim of an individual acquitted by a jury of 
murder in the second degree that a statute allowing the prosecution to appeal questions of 
law, with the permission of the presiding judge, violated the common law principle 
against double jeopardy, and granting the prosecution a new trial because of the trial 
court’s erroneous exclusion of evidence); State v. Felch, 105 A. 23, 26–28 (Vt. 1918)
(rejecting the claim of an individual acquitted by a jury of murder that a statute allowing 
the prosecution to seek review of alleged errors at trial violated the Fourteenth 
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consequently bars the government from trying an individual a second 
time for the same offense following his acquittal,213 whether the acquittal
was rendered by a jury,214 a judge in a bench trial,215 or a judge in a jury
Amendment, and remanding the case for retrial because of the erroneous exclusion of 
evidence); State v. Kennedy, 113 N.W.2d 372, 375-77, 379 (Wis. 1962) (holding that the 
trial court’s ruling that there was insufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury was
a question of law, and therefore appealable by the prosecution under a statute allowing
the prosecution, with the permission of the trial judge, to appeal acquittals upon
questions of law, and additionally holding that subjecting the defendant to a second trial
because of errors in his first trial would not subject him to double jeopardy in violation
of the state constitution, but nevertheless affirming the defendant’s acquittal on the
ground that the trial court did not err in its ruling), overruled in part on other grounds by
State v. Holmstrom, 168 N.W.2d 574 (Wis. 1969). See generally OFFICE OF LEGAL 
POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE REP. NO. 6, REPORT TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND GOVERNMENT APPEALS OF ACQUITTALS
(1987) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL], reprinted in 22 J. LAW 
REFORM.834, 878–85 (1989).  Indeed, in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 
(1937), overruled by Benton, supra, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for first-
degree murder (and sentence of death) of a defendant whose previous conviction for
second-degree murder (and sentence of life imprisonment), after a trial for first-degree 
murder, was reversed following the prosecution’s successful appeal.  In doing so, the
Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Connecticut statute involved in Lee, supra, 
against a claim that it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Court reasoned that allowing the prosecution to appeal an acquittal did not violate 
the requirements of due process because it was not contrary to “a scheme of ordered 
liberty,” Palko 302 U.S. at 325, and did not “violate those ‘fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.’” Id. at 
328 (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).  See also id. (concluding 
that such an appeal did not subject the defendant to “a hardship so acute and shocking 
that our polity will not endure it”). 
213. Smith, 543 U.S. at 467; Smalis, 476 U.S. at 145–46; Bullington, 451 U.S. at 
437; DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 129; Scott, 437 U.S. at 88; Sanabria, 437 U.S. at 64; 
Burks, 437 U.S. at 10–11; Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978); Martin 
Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 576; United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 289-91 & n.18
(1970); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970); Benton, 395 U.S. at 797; Fong Foo, 
369 U.S. at 143; Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188, 192 (1957); Kepner v. 
United States, 195 U.S. 100, 130, 133 (1904) (although the decision was based on a 
statute extending double jeopardy protection to the Philippines, not on the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, the Supreme Court in DiFrancesco stated that it “has accepted [the] 
decision [in Kepner] as having correctly stated the relevant double jeopardy principles,” 
449 U.S. at 133 n.13 (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ball, 163 U.S. at 671. 
The Double Jeopardy Clause also bars a second trial when a defendant’s conviction is 
reversed by a reviewing court solely for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain the 
conviction. Burks, 437 U.S. at 18 (concluding that “the only ‘just’ remedy” in such a 
situation is for the reviewing court to “direct[] a judgment of acquittal”).
214. See Price, 398 U.S. at 329 (implied acquittal of charged greater offense by
conviction for lesser offense); Benton, 395 U.S. at 785, 797; Green, 355 U.S. at 184, 198
(implied acquittal of charged greater offense by conviction for lesser offense); Ball, 163
U.S. at 671. 
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trial.216  The finality of an acquittal applies even if it were “based upon 
an egregiously erroneous foundation.”217 
215. Smalis, 476 U.S. at 145–46 (the trial judge sustained the defendants’ demurrer
at the end of the prosecution’s case); Kepner, 195 U.S. at 133-34. See also Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 573 n.12 (“In the situation where a criminal prosecution is tried
by a judge alone, there is no question that the Double Jeopardy Clause accords his 
determination in favor of a defendant full constitutional effect.”).
216. Smith, 543 U.S. at 467 (at the conclusion of the prosecution’s case, the trial 
judge granted the defendant’s motion for a required finding of not guilty on one count of 
a three-count indictment); Sanabria, 437 U.S. at 54, 64 (in a multi-defendant trial, the 
trial judge granted one defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal); Martin Linen 
Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 564 (the trial judge granted the defendants’ motions for
judgments of acquittal following the discharge of a hung jury); Fong Foo, 369 U.S. at 
142-43 (the trial judge, apparently on his own motion, “directed the jury to return 
verdicts of acquittal”). 
Moreover, when the trial judge has ruled at the close of the prosecution’s case that its 
proof failed as a matter of law to establish the defendant’s guilt as to fewer than all the 
charges, and the trial has proceeded to the defendant’s introduction of evidence
concerning the remaining charges, the Double Jeopardy Clause generally prohibits the
judge from reconsidering her midtrial ruling. Smith, 543 U.S. at 473 (“unless the
availability of reconsideration has been plainly established by pre-existing rule or case 
authority”).  Compare Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 643 (2003) (holding the state 
supreme court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law when it 
concluded the Double Jeopardy Clause was not violated when the trial judge, before any
further proceedings occurred and before he informed the jury of his decision, reversed
his initial ruling that the prosecution failed to introduce sufficient evidence of 
premeditation to support a conviction for first-degree murder).
In Smith, the Supreme Court stated that “the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment prohibits reexamination of a court-decreed acquittal to the same extent it
prohibits reexamination of an acquittal by jury verdict.  This is so whether the judge’s 
ruling of acquittal comes in a bench trial or . . . in a trial by jury.”  543 U.S. at 467 
(citations omitted).  See also Smalis, 476 U.S. at 145 (“[W]hether the trial is to a jury or
to the bench, subjecting the defendant to postacquittal factfinding proceedings going to
guilt or innocence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.”); United States v. Jenkins, 420 
U.S. 358, 365 (1975) (“Since the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
nowhere distinguishes between bench and jury trials, the principles given expression
through that Clause apply to cases tried by a judge.”), overruled on other grounds by
Scott, 437 U.S. 82.
217. Fong Foo, 369 U.S. at 143 (indicating the trial judge had no power to direct a 
verdict of acquittal under the circumstances, but nevertheless concluding the acquittal 
could not be reviewed without putting the acquitted defendants twice in jeopardy in 
violation of the Constitution).  Accord DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 129 (quoting Fong Foo, 
369 U.S. at 143); Washington, 434 U.S. at 503 (quoting Fong Foo, 369 U.S. at 143).  See 
also Smith, 543 U.S. at 473 (“[T]he well established rule [is] that the bar [of the Double
Jeopardy Clause] will attach to a pre-verdict acquittal that is patently wrong in law.”);
Smalis, 476 U.S. at 144 n.7 ( “[T]he fact that the acquittal may result from erroneous 
evidentiary rulings or erroneous interpretations of governing legal principles . . . affects 
the accuracy of that determination but it does not alter its essential character.” (quoting 
Scott, 437 U.S. at 98) (internal quotations marks omitted; alterations by the Court));
DiFrancesco. 449 U.S. at 132 (“It is acquittal that prevents retrial even if legal error was 
committed at the trial.”); Burks, 437 U.S. at 16 (“[W]e . . . afford absolute finality to a 
jury’s verdict of acquittal–no matter how erroneous it decision . . . .” (emphasis 
deleted)); Green, 355 U.S. at 188 (“[I]t is one of the elemental principles of our criminal 
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Accordingly, although the primary purpose of the double jeopardy 
provision in the Fifth Amendment is not “to prevent . . . [g]overnment 
appeals per se,”218 it nevertheless prohibits an appeal by the prosecution 
of an acquittal whenever reversal by the appellate court would lead 
either to a second trial219 or “further proceedings of some sort, devoted
to the resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the offense 
charged,”220 such as a resumption of the appellee’s trial.221  The Supreme 
law that the [g]overnment cannot secure a new trial by means of an appeal even though
an acquittal may appear to be erroneous.”).
To be accorded this finality, however, the acquittal must be rendered in a court having 
jurisdiction over both the defendant and the offense.  For an acquittal rendered in a court 
lacking jurisdiction is “absolutely void,” and therefore does not bar a second trial for the 
same offense in a court that has jurisdiction. Ball, 163 U.S. at 669. 
218. Sanabria, 437 U.S. at 63. Accord Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 568– 
69 (“The development of the Double Jeopardy Clause from its common-law origins . . . 
suggests that it was directed at the threat of multiple prosecutions, not at [g]overnment
appeals, at least where those appeals would not require a new trial.” (quoting United 
States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 342 (1975)).  See also DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 131
(“The Double Jeopardy Clause is not a complete barrier to an appeal by the prosecution
in a criminal case.”); Wilson, 420 U.S. at 342 (“In the course of the debates over the Bill 
of Rights, there was no suggestion that the Double Jeopardy Clause imposed any general
ban on appeals by the prosecution.”). 
For a brief overview of how the Supreme Court and Congress have dealt with 
prosecution appeals in the Federal courts, see id. at 336–42. 
219. See Smalis, 476 U.S. at 145–46; Scott, 437 U.S. at 91; Martin Linen Supply
Co., 430 U.S. at 570–71; Wilson, 420 U.S. at 336.  See also DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 
132 (“[W]here a [g]overnment appeal presents no threat of successive prosecutions, the
Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended.” (quoting Martin Linen Supply, 430 U.S. at 
569–70)); Green, 355 U.S. at 188 (“[T]he [g]overnment cannot secure a new trial by
means of an appeal even though an acquittal may appear to be erroneous.”).
220. Smalis, 476 U.S. at 145–46 (quoting Martin Linen Supply Co. 430 U.S. at 
570).
See also Smith, 543 U.S. at 469 n.4 (“[A]n acquittal, once final, may not be 
reconsidered on appeal or otherwise.”); Sanabria, 437 U.S. at 69 (“[The] judgment of
acquittal [for insufficient evidence], however erroneous, bars further prosecution . . . and 
hence bars appellate review of the trial court’s error.”); Martin Linen Supply Co., 430
U.S. at 575 (“[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause bars appeal from [a judgment of] acquittal
entered [by a trial court upon a motion by the defendant or upon the court’s own
motion].”); Wilson, 420 U.S. at 345 (“[A] verdict of acquittal at the hands of the jury [is]
not subject to review by . . . appeal . . . .”) (quoting Forman v. United States 361 U.S.
416, 426 (1960)); Fong Foo, 369 U.S. at 143 (“The verdict of acquittal was final, and
could not be reviewed . . . without putting [the petitioners] twice in jeopardy, and thereby 
violating the constitution.” (quoting Ball, 163 U.S. at 671) (alteration by the Court)); 
Kepner, 195 U.S. at 133–34 (holding, as characterized in Green, 355 U.S. at 192, “that 
the [g]overnment could not appeal an acquittal”).
221. Smalis, 476 U.S. at 145 (rejecting the prosecution’s contention that its appeal 
was permissible “because resumption of [the] petitioners’ bench trial following a
reversal on appeal would simply constitute ‘continuing jeopardy.’”). Cf. Smith, 543 U.S. 
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Court of the United States has recognized that “[a] system permitting 
review of all claimed legal errors would have symmetry to recommend
it222 and would avoid the release of some defendants who have benefitted 
from instructions or evidentiary rulings that are unduly favorable to 
them.”223  Nevertheless, the Court has rejected that position, being “of 
the view that the policies underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause
militate against permitting the [g]overnment to appeal after a verdict of 
acquittal.”224  “Granting the [g]overnment such broad appeal rights,” the
Court explained in United States v. Wilson,225 “would . . . disserve the
at 467 (holding that submission to the jury of a count of the indictment on which the trial 
judge had reconsidered and reversed her initial midtrial ruling entering a required finding 
of not guilty subjected the defendant “to further ‘factfinding proceedings going to guilt
or innocence,’ prohibited by Smalis following an acquittal”) (quoting Smalis, 476 U.S. at 
145)).
If an appeal by the government does not present a threat of successive prosecutions, 
the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 569– 
70. Accord DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 132.  Thus, the government can appeal an acquittal 
ordered by a trial judge overruling a jury’s verdict of guilty.  For in such a situation a 
new trial would not be necessary; rather the appellate court could merely reverse the trial 
judge’s decision, thereby reinstating the jury’s original verdict of guilty. Jenkins, 420
U.S. at 365, overruled on other grounds by Scott, 437 U.S. 82.  See Wilson, 420 U.S. at 
352–53. See also Smith, 543 U.S. at 467; DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 130.  For the same 
reason, the government can appeal an acquittal when the judge in a bench trial finds the
defendant guilty, but then sets aside that finding and enters a judgment of acquittal after
concluding that some of the evidence on which he based his initial finding of guilt 
should not have been admitted into evidence and that, without that evidence, the
prosecution failed to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United 
States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 270–71 (1978). See also DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at
136–38, 143 (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude the prosecution 
from appealing a convicted defendant’s sentence). 
222. At least in felony cases, a convicted defendant generally can appeal his 
conviction, JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: VOLUME 2: ADJUDICATION § 16.01 (4th ed. 2006); 7 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 27.1 (3d ed. 
2007) [hereinafter LAFAVE ET AL.] (“In the federal system and in most states, statutes (or 
state constitutional provisions) guarantee defendants in all felony cases a right to 
appellate review. In a small number of states, review of felony convictions remains at the
discretion of the state’s highest court, but the defendant has at least the opportunity to 
gain appellate review.”); e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(j)(1)(A); 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006); ILL.
CONST. art. 6, § 6; ILL. SUP. CT. R.615; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 450.10 (McKinney
2005); see generally 7 LAFAVE ET AL., supra, §§ 27.1–.2, 27.5–.6, and, if successful, 
obtain a new trial.  E.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 615(b)(5); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.20
(McKinney 2009).  Ordinarily, a second trial for the same offense under such
circumstances does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Ball, 163 U.S. at 671–72. 
Accord Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38–39 (1988); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 
326–27 (1970); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465–66 (1971) (articulating the 
rationale for allowing a second trial).  But see Burks, 437 U.S. at 16 (holding that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause bars a second trial when a defendant’s conviction is reversed by
a reviewing court solely for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction). 
223. Wilson, 420 U.S. at 352
224. Id.
225. 420 U.S. 332 (1975). 
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defendant’s legitimate interest in the finality of a verdict of acquittal.”226 
More importantly, though, it “would allow the prosecutor to seek to
persuade a second trier of fact of the defendant’s guilt after having failed
with the first; it would permit him to re-examine the weaknesses in his 
first presentation in order to strengthen the second”227  and “would present
an unacceptably high risk that the [g]overnment, with its vastly superior 
resources, might wear down the defendant,”228  “thereby ‘enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.’”229  It  
therefore seems that in the United States a statute containing provisions 
akin to those in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 allowing a prosecution
appeal of a judge’s pre-verdict finding that the prosecution failed to 
prove the defendant’s guilt would be unconstitutional.230 
226. Id. at 352.  See also Smalis, 476 U.S. at 145 (“When a successful postacquittal
appeal by the prosecution would lead to proceedings that violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause, the appeal has no proper purpose.  Allowing such an appeal would frustrate the
interest of the accused in having an end to the proceedings against him.”).
227. Wilson, 420 U.S. at 352. 
228. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978). 
229. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129–30 (1980) (quoting Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957)).  Accord Scott, 437 U.S. at 91. 
In Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978), the Supreme Court stated: 
[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause [does not] permit[] the [g]overnment to obtain 
relief from all of the adverse rulings—most of which result from defense 
motions—that lead to the termination of a criminal trial in the defendant’s
favor.  To hold that a defendant waives his double jeopardy protection
whenever a trial court error in his favor on a midtrial motion leads to an 
acquittal would undercut the adversary assumption on which our system of
criminal justice rests and would vitiate one of the fundamental rights 
established by the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
230. Some uncertainty exists because of the language contained in the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467 (2005).  The Court in 
Smith held that the defendant had been subjected to double jeopardy when, at the 
conclusion of his trial, the trial judge reversed her initial midtrial ruling entering a 
required finding of not guilty on one count of a multi-count indictment and submitted 
that count to the jury.  In doing so, however, the Court emphasized that an “acquittal, 
once final, may not be reconsidered on appeal or otherwise.” Id. at 469 n.4. See also id.
(“[T]he initial jeopardy does not end until there is a final decision.”).  Moreover, the 
Court stated that it thought “that as a general matter state law may prescribe that a 
judge’s midtrial determination of the sufficiency of the State’s proof can be
reconsidered.” Id. at 470.  See also id. at 473 (“If, after a facially unqualified midtrial 
dismissal of one count, the trial has proceeded to the defendant’s introduction of 
evidence, the acquittal must be treated as final, unless the availability of reconsideration 
has been plainly established by pre-existing rule or case authority expressly applicable to
midtrial rulings on the sufficiency of the evidence.”).  If a state can allow a trial judge to
reconsider his midtrial ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence without violating the 
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Thus, some disagreement exists among common law jurisdictions on 
whether the rule against double jeopardy prohibits the prosecution from 
appealing an acquittal. Nevertheless, even if the rule itself does not bar
such appeals, one must recognize, as did the English Law Commission, 
that “[t]he issues of double jeopardy and prosecution appeals . . . are clearly 
related,” because “[t]hey both concern the circumstances in which an
acquittal may be revisited at the instigation of the prosecution, with the
possibility of retrial.”231  It is therefore appropriate, in evaluating the
wisdom of allowing the prosecution to appeal a ruling of no case to answer, 
to weigh the need for such prosecution appeals against the policies
underlying the rule against double jeopardy.232 
V. PROSECUTION APPEALS OF A RULING OF NO CASE TO ANSWER IN 
LIGHT OF THE POLICIES UNDERLYING THE PROHIBITION
AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY
A. The Need for a Prosecution Right to Appeal a Ruling of 
No Case to Answer
A number of different arguments can be made in support of the need
for a scheme under which the prosecution can appeal a trial judge’s 
ruling that the defendant has no case to answer.  It can be argued that
such appeal rights will: (1) help to achieve symmetry between the appeal 
rights of the prosecution and those of the defendant, thereby aiding in 
rectifying an imbalance in the criminal justice system;233 (2) clarify the
law involved in the particular case and, more importantly, prevent the 
law from taking the wrong course;234 (3) increase the accountability of
Double Jeopardy Clause, perhaps it may also be constitutionally permissible for a state to 
provide by statute that the prosecution can take an immediate appeal from such a midtrial
ruling. But see id. at 469 n.4 (“[T]he taking of an appeal necessarily signals the finality
of the order appealed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 477 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“An appeal, including an interlocutory appeal, moves a case from a court of 
first instance to an appellate forum, and necessarily signals that the trial court has ruled 
with finality on the appealed issue or issues.”) (emphasis added). 
231. ENG. LAWCOMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 1.11. 
232. This ostensibly was the approach taken by the English Law Commission in its
report on prosecution appeals. See ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, 
para. 7.18 (“[A] trial is a forum in which it is sought to do justice between the different, 
often incompatible interests of the various participants. . . .  [T]he participants whose
interests have to be accommodated are not limited to the prosecution, representing the
public interest, and the defendant, but may also include the complainant insofar as that 
person may have a different perspective from that of the prosecution.  The concept of
‘balancing’ those competing interests is . . . in our judgment entirely appropriate.”). 
233. See infra text accompanying notes 237–67. 
234. See infra text accompanying notes 269–79. 
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trial judges and improve the quality of their performance;235 and (4) 
enhance the accuracy of the outcome of criminal proceedings, thereby 
preventing miscarriages of justice in some cases and maintaining respect
for, and confidence in, the criminal justice system.236 
1. Achieving Symmetry and Rectifying an Imbalance in the     
Criminal Justice System
In a 1999 lecture, Lord Williams of Mostyn, then the Attorney General of
England, expressed his concern that there was an “imbalance”237 in the
criminal justice system because, unlike a convicted defendant,238 the 
prosecution could not appeal various types of adverse rulings made by
the judge during a trial.239  In particular, Lord Mostyn pointed out that
the prosecution could not appeal a trial judge’s ruling to stay the 
prosecution on the ground of abuse of process, to direct the jury to acquit 
the defendant (i.e., that the defendant had no case to answer), or to
exclude crucial evidence from the prosecution’s case.240  According to 
the Lord Mostyn, the way to “remedy” this “imbalance” was to allow the
prosecution to appeal such rulings,241 which would thereby have the
effect of making the appeal rights of the defendant and the prosecution 
more symmetrical. 
As Lord Mostyn’s statements illustrate, appeal rights in Anglo-
American criminal justice systems, at least in the recent past, have been
asymmetrical in nature, that is, the defendant possesses greater rights of
235. See infra text accompanying notes 280–306. 
236. See infra text accompanying notes 307–26. 
237. Lord Williams of Mostyn, Attorney General, Tom Sargant Commemorative 
Lecture: Unfinished Business—Work Still To Be Done, para. 54 (Nov. 29, 1999), 
available at http://www.roughjusticetv.co.uk/ mostyn.htm [hereinafter Lord Williams of
Mostyn].
238. See Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, c. 19, § 1(1) (Eng.). 
239. Lord Williams of Mostyn, supra note 237, paras. 53–54. 
Two years later, the English Law Commission amplified this theme when it stated:
“The absence of a right of appeal, on a point of law, against a verdict for one side only is 
an anomaly within our system, which otherwise provides the loser in litigation, whether
claimant or defendant, with the facility of a higher court giving a second opinion on 
questions of law.”  ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 7.11.  See 
also  REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 212, at 837 (stating that under
current American law there is a “disparity of treatment” between the appeal rights of
defendants and those of the prosecution). 
240. Lord Williams of Mostyn, supra note 237, para. 54. 
241. Id. at paras. 54–55. 
 55










   




















   
 
appeal than does the prosecution.242  But the fact that allowing the
prosecution greater appeal rights will help to achieve symmetry in appeal
rights is not, in itself, a valid argument to grant such rights.243  For “there
is no necessity for symmetry, just for the sake of symmetry.”244  Rather, in 
determining whether the prosecution should be allowed to appeal certain 
types of rulings by a trial judge, the merits of permitting such appeals 
must be considered with respect to each type of ruling.245  For example, 
on the merits, a decision to allow the prosecution to appeal a pretrial
ruling by a trial judge dismissing the indictment,246 or excluding certain
evidence from the prosecution’s case,247 may be a wise one, and the
effect of extending such appeal rights to the prosecution will, of course,
be greater symmetry.  Nevertheless, the resulting symmetry should merely
be a consequence of any such change, not a reason for it.248 
242. In the United States, for example, although a defendant convicted of a serious 
offense after a trial generally can appeal that conviction, see supra note 222, the 
prosecution is, in most cases, constitutionally barred from appealing an acquittal, “even 
if legal error was committed at the trial,” United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 
132 (1980). See supra text accompanying notes 210–30. 
Prior to England’s expanding the prosecution’s appeal rights in the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003, some common law jurisdictions had already taken steps towards achieving
greater symmetry.  For example, in 1924 the Australian state of Tasmania granted the 
prosecution the right to appeal an acquittal on matters of law, see supra text 
accompanying notes 190–95, and in 1930 Canada, see Cullen v. The King, [1949] S.C.R. 
658, 661 (Can.) (“The right to appeal to the Court of Appeal against any judgment or 
verdict of acquittal in a trial court in respect of an indictable offence on any ground of 
appeal which involves a question of law alone was first given by s. 28, c. 11, Statutes of 
Canada 1930.”), did the same.  See supra text accompanying notes 175–79. 
243. In writing for the Supreme Court of the United States in an opinion upholding 
the constitutionality of a state statute allowing the prosecution to appeal questions of law 
following a jury’s acquittal of the defendant, Justice Benjamin Cardozo focused upon the 
symmetry of a system allowing both the defendant and the prosecution to appeal a jury
verdict. He stated, under the statute in question, “[t]he edifice of justice stands, its 
symmetry, to many, greater than before.”  Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328
(1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
244. FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 280 (commenting on the view that a new trial 
should not be allowed following an improper conviction because a new trial is not 
permitted following an improper acquittal).
245. Cf. id. (“The answers to the question whether there should be new trial in each 
case [following a successful appeal of an acquittal and following the successful appeal of 
a conviction] depend on considerations of policy and the factors influencing each are 
bound to be different.”). 
246. See 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (2006); R v. T., [2005] EWCA (Crim) 3511, [1]–[2], [7],
[16], [18] (Eng.) (allowing the prosecution’s appeal, taken pursuant to the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003, of the trial judge’s ruling quashing seven counts of an indictment on 
the ground they were defective in law). 
247. See 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (2006); Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 
1996, c. 25, §§ 31(3)(a), 35(1) (Eng.). 
248. To illustrate the fallacy in the “symmetry for symmetry’s sake” argument, one 
need only point out that, prior to 2003, Parliament could truly have made the appeal 
rights of the parties in a criminal case symmetrical by repealing the statutes granting a 
defendant the right to appeal a conviction, thereby creating a “symmetrical” system in
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By its very nature, an Anglo-American legal system is asymmetrical.
Only the government249 (i.e., the prosecution) has the power to haul a
person into court and force her to defend herself against charges of
criminal conduct.  An individual whose name has been bandied about in 
the press as a “suspect” in a particular crime, or who is “rumored” to
have committed a certain crime, cannot force the government to prosecute 
her so she can seek to be acquitted and thereby clear her name.
Similarly, the standard of proof required in a criminal case results in an 
“asymmetrical” system, in that the prosecution, to obtain a conviction, 
must prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,250 but the
defendant need only create a reasonable doubt of her guilt to be entitled 
to an acquittal.251  A “symmetrical” system would merely require the
prosecution to meet a preponderance of the evidence standard to gain a 
conviction. So too, the defendant in a criminal case may, if she so
desires, enter the witness box (i.e., take the stand) and testify in her own
behalf;252 yet, because she is clothed with a privilege against self-
which neither the prosecution nor the defendant could appeal an adverse verdict.  But 
certainly there are valid policy reasons for allowing a convicted defendant to appeal her
conviction, reasons that apply without regard to whether the prosecution has a similar 
right to appeal. One would hope that in the 21st century no right-minded person would
opt to disregard those reasons and, merely for the sake of symmetry, opt for a system that 
precludes a convicted (and perhaps factually innocent) defendant from showing that her 
conviction resulted from a legal error at her trial. 
249. Although a private individual can, under certain circumstances, bring a 
criminal prosecution in England, see supra note 117, such prosecutions are rare.  See
SPRACK, supra note 16, § 4.20. 
250. Woolmington v. DPP, [1935] A.C. 462 (H.L.) 481-82 (Viscount Sankey)
(appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.); WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 42–43; In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally
required in criminal cases).
251. See, e.g., Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 234 (1987) (“When the prosecution
has made out a prima facie case and survives a motion to acquit, the jury may 
nevertheless not convict if the evidence offered by the defendant raises any reasonable 
doubt about the existence of any fact necessary for the finding of guilt.”). 
252. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49 (1987) (“At this point in the development 
of our adversary system, it cannot be doubted that a defendant in a criminal case has the 
right to take the witness stand and to testify in his or her own defense.”); Criminal 
Evidence Act, 1898, c. 36, § 1 (Eng.) (“A person charged in criminal proceedings shall 
not be called as a witness in the proceedings except upon his own application.”
(emphasis added)); SPRACK, supra note 16, § 20.58 (“The [defendant] is a competent . . .
witness for the defence.” (emphasis added)). See also Criminal Justice and Public Order
Act, 1994, c. 33, § 2 (Eng.) (“[T]he court shall, at the conclusion of the evidence for the 
prosecution, satisfy itself (in the case of proceedings on indictment with a jury, in the 
presence of the jury) that the accused is aware that the stage has been reached at which 
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incrimination, the prosecution cannot call her to testify, no matter how 
favorable her testimony would be to the prosecution’s case.253  In each of
these situations a policy decision has been made that there is a need for 
asymmetrical rights.  Thus, for policy reasons, Anglo-American systems
of criminal justice have been (and are) asymmetrical, and will continue 
to be so, even though the prosecution might possess greater appeal rights 
than in the past. 
Moreover, despite the recent legislation in England granting the
prosecution the right to appeal certain rulings, appeal rights in that country 
are still asymmetrical.  For instance, only the defendant can appeal a
non-directed verdict rendered by a jury.  Certainly if one were going to
focus on symmetry as a justification for expanding the appeal rights of the
prosecution, one would, to be consistent, have to argue that the prosecution
should be permitted to appeal a jury’s non-directed verdict of not guilty.
Yet the English Law Commission opposed such an expansion of appeal 
rights in its 2000 consultation paper on prosecution appeals,254 and in its
2001 report on that topic revealed that it had received “virtually no
opposition”255 to that position.256 When contrasted with the fact that the
Law Commission’s provisional conclusion “that there should be no right
of appeal by the prosecution against a ruling of no case to answer”257 
“gave rise to [a] significant level of . . . dissent,”258 it is clear even those 
favoring the expansion of the prosecution’s rights of appeal were satisfied
with an asymmetrical system.  Moreover, one could argue the current
system of appeal rights in England is asymmetrical in another respect,
because, while the prosecution can immediately appeal a trial judge’s
ruling of no case to answer, the defendant cannot immediately appeal a 
trial judge’s refusal to allow a submission of no case to answer.259 
evidence can be given for the defence and that he can, if he wishes, give evidence.”
(emphasis added)). See generally 6 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 222, § 24.5(d). 
253. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974) (noting that the language of the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination clearly encompasses the 
“situation[] in which the prosecution seeks to call a defendant to testify against himself at 
his criminal trial”); Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, c. 36, § 1 (Eng.) (“A person charged in 
criminal proceedings shall not be called as a witness in the proceedings except upon his 
own application.” (emphasis added)).  See generally 6 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 222, 
§ 24.5(a).
254. ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158, supra note 25, para. 6.26 
(“We provisionally conclude that there should be no right of appeal by the prosecution 
against a jury’s verdict of not guilty, even where there has been a misdirection by the
trial judge which may have favoured the defence.”). 
255. ENG. LAWCOMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 7.78. 
256. Id. (stating “[t]here was . . . no opposition . . . from any practitioner or judge”). 
257. ENG. LAWCOMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158, supra note 25, para. 6.20. 
258. ENG. LAWCOMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 7.3. 
259. See id. at para. 7.41 (“[T]he defence right of appeal is most properly and 
conveniently exercised at the end of the trial after conviction.  It may, of course, include, 
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To put it succinctly, an Anglo-American criminal justice system is
not, nor is it intended to be, a system containing symmetrical rights for 
the prosecution and the defendant. Why?  Because “the parties are not 
of equal strength.”260  Indeed, the accused is “powerless[] . . . relative to 
the [prosecution].”261  Putting aside other advantages it may possess,262 
the prosecution—that is to say, the government263—possesses an
enormous advantage in resources over those possessed by an individual 
accused of crime, typically allowing it to do much more in its efforts to 
convict the individual than the individual can do in his defense.  For 
example, if the prosecution knows a particular person’s testimony would 
be favorable to it, but does not know the person’s whereabouts, it can 
spend huge sums of money to track down the missing witness, perhaps 
even using the police department to help it.  Moreover, not only can the 
prosecution assign numerous staff attorneys to prepare and present its
case, it also can use doctors, scientists, and other forensic experts on the 
government payroll (or it can hire such individuals on a case-by-case 
as a ground of appeal, the refusal of the trial judge to make a terminating ruling.  A 
defence right of appeal during the trial would lead to . . . delay and disruption . . . .”). 
One could, of course, respond to this argument, as the English Law Commission did, 
by saying that the appeal rights are indeed symmetrical because the defendant, if
convicted, can appeal on the ground that the trial judge erred in refusing her submission
of no case to answer.  Id. (“There is effective and practical parity in that, if the defendant
is convicted, then the general right of defence appeal against conviction includes an 
appeal against the refusal of an application for a terminating ruling.  Thus both sides 
have an appeal against the ruling at the conclusion of the trial, whenever that may be.”).
See also R v. Broadhead, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 1705, [14] (Eng.) (“[W]e do not accept 
that it is proper on an appeal based upon an allegedly erroneous ruling as to a ‘no case’
submission for this court to have regard to evidence subsequently given at the trial in the 
course of the case for the defendant or co-defendants. . . .  [T]he clear weight of authority
is in favour of the proposition that such an erroneous ruling must render the conviction
unsafe because it follows that, but for the ruling, the jury’s verdict would have been 
different.  It would have been to acquit the defendant on the direction of the judge.”). 
260. FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 280 (commenting on the view that a new trial 
should not be allowed following an improper conviction because a new trial is not 
permitted following an improper acquittal).
261. N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N, DISCUSSION PAPER 37, supra note 191, para. 
4.14. 
262. During the period between indictment and trial, the accused, unlike the 
prosecution, may suffer adverse physical and psychological effects, as well as significant 
financial consequences, see infra text accompanying notes 458–62, that can have a 
negative impact upon his case.  For instance, the psychological effects of the charge 
upon the accused might hamper his ability to help his attorney prepare his defense, or an 
innocent individual, overwrought at the prospect of his looming trial, might plead guilty
merely to “get the matter over with.”
263. But see supra note 117. 
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basis) to help in the investigation, preparation, and presentation of its
case. In sum, the prosecution can spend “whatever it takes” in a particular 
case to obtain a conviction. On the other hand, it is unlikely that all but
the wealthiest criminal defendants could afford to retain an attorney and
then match, or even come close to matching, the government’s spending
to allow the attorney to investigate the facts in the case and to prepare
for trial.264  Nor is it likely that a legal aid attorney representing a
defendant who lacks sufficient means to hire a lawyer265 would be permitted
to expend substantial sums from the public coffers for such purposes.266 
Arguing a particular procedure should be adopted merely to make part
of the criminal justice system symmetrical fails to take into account this 
inequality between the parties.  Certain safeguards must be afforded “the 
weaker of the two parties”267 to reduce, to some extent, the enormous 
advantage in resources that the government possesses.  One logically 
could maintain, for example, that if the prosecution, with all its
resources, managed to obtain a conviction, the defendant should be able
to attack that conviction on appeal, but that if the prosecution, despite its 
enormous advantage in resources, could not present a sufficient case to
convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
264. This would seem to be true in England even though a criminal defendant who 
is “tried on indictment and acquitted” is entitled to be reimbursed, Prosecution of 
Offences Act, 1985, c. 23, § 16(2)(b) (Eng.), an “amount as the [trial] court considers 
reasonably sufficient to compensate him for any expenses properly incurred by him in 
the proceedings.” Id. § 16(6). For it is difficult for one to expend large sums of money
he does not have, even if he knows that he will be, at least to some extent, reimbursed if
he is acquitted at trial.
265. The Access to Justice Act 1999 eliminated a means test to qualify for legal aid 
in criminal cases (although leaving it open for a means test to be re-introduced through
regulations). Access to Justice Act, 1999, c. 22, §§ 12–15, 17–17A, Sch. 3, §§ 1(1), 
2(1), 3B(1), 5(1), (2) (Eng.). As a result, for about a decade, very few individuals in
England retained private counsel to represent them in a criminal case.  Norman Lefstein, 
In Search of Gideon’s Promises: Lessons from England and the Need for Federal Help, 
55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 868 (2004) (stating that several solicitors told the author that the 
only people who retain private counsel in criminal cases are celebrities and those 
charged with corporate misconduct, and that “the Head of Public Legal Services for the 
Lord Chancellor’s Department commented that more persons retain private physicians in 
lieu of the National Health Service than defendants in criminal cases retain private 
lawyers”).  Regulations that recently took effect, however, re-introduced a means test for 
cases tried in the Crown Court, which means that far fewer individuals will be entitled to
a legal aid attorney at no cost to themselves.  See Criminal Legal Aid Eligibility, LEGAL
SERV. COMM’N, http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/criminal/getting_legal_aid/means_testing
_in_the_courts.asp (explaining the means test and stating that “[a]bout half of all 
defendants receive legal aid at the magistrates’ court, and about 3 out of 4 at the Crown
Court”). See also  PROPOSALS FOR THE REFORM OF LEGAL AID IN ENGLAND AND WALES
ANNEX B 156-57 (Nov. 2010).  See generally  LEGAL AID IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS, 
available at http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/docs/cds_main/ A_guide_to_CCMT.pdf. 
266. See supra note 264. 
267. FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 280 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the crime in question, or to convince a trial judge that the evidence
introduced by the prosecution–even when taken most favorably to the 
prosecution–could not convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
defendant’s guilt, that should be the end of the matter and no appeal
from that decision should be allowed. 
2. Clarifying the Law and Preventing It from          
Taking the Wrong Course 
A second argument in favor of a prosecution right to appeal a trial
judge’s ruling of no case to answer is that a successful appeal of an 
erroneous decision will help to clarify the law at issue in the particular 
case and prevent the law from following the wrong course.268  To  
illustrate: Assume D1 is charged with committing crime X and that at the
close of the prosecution’s case D1’s attorney argues Y is an essential
element of crime X and submits that because the prosecution failed to
introduce any evidence of element Y, her client has no case to answer.
Further assume the trial judge allows the submission,269 erroneously
concluding that crime X does indeed require element Y. It could be 
argued that unless the prosecution can appeal that erroneous decision, 
not only will D1 be acquitted, but the law concerning crime X will be 
wrongly-stated and develop along the wrong path.
Such an argument, however, suffers from at least three serious flaws.
First, the hypothetical stated above and other fact situations raising
questions about the scope of the substantive law will rarely occur.  For in 
the run-of-the-mill case involving a submission of no case to answer, the 
elements of the offense with which the defendant is charged are clear,
and the judge merely must decide whether the prosecution introduced
evidence that, if believed, would be sufficient to convince a jury beyond 
a reasonable doubt of the presence of each of those elements and of the 
identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the offense.  Such a 
decision is case-specific, and its resolution will not affect the development 
268. See N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N, DISCUSSION PAPER 37, supra note 191, 
para. 4.19; N.S.W. LAWREFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 207, para. 2.29. 
269. See R v. Galbraith, [1981] 73 Crim. App. 124, 127 (Eng.) (“If there is no evidence 
that the crime alleged has been committed by the defendant, there is no difficulty.  The 
judge will of course stop the case.”); SPRACK, supra note 16, § 20.49 (“If there is literally
no evidence relating to an essential element of the offence . . . , a submission of no case 
must clearly succeed.”). See also ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, 
para. 7.50 & n.30 (setting forth criteria from Galbraith). 
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of the law with respect to the offense with which the defendant is
charged.  For example, in the Northern Ireland case involving “Mo”
Courtney,270 there was no dispute about the elements of the crime of
murder or about the fact that someone had murdered Alan McCullough. 
The only issue raised by Courtney’s submission of no case to answer
was whether the evidence introduced by the prosecution was sufficient
to show “Mo” Courtney was the person who killed, or at least participated
in the killing of, Alan McCullough. Even if the prosecution could not 
have appealed the trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer and that 
ruling had stood, it would not have steered the law of murder in the
wrong direction.
But even in those few cases that involve a legal question concerning 
the scope of the crime charged, such as, in the above hypothetical, 
whether that crime (crime X) requires a particular element (element Y), it 
is unlikely, even absent a prosecution right of appeal, that a decision by
one trial judge will alter the course of the law. Assuming prosecutions
for crime X occur with some frequency, it is highly probable that the 
same legal issue that arose in the prosecution of D1 will arise again in 
the prosecutions of other individuals. It is also fair to assume that in at 
least one of these other prosecutions, say the trial of D2, the trial judge, 
unlike the judge in the trial of D1, will conclude that element Y is not a 
required element of crime X and that D2 will be convicted of crime X
and will appeal that conviction. On appeal, D2 will contend, as D1 did
in his case, that he could not properly be convicted of crime X because
the prosecution failed to prove the existence of element Y. The issue 
whether element Y is an essential element of crime X—the issue the 
prosecution would have liked to appeal in D1’s case—will then be 
joined before the Court of Appeal, and that court can reject the first trial 
judge’s erroneous interpretation and redirect the law of crime X to its 
proper path.
Finally, in cases such as the one in the above hypothetical,271 English
law provides a procedure by which the government can seek to prevent 
the law from being diverted down the wrong path. Under the Criminal 
Justice Act 1972, when a person has been acquitted in a trial on an 
indictment, the Attorney General can obtain the opinion of the Court of 
Appeal on a point of law that arose in the case by referring the point to 
that court.272  The Court of Appeal gives its opinion on the point of law
after a full adversary hearing at which both the Attorney General273 and 
270. See supra text accompanying notes 11–39. 
271. See supra text accompanying note 269. 
272. Criminal Justice Act, 1972, c. 71, § 36(1) (Eng.). 
273. Id. § 36(2)(a).
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counsel for the acquitted individual,274 or an advocate appointed by the
court as amicus curiae,275 present their arguments.  Once the Court of 
Appeal has given its opinion on the point of law, it can refer that point to 
the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, either on its own motion or 
pursuant to an application of one of the parties,276 to obtain that court’s
opinion on the point.277  The opinion of the Court of Appeal (or the
Supreme Court) on the point of law does not, however, “affect the trial 
in relation to which the reference [was] made or [the] acquittal in that
trial.”278  Thus, even without a prosecution right of appeal, this Act
provides a mechanism by which the Attorney General can have the 
Court of Appeal, and perhaps the Supreme Court, clarify an issue of law
and set it on the proper path, without setting aside the acquittal of the 
accused in the particular case.279 
3. Increasing the Accountability of Trial Judges 
A third argument in favor of allowing prosecution appeals of a trial
judge’s ruling of no case to answer is that such appeal rights will 
increase the accountability of trial judges by permitting their rulings to 
274. The acquitted person can, if he so desires, have counsel present his argument 
on the point to the Court of Appeal (and Supreme Court of the United Kingdom) on his 
behalf.  Id. § 36(2)(b) (also allowing the acquitted individual, with leave, to present his 
argument personally).  An acquitted individual who appears by counsel is entitled to be 
reimbursed from public funds for his costs.  Id. § 36(5). 
275. ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158, supra note 25, para. 2.2 
(stating that if the acquitted individual declines to argue the point of law, “the court may
appoint an advocate as an amicus curiae”). 
276. Criminal Justice Act, 1972, § 36(3) (providing that the Court of Appeal “may, 
of their own motion or in pursuance of an application in that behalf, refer the point to the 
Supreme Court if it appears to the Court of Appeal that the point ought to be considered
by the Supreme Court”). 
277. Id. § 36(4) (“If a point is referred to the Supreme Court . . . , the Supreme
Court shall consider the point and give its opinion on it accordingly . . . .”).
278. Id. § 36(7). 
279. ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158, supra note 25, para. 1.27. 
See also N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N, DISCUSSION PAPER 37, supra note 191, para. 
4.19 (concluding that, in light of the then-existing statutory authority of the Attorney
General or Director of Public Prosecution to appeal important questions of law arising in 
a trial, without affecting the verdict or outcome of the particular trial, a new provision 
allowing the prosecution to appeal directed verdicts of acquittal “is not required in order 
to provide a means of preventing the criminal law from being corrupted by error”);
N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 207, para. 2.29 (“An appeal 
mechanism that aids the administration of the criminal law generally and avoids ‘rogue’ 
judgments corrupting the body of precedent already exists.”). 
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undergo the scrutiny of a higher court.280  Whenever a ruling by a trial 
judge is appealed, the appellate court considers, and usually comments 
upon, the propriety of that ruling, and if the appellate tribunal finds the 
trial judge made a sufficiently serious error, it will grant relief to the 
appealing party.281 Through this process “trial judges are, to some
degree, held accountable for their interpretation and application of the 
law,”282 thereby helping to satisfy the public’s interest “in ensuring that 
the trial court’s rulings against the prosecution represent fair applications 
of the existing law.”283  On the other hand, when the prosecution cannot
seek review of a particular ruling, “the trial judge will not be held
accountable for the ruling through normal judicial processes.”284 This,
in turn, leaves trial judges “free to behave in a lawless manner,”285 not
necessarily in the sense of engaging in unlawful (i.e., criminal) activity,286 
but in the sense of either being unable to reach the correct decision (i.e., 
the one required by existing law) because of their lack of legal
knowledge or skill, or their not acting conscientiously when making 
their rulings.  For example, some trial judges, especially those who are 
“weak”287 and who are presiding over a “difficult case,”288 might be
tempted “too readily to accept defence submissions [of no case to
answer] where they know that their reasoning will not be susceptible to 
scrutiny by the Court of Appeal.”289  Other judges might be lazy and
might not put in sufficient time and effort before a making a particular 
ruling.  Regardless of how it might be manifested, such “[l]awless
behavior destroys the actual and apparent fairness of the justice system,
280. Lord Williams of Mostyn, supra note 237, para. 54 (the then-Attorney General
of England asked: “If a judge decides . . . to direct the jury to acquit a defendant, . . . 
[and]  the prosecution [cannot] . . . test that decision on appeal . . . , are we not allowing 
in fact a system in which judges are unaccountable to the appeal courts as to a crucial
aspect of their responsibilities . . . ?”).
281. Poulin, supra note 170, at 958 n.20. 
282. Id.
283. Id. at 959. 
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Of course, criminal conduct on the part of a judge in connection with his
judicial duties is not unheard of, at least in the United States. E.g., United States v. 
Maloney, 71 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming the conviction of a judge for 
various offenses in connection with his taking bribes, inter alia, to acquit individuals in
bench trials); People v. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d 615 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (holding that an
individual previously acquitted of murder in a bench trial could be retried for the same 
offense because he had obtained the acquittal by bribing the trial judge), aff’g, Nos. 93 
CR 28786, 93 CR 28787, 1994 WL 684499 (Cir. Ct., Oct. 12, 1994) (interim ruling on
defendant’s motion to dismiss indictments). 
287. ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 7.57 (quoting a 
“senior trial judge with Court of Appeal experience”).
288. Id. (quoting a “senior trial judge with Court of Appeal experience”). 
289. Id. at para. 7.62.
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and may also harm the public directly by freeing criminal offenders
despite the existence of adequate proof of guilt.”290 Allowing the
prosecution to appeal rulings of no case to answer, so the argument goes, 
will thus serve “the public interest in judicial accountability,”291 first, by 
permitting an appellate court to rectify an “error”292 made by the trial
judge in ruling the defendant had no case to answer, and second, by
forcing a trial judge, when faced with a submission of no case to answer,
to “concentrate [his] mind[] and improve both the quality of [his] 
decision . . . and its expression”293 because of the desire not to have his
ruling overturned on appeal.294
 290. Poulin, supra note 170, at 959. 
291. Id.
292. The word “error” is enclosed in quotation marks because a ruling by a trial 
judge is deemed to be erroneous whenever the majority of an appellate court disagrees
with the trial judge’s decision.  In fact, it may not be an “error” at all.  For it is quite
conceivable (as illustrated by the numerous cases in which a supreme court reverses the 
decision of an appellate court disagreeing with the ruling of the trial judge) that the trial 
judge—not the appellate court—reached the “correct” result.  See ENG. LAW COMM’N,
CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158, supra note 25, para. 3.19 n.21 (acknowledging that 
“appellate courts . . . can make mistakes”).  However, because the appellate court is a 
“higher” court than the trial court, its decision will stand (unless, of course, an even 
higher court overturns its decision). 
293. ENG. LAWCOMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 7.62. 
294. In a 1999 lecture, the then-Attorney General of England said that he “strongly
suspect[ed] that the mere existence of a prosecution right of appeal, even if only
sparingly used, could lead to a significant and beneficial change in the culture of practice 
in the criminal courts.” Lord Williams of Mostyn, supra note 237, para. 53–55 
(discussing whether to allow the prosecution to appeal (1) directed verdicts of acquittal;
(2) a trial judge’s decision “to stay a prosecution on the ground of abuse of process,” see
supra note 132, supra text accompanying notes 148–55; see generally CHOO, supra note 
148; and (3) “a [trial judge’s] ruling concerning the admissibility of evidence which has
the effect of depriving the prosecution of a crucial plank in its case.”).  Similarly, the 
Crown Prosecution Service, in its response to the English Law Commission’s 2000
consultation paper on prosecution appeals of judges’ rulings, claimed that “[t]he mere
existence of the right [to appeal] would serve to improve the quality of such rulings . . . ” 
ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 7.60 (quoting the response of 
the Crown Prosecution Service).  See also id. at para. 7.57 (setting forth one line of 
argument against its provisional conclusion that the prosecution should not be allowed to 
appeal a trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer as: “The possibility of an appeal against
an acquittal arising from an erroneous ruling of no case would help to ‘keep the judges 
honest.’”).  Cf. House of Commons Select Committee on Home Affairs, 1999–2000 
session, Minutes of Evidence, Jan. 25, 2000, available at http://www.publications. 
parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmhaff/190/0012505.htm (the then-Director of 
Public Prosecutions, David Calvert-Smith, testified that the prosecution should be 
permitted to appeal a trial judge’s ruling that a trial would be an abuse of process, in part, 
because “if a judge knows that he can be appealed either way in due course, he, or she, is 
going to focus carefully on the decision”). 
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The response to this argument, however, is quite simple: A defendant 
should not have to pay the price of a second trial295 because of a weak, 
lazy, incompetent, or dishonest judge.296  Although the judge in a common 
law system plays a neutral role in the trial, she “is more closely allied 
with the government than with the accused.”297  For she is appointed by
the state,298 and is compensated by the state for performing judicial
functions,299 and under certain circumstances, can be removed from
295. Or even the resumption of his initial trial.  See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 
44, § 61(4)(a), (5), (6), (8) (Eng.). 
Even if the appellate court found that the trial judge did not err in allowing the 
defendant’s submission of no case to answer and upheld the acquittal, the defendant still 
may have “paid” the cost of an appeal in having “faced an unnecessary emotional and 
financial burden.”  N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 207, para.
2.13. 
296. R v Jessop, [1974] Tas SR 64, 87 (Crim. App.) (Austl.) (Chambers, J., 
dissenting) (“If the [trial] judge makes a mistake and the accused is acquitted, then the 
setting aside of the verdict may involve the accused in the emotional ordeal of going
through it all again, although the mistake was something over which he had no control.”
(emphasis added)). See also N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 207, 
para. 2.23.  But see  FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 297–99 (stating that the “initial
presumption must be . . . [that] an accused should not have to pay the price of a second 
trial because of a lack of judicial competence in the particular case,” but concluding that 
the prosecution should not “bear the risk of [judicial] error” in those cases in which “the 
error must have,” rather than may have, contributed to the acquittal, such as in cases in
which the trial judge directed a verdict of acquittal).
Of course, this argument does not apply if the defendant participated in a “corrupt” 
ruling by the judge, for example, by bribing the judge.  See Rudstein, Retrying the 
Acquitted in England: Part II, supra note 44, at 265–69. It is interesting to note that, 
although the Court of Appeal can, under certain circumstances, quash a “tainted” 
acquittal and order that the previously-acquitted individual be re-tried, see Criminal
Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, §§ 54–57 (Eng.), it cannot do so when the 
acquittal was obtained through the defendant’s bribery or intimidation of the trial judge. 
See id. § 54(1)(b) (limiting the provision to situations in which the previously-acquitted 
defendant was subsequently “convicted of an administration of justice offence involving 
interference with or intimidation of a juror or a witness (or potential witness)in any 
proceedings which led to [his] acquittal”).  One explanation may be that an individual
charged with a felony in England cannot opt for a bench trial, see supra note 57, so a 
defendant in England cannot choose to be tried by a judge alone and then “buy” a finding
of not guilty, as apparently occurred in the cases cited supra in note 286.  Nevertheless, 
despite the inability to obtain a bench trial, an English defendant could, theoretically, 
bribe or intimidate the trial judge either to allow a submission of no case to answer or to 
exclude evidence so important to the prosecution’s case that a finding of no case to
answer is inescapable.  An alternative explanation for excluding the bribing or
intimidating of a trial judge from the “tainted” acquittal provisions of the Criminal 
Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 is that Parliament did not believe that English
judges are corruptible or subject to intimidation. 
297. FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 298. 
298. In England, the Queen, upon the recommendation of the Lord Chancellor 
appoints Circuit judges to serve on the Crown Court.  Courts Act, 1971, c. 23, § 16
(Eng.). In addition, the Queen, upon the recommendation of the Lord Chancellor, may
appoint Recorders “to act as part-time judges of the Crown Court,” id. § 21(1), for a
fixed, extendable term. Id. §§ 21(3)(a), (4A). 
299. Id. § 18 (Circuit judges); id. § 21(7) (Recorders). 
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office by the state.300  If the state is concerned about the work habits,
competence, and honesty of its judges, it should focus its attention on
direct means of improving the quality of the judiciary, rather than relying 
upon the indirect means of allowing the prosecution to appeal trial judges’ 
rulings.301 It could begin by selecting more qualified individuals to serve 
on the bench,302 perhaps by engaging in a more thorough vetting process,
and certainly by eliminating political considerations in appointments 
to the bench. In conjunction with choosing more qualified individuals, it 
could be more vigilant in its oversight of sitting judges, conducting 
educational programs for those whose rulings frequently appear to be 
inconsistent with established law,303 and if necessary, attempting to
remove any judges who engage in misconduct.304  Certainly any judge
who engages in criminal activity in conjunction with his office should be
prosecuted criminally.305  The steps outlined above should have a far
300. The Lord Chancellor, with the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice, can
remove a Circuit judge “on the ground of incapacity or misbehaviour,” id. § 17, and may
decline to extend the term, or terminate the appointment, of a Recorder, on the ground, 
inter alia, of “incapacity or misbehaviour,” or that a circumstance for termination
specified in the initial appointment applies.  Id. §§ 21(4C)(a), (c), (6)(a), (c). E.g., Office 
for Judicial Complaints, OJC 53/11, Statement from the Office for Judicial Complaints: 
Mr. James Allen QC (Nov. 2, 2011) (stating that the Lord High Chancellor and the Lord
Chief Justice removed Judge Allen, a Deputy High Court Judge and a Recorder, from his 
judicial positions following his conviction for assault, because his actions “brought the 
judiciary into disrepute”), available at http://judicialcomplaints.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/ 
Mr_James_Allen_QC_-_OJC_Investigation_Statement_-_3311.pdf. 
301. See FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 298–99. 
302. See supra note 298. 
303. Poulin, supra note 170, at 987. 
304. See supra note 300. 
Professor Poulin suggests that, among other things, 
judicial administration and discipline could be employed to discourage 
inappropriate judicial action.  Judicial oversight committees should focus on
judges who repeatedly render mid-trial rulings that bar further proceedings; the
authorities should scrutinize those rulings to determine whether they flow from 
ignorance, carelessness, or corruption, and should follow through with 
responsive education or discipline. 
Poulin, supra note 170, at 987. 
305. Poulin, supra note 170, at 987–88 (“When a prosecutor has adequate proof of 
conduct that is criminal, the prosecutor can pursue charges against both the defendant
who procured the acquittal and the judge . . . who was corrupted.”). 
A judge who, in relation to his judicial duties, engages in misconduct amounting to
criminal activity can be subjected to a criminal prosecution.  See, e.g., ARCHBOLD, supra
note 15, § 31-138 (“Where a person in the position of trustee to perform a public duty
takes a bribe to act corruptly in discharging that duty, it is an offence in both parties. . . .
This formulation of the offence is clearly wide enough to embrace those involved in the 
administration of justice, such as . . . a justice (R. v. Gurney (1867) 10 Cox 550) . . . .”); 
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greater impact on holding trial judges accountable for their rulings than
merely making their rulings against the prosecution subject to review on
appeal, and it would do so without placing the burden for increasing their 
accountability on the backs of acquitted defendants.306 
4. Ensuring the Accuracy of the Outcome
A primary goal—if not the primary goal—of any criminal justice 
system is to identify, convict, and punish those who violate the law.307 
Society is justifiably concerned about the erroneous acquittal of a guilty 
person.308  For an erroneous acquittal of an individual charged with a
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *139 (“Bribery is where a judge . . . takes any undue 
reward to influence his behaviour in office.”). 
306. Of course, too great an oversight on trial judges might make them reluctant to
rule against the prosecution. Cf. Poulin, supra note 170, at 991 (discussing the possible 
ramifications of investigations for corruption when a trial judge acquits an individual in a
bench trial).  Nevertheless, one could argue that the same result might occur under a 
regime in which the prosecution can appeal a trial judge’s rulings, especially a ruling of 
no case to answer. The judge might think, “If I rule that the defendant has no case to 
answer, the prosecution might appeal that decision, and it is possible that I will be shown 
to have been mistaken in my ruling.  On the other hand, if I rule in favor of the
prosecution and find there is a case to answer, the defendant might be acquitted by the 
jury—a likely result, because, in my learned opinion, the prosecution did not introduce 
sufficient evidence to prove the defendant’s guilt—and the prosecution cannot appeal 
that verdict.  Under such circumstances, the defendant gets what he wants—an
acquittal—and my decision will not have been held to be error by the Court of Appeal.” 
307. 1 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 222, § 1.5. See also  ENG. LAW COMM’N,
CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158, supra note 25, para. 3.3.
308. An erroneous acquittal can occur in several ways.  It is most likely to be the 
result of an erroneous factual conclusion reached by the fact finder in the case.  In any
litigation, including criminal prosecutions, “‘[t]here is always . . . a margin of error in 
factfinding,’” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513, 525 (1958)), because “in a judicial proceeding in which there is a dispute about 
the facts of some earlier event, the factfinder cannot acquire unassailably accurate
knowledge of what happened.  Instead, all the factfinder can acquire is a belief of what 
probably happened.”  Id. at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring).  This belief of “what probably
happened” must be based upon the evidence introduced by the parties at trial.  We know, 
however, “that the trier of fact will sometimes, despite [its] best efforts, be wrong in [its] 
factual conclusions.”  Id.  In a criminal prosecution, “a factual error can make a
difference in one of two ways.  First, it can result in a judgment in favor of the 
[prosecution] when the true facts warrant a judgment for the defendant,” id., that is, the 
fact finder “convict[s] an innocent man.”  Id. at 370–71. Or, “an erroneous factual 
determination can result in a judgment for the defendant when the true facts justify a 
judgment in [the prosecution’s] favor,” id. at 371, that is, the fact finder “acquit[s] . . . a 
guilty man.”  Id. See also Paul Roberts, Double Jeopardy Law Reform: A Criminal 
Justice Commentary, 65 M.L.R. 393, 402 (2002) (“A fallible human process like 
criminal adjudication is going to make mistakes in both directions, convicting some
people who are factually innocent and acquitting others who are factually guilty.”).  In
addition, an erroneous acquittal can result from a trial judge’s finding of no case to
answer based upon his erroneous legal conclusion that either (1) the crime at issue 
requires a particular element (and his finding that the prosecution did not introduce any
evidence to show the presence of that element), see supra text accompanying notes 50– 
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serious crime, such as murder, robbery, or rape, usually will allow a 
dangerous person to remain at-large in the community,309 where he or 
she may commit other serious crimes in the future.  Moreover, erroneous 
acquittals, at least in serious cases,310 can spawn a lack of respect for, 
and confidence in, the criminal justice system.311  Nevertheless, the goal 
of the criminal justice system in a civilized democracy is not merely to
convict and punish the guilty, but to convict and punish only the guilty,
that is, it must ensure, insofar as possible,312 that those who did not
transgress the law are not convicted and are not subjected to criminal
sanctions.313  Thus, the goal of a criminal trial in an Anglo-American
51, 53, or (2) the evidence introduced by the prosecution, taken at its highest, was 
insufficient to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See supra text 
accompanying note 52–53.  It is also possible that the jury will reach the correct factual 
conclusions but erroneously acquit the defendant because it has misinterpreted the law,
either on its own or due to a misdirection by the trial judge.  Finally, the jury might reach 
both the correct factual and legal conclusions and yet still “erroneously” acquit the 
accused as an act of jury nullification. See infra text accompanying notes 348–55. 
309. In some cases, an erroneously acquitted individual will remain in custody for 
some other offense.  See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 785 (1969) (even if the
jury had erroneously acquitted the accused of larceny, he would still have remained in 
custody because the same jury convicted him of burglary, for which he was sentenced to
serve ten years’ imprisonment).  In other cases the erroneously acquitted individual will
be initially released from custody, but shortly thereafter will be arrested, convicted, and
imprisoned for another offense.  See, e.g., R v. Dunlop, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 1354, 
[10], [12], [2007] Crim. App. 8, at 120–21 (Eng.) (an individual erroneously acquitted of 
murder subsequently was convicted of an unrelated assault and sentenced to seven years’ 
imprisonment, and then, two years later, pleaded guilty to committing perjury in his 
murder trial and was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment). 
310. The English Law Commission believes that 
The general public . . . is well aware that the evidence against a defendant will
sometimes fail to satisfy [the very high] standard [of proof required in a 
criminal case] although the defendant is in fact guilty; and, in the ordinary run 
of offences against property and minor assaults, the public is generally content 
to accept this as the price to be paid for the presumption of innocence. 
ENG. LAWCOMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 25, para. 5.23. 
311. Id. at para. 1.4; ENG. LAWCOMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 4.5. 
312. Requiring that the prosecution prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, see supra text accompanying note 250, is one procedural device adopted in 
common law jurisdictions to help ensure that factually innocent individuals are not 
erroneously convicted.  Winship, 397 U.S. at 363.  See also Rudstein, Retrying the
Acquitted in England, Part I, supra note 44, at 429–30. 
313. ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158, supra note 25, para. 3.3.
See also Roberts, supra note 308, at 404 (“Liberal states have an obligation to detect, 
catch, try and punish offenders, but that obligation can be legitimately discharged only
under certain conditions.  Prominent amongst them is the condition that appropriately
strenuous efforts be made to avoid wrongful convictions.”).
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criminal justice system314 is to achieve an accurate outcome.315 
This leads to the strongest, and perhaps only viable, argument in favor 
of allowing prosecution appeals of trial judges’ rulings of no case to
answer. It is urged that such appeals will enhance the accuracy of the 
outcome of criminal proceedings,316 “because an accurate outcome is
more likely to be achieved if the law is correctly applied than if it is 
not.”317  As explained by the English Law Commission, “[a] prosecution
right of appeal is designed to remove an inaccuracy which benefits the 
defendant, (for instance, a wrong ruling by a judge on the law).  By
correcting the inaccuracy, a successful appeal makes it more likely that a 
guilty defendant will be convicted.”318  Allowing prosecution appeals of
a trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer therefore will, according to 
this argument, prevent “miscarriage[s] of justice”319 in some cases by 
overturning rulings that would otherwise result in the final acquittal of 
an individual who in fact is guilty of committing a crime.320 
In addition to preventing miscarriages of justice, when a trial judge
erroneously allows a submission of no case to answer, she not only 
“deprives the jury of a proper opportunity to judge the case,”321 but also
denies the prosecution a full and fair opportunity to convict the 
defendant.322  This in turn arguably can “diminish[] the legitimacy of the
resulting acquittal”323 and “may appear to interested persons and the
public to be the product of bizarre technicality,”324 thereby “damag[ing]
public confidence in the system.”325  According to the English Law 
314. In this Article the Author is focusing primarily upon Anglo-American systems 
of criminal justice, and is by no means implying that the goal mentioned in the text is not 
also the goal under other systems of law.
315. ENG. LAWCOMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158, supra note 25, para. 3.3.
316. Id. at para. 3.19.
317. ENG. LAWCOMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 7.13. 
318. ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158, supra note 25, para. 3.19 
(footnote omitted) (also stating that, “[c]onversely, the outcome is no less likely to be 
accurate if an appeal is unsuccessful.”).
The Law Commission recognized that “appellate courts too can make mistakes,” but 
concluded that, for purposes of its analysis, it was “reasonable to suppose that generally
the appeals process works, in the sense of correcting errors at first instance and not 
overturning correct first instance decisions.” Id. at para. 3.19 n.21. 
319. N.S.W. LAWREFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 207, para. 2.15. 
320. As discussed infra text accompanying notes 501–546, allowing prosecution
appeals of rulings of trial judge may, in some circumstances, lead to a wrongful
conviction. 
321. ENG. LAWCOMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 7.56. 
322. Poulin, supra note 170, at 958. 
323. ENG. LAWCOMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 7.56. 
324. Id.
325. Id. See also N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 207, para. 
2.15 (“[T]he public may regard [a directed verdict based upon a judicial error] as a
miscarriage of justice for failing to impose a sanction for wrongdoing, or to safeguard
70
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Commission,  “[i]f a case is to fail on a legal argument it is better for 
public confidence in the system of criminal justice that it be susceptible
to the second opinion of a higher court than that it be unappealable.”326 
B. The Policies Underlying the Rule Against Double Jeopardy 
As stated earlier, even if the rule against double jeopardy itself does 
not preclude prosecution appeals of trial judges’ rulings of no case to 
answer, the underlying policies of that rule are relevant in analyzing the 
wisdom of allowing such appeals.327  The double jeopardy prohibition 
against prosecuting an acquitted individual a second time for the same 
offense serves a number of related interests, both of the individual and of
society as a whole.328  This section of the Article will discuss how each 
of these policies applies to prosecution appeals of a ruling of no case to
answer.329 
1. Encouraging Efficient Investigation and Prosecution 
Allowing the government to retry a previously-acquitted individual for 
the same offense would, as a general matter, give rise to the danger that 
the police would not initially investigate the matter,330 and prosecutors
the public in cases where the danger posed by a guilty party would have rendered a 
custodial sentence appropriate.  Members of the public may be left with the impression
that a guilty person has escaped justice because of a legal technicality, a perception
which can lead to a weakening of public confidence in the judicial system.”); N.S.W.
LAW REFORM COMM’N, DISCUSSION PAPER 37, supra note 191, para. 4.1 (“The policy
basis of . . . a [prosecution] right [of appeal against acquittals generally, or directed 
acquittals in particular, where there has been an error in law] would be the importance to 
the community of ensuring that serious criminal matters are dealt with fully according to 
the law, and that the full process of criminal justice is not impeded by ‘technical’ legal
irregularities.”). But see infra text accompanying notes 553–62 (indicating how a 
prosecution right to appeal a ruling of no case to answer might adversely affect the 
public’s confidence in, and respect for, the criminal justice system).
326. ENG. LAWCOMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 7.63. 
327. See supra text accompanying notes 231–32. 
328. See supra text accompanying notes 117–28. 
329. The policies will be discussed in a different order than those in which they
were initially presented.
330. ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 25, para. 4.11;
AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 111, at 2; N.Z. 
LAW COMM’N, REPORT 70, supra note 127, para. 16; Dennis, supra note 125, at 941.  See 
also  FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 4  (“It is to the first trial . . . that [the] efforts [of the
police] should be directed.”); SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOME AFFAIRS, THE DOUBLE
JEOPARDY RULE, supra note 27, para. 19 (noting that one of the arguments against 
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would not initially prosecute the case,331 as diligently as they otherwise 
might because they would know that, should the first prosecution fail,
they would get a “second bite at the cherry”332 and could carry out a
more thorough investigation before, and conduct a more vigorous
prosecution at, the individual’s second trial.333  The fact that the rule
against double jeopardy generally334 provides the government with “but
creating exceptions to the traditional rule barring a retrial following an acquittal is that “a
second opportunity to prosecute would encourage the police to be less thorough in their 
initial investigation”).
331. Dennis, supra note 125, at 941; see also FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 4 (“It is
to the first trial . . . that [the] efforts [of the prosecutor] should be directed.”). 
332. Ian Dennis, Double Jeopardy: A Second Bite at the Cherry, [1999] CRIM. L.R.
927, 927. See also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978) (“second bite at the 
apple”).
333. Initially, the Author was somewhat skeptical of the argument that police
officers would conduct a less diligent investigation of a case if they knew that the 
government would be able to try an individual a second time following an unsuccessful 
prosecution.  A number of veteran police officers, from both urban and suburban police 
departments in the United States, assured the Author that the skepticism was
unwarranted.  They informed the Author that, given the heavy case loads of their police 
departments, they, and their fellow officers, would be much more willing to “wrap up” 
an investigation and “move on to the next case” at an earlier point under a regime that 
allowed the government to retry an individual should he be acquitted at trial than under 
the current regime that bars a subsequent prosecution following an acquittal.  Given the 
heavy case loads facing prosecutors in urban areas in the United States, it would not be 
surprising to find that they possessed the same mind-set as police officers.  With respect 
to England, the Author is willing to defer to the conclusions of the Law Commission.
See ENG. LAWCOMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 25, para. 4.11. 
334. In England, as in the United States, retrials normally are permitted following 
the discharge of the jury and the declaration of a mistrial.  R v. Davison, [1860] 175 E.R. 
1046 (Eng. Cent. Crim. Ct.) 1048; 2 F. &. F. 250, 254 (Pollock, C.B.) (concluding that a 
defendant can be retried when the trial judge, in the exercise of his discretion, discharged 
the jury); id.; 2 F. & F. at 255 (Martin, B.) (same); id.; 2 F. & F. at 255 (Hill, J.) (same);
ARCHBOLD, supra note 15, § 4-262; ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, 
paras. 2.47, 2.50–.51; Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673 (1982) (holding that retrial 
is constitutionally permissible following a mistrial declared at the request of the 
defendant, except when the prosecution engaged in conduct “intended to ‘goad’ the 
defendant into moving for [the] mistrial”); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505, 
516 (1978) (holding that retrial is constitutionally permissible following a mistrial 
brought about by a manifest necessity); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607–08, 
611 (1976) (holding that retrial is permissible following a mistrial declared at the request 
of or with the consent of the defendant, even if his request is necessitated by judicial or 
prosecutorial error); United States v. Perez,  22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824) (holding
that retrial is constitutionally permissible following a mistrial brought about by a 
manifest necessity, such as a deadlocked jury); RUDSTEIN, supra note 111, at 132–48. 
Similarly, in both England and the United States, a convicted defendant who
successfully appeals his conviction generally can be retried. Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, 
c. 19, § 7 (Eng.); ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 2.52; United 
States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671–72 (1896).  Accord Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 
38–39 (1988); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326–27 (1970); United States v. Tateo,
377 U.S. 463, 465–66 (1971) (articulating the rationale for allowing a second trial).  But
see Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (holding the Double Jeopardy Clause 
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bars a second trial when a defendant’s conviction is reversed by a reviewing court solely
for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction). 
In addition, in England, the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 allows the government to
appeal an acquittal rendered in a magistrates’ court by way of case stated, and if 
successful, to retry the individual for the same offense.  Magistrates’ Court Act, 1980,
c. 43, § 111(1) (Eng.) (but limiting the grounds of such an appeal to a claim that the 
verdict was either “wrong in law or in excess of jurisdiction”).  So too, the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003, Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, §§ 75–86 (Eng.), sets forth a 
procedure under which the government can prosecute an individual a second time for
certain serious offenses, despite the individual’s previous acquittal, when “there is new
and compelling evidence against the acquitted person in relation to the . . . offence,” id.
§ 78(1), and “it is in the interests of justice” to try the individual again. Id. § 79(1).  See 
also Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act, 2001, §§ 98–100, 102, 104–06 (N.S.W.) (Austl.)
(setting forth a procedure under which the government can retry an acquitted individual 
for a “life sentence offence” when “there is fresh and compelling evidence against the 
acquitted person in relation to the offence, and . . . it is in the interests of justice” to try 
the individual again); Criminal Code, 1899, §§ 678–678B, 678D, 678F–678H (Qld) 
(Austl.) (setting forth a procedure under which the government can retry an acquitted
individual for murder when “there is fresh and compelling evidence against the acquitted
person in relation to the offence and . . . it is in the interests of justice” to try the
individual again); Criminal Law Consolidation Act, 1935, §§ 331–32, 334, 337 (SA)
(Austl.) (setting forth a procedure under which the government can retry an acquitted
individual for certain serious offenses when there is “fresh and compelling evidence
against the acquitted person in relation to the offence and it is likely that the new trial
would be fair”); Criminal Code Act, 1924, §§ 390–91, 393, 395, 397, 397AC–397AD
(Tas) (Austl.) (setting forth a procedure under which the government can retry an 
acquitted individual for “a very serious crime” when “there appears to be fresh and 
compelling evidence against the acquitted person in relation to the crime and it is in the
interests of justice” to try the individual again).  Similarly, the Criminal Procedure and
Investigation Act 1996, Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act, 1996, c. 25, §§ 54–57 
(Eng.), sets forth a procedure under which the government can retry an acquitted
individual for the same offense when the individual’s acquittal was “tainted” by
interference with or intimidation of a juror, witness, or potential witness.  See also
Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act, 2001, §§ 98–99, 101, 103–06 (NSW) (Austl.) (setting
forth a procedure under which the government can retry an acquitted individual when the
acquittal was “tainted”); Criminal Code, 1899, §§ 678–678A, 678C, 678E–678H (Qld)
(Austl.) (setting forth a procedure under which the government can retry an acquitted
individual for offenses punishable by a period of 25 years or more when the acquittal 
was “tainted”); Criminal Law Consolidation Act, 1935, §§ 331, 333–34, 336 (SA)
(Austl.) (setting forth a procedure under which the government can retry an acquitted
individual for certain serious offenses when the acquittal was “tainted”); Criminal Code
Act, 1924, §§ 390–91, 394, 396–97, 397AC–397AD (Tas) (Austl.) (setting forth a 
procedure under which the government can retry an acquitted individual when the 
acquittal was “tainted”); Aleman v. Honorable Judges of the Circuit Court of Cook
County, 138 F.3d 302, 303 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming the denial of habeas corpus relief
to an individual being retried for murder following his acquittal in a bench trial
conducted before a judge whom he bribed), aff’g sub nom. United States ex rel. Aleman 
v. Circuit Court of Cook County, 967 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ill. 1997); People v. Aleman, 
667 N.E.2d 615 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (holding that an individual previously acquitted of 
murder in a bench trial could be retried for the same offense because he had obtained the 
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one chance to convict a defendant [therefore] operates as a powerful
incentive to efficient and exhaustive investigation”335 and prosecution 
from the outset.336 
It is unlikely, however, that allowing the prosecution to appeal a trial 
judge’s ruling of no case to answer—and permitting the prosecution to 
retry the accused if it succeeds in the appeal—would cause police and
prosecutors to be less efficient in their initial investigation and prosecution 
of crimes.  As a general matter, when police are investigating a crime,
and when prosecutors are preparing for a criminal trial, they have every
incentive to obtain and present as much evidence as possible to establish
the guilt of the individual suspected of, or charged with, committing the 
crime.  For they cannot accurately predict whether the trial judge will 
find some of their evidence inadmissible under the applicable rules of 
evidence or, perhaps more importantly, whether the jury will reject as 
unreliable some of the evidence presented at trial or will refuse to draw 
some of the desired inferences from the evidence.  Curtailing an
investigation, or limiting the amount of evidence presented at trial, would 
increase the risk that the jury will find the evidence that is introduced at 
trial insufficient to prove the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
and therefore acquit the accused, which, in light of the prosecution’s
inability to appeal a jury’s verdict of not guilty,337 would put an end to
the case without a conviction. 
acquittal by bribing the trial judge), aff’g, Nos. 93 CR 28786, 93 CR 28787, 1994 WL 
684499 (Cir. Ct., Oct. 12, 1994) (interim ruling on defendant’s motion to dismiss 
indictments). 
335. ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 25, para. 4.11. 
See also N.Z. LAW COMM’N, REPORT 70, supra note 127, para. 16 (stating that the 
argument that the rule against double jeopardy “promot[es] . . . efficient investigation 
preceding prosecution of the original trial” “has obvious force”).  But see  SELECT
COMMITTEE ON HOME AFFAIRS, THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULE, supra note 27, paras. 46–
48 (reporting that neither the Director of Public Prosecutions nor the Chief Constable of
Kent agreed that an exception to the traditional rule against double jeopardy allowing a 
second trial when new evidence of an acquitted defendant’s guilt is discovered would
“allow the police to proceed without due diligence” in their initial investigation, and
concluding that “[w]e do not expect that the proposed relaxation of the double jeopardy
rule would have an adverse impact on the quality of future police investigations”
(emphasis deleted)).
336. Dennis, supra note 125, at 941. 
337. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 does not permit the prosecution to appeal a
jury’s verdict of not guilty.  See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 58(1) (Eng.) (“58.
General right of appeal in respect of rulings. (1) This section applies where a judge
makes a ruling in relation to a trial on indictment at an applicable time and the ruling 
relates to one or more offences included in the indictment.” (emphasis added)). Under 
previously-enacted statutes, the prosecution can appeal various rulings and decisions, 
such as those of a judge at a preparatory hearing, Criminal Procedure and Investigations 
Act, 1996, c. 25, § 35(1) (Eng.); Criminal Justice Act, 1987, c. 38, § 9 (11) (Eng.), and
the sentence imposed upon a convicted defendant, Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, 
§ 36(1) (Eng.), but not a jury’s verdict of not guilty.  Although the Attorney General can
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Allowing the prosecution to appeal a trial judge’s ruling of no case to
answer does not change the incentives, so it is highly unlikely the police 
would end their investigation immediately after concluding the evidence
they had thus far obtained was sufficient to survive a submission of no 
case to answer,338 or that prosecutors would seek and present only enough 
evidence to meet this standard.  For even if they are correct and the 
limited amount of evidence survives a submission of no case to answer,
the particular jury trying the case might view the evidence and the
credibility of the witnesses differently than the police and prosecutors
and find the defendant not guilty,339 thereby putting an end to the case.340 
Moreover, evidence the police and prosecutors believe is sufficient to 
prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt may be perceived 
differently by the trial judge, and she might put an end to the case 
without even permitting the jury to consider the evidence by acceding to 
a submission of no case to answer.  If the prosecution could appeal such 
a ruling only with leave to appeal, as the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
refer a point of law to the Court of Appeal following a jury acquittal, Criminal Justice
Act, 1972, c. 71, § 36(1) (Eng.) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 272–78), such
a reference does “not affect the trial in relation to which the reference is made or any 
acquittal in that trial.”  Criminal Justice Act, 1972, c. 71, § 36(7) (Eng.). See generally
ENG. LAWCOMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 25, paras. 2.2–.17.
Assuming the trial judge properly directed the jury and made no erroneous evidentiary
rulings adverse to the prosecution, the case would terminate even in those common law
jurisdictions allowing the prosecution to appeal an error of law in a trial that resulted in 
the defendant’s acquittal. See supra text accompanying notes 175–76, 180–82, 190–91. 
338. Police officers, for the most part, lack a legal education, and they almost
certainly do not have experience in trying cases.  In addition, the police are unlikely to 
have knowledge of all the evidence against the suspect possessed by prosecutors.  As a
result, the police probably would not even know when their investigation had reached the 
point that the evidence against the suspect would suffice to survive a submission of no 
case to answer, if indeed such point is identifiable.  Moreover, even if the police 
concluded their investigation at the point at which the evidence would be just enough to
survive a submission of no case to answer, prosecutors, after reviewing the evidence,
would realize the case against the suspect was marginal at best and, consequently, would 
more than likely insist that the police resume their investigation in an attempt to discover
additional evidence implicating the suspect in the crime in question.
339. As explained earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 54–55, if the evidence 
introduced by the prosecution at trial “is such that its strength or weakness depends on
the view to be taken of a witness’s reliability, or other matters which are generally within 
the province of the jury,” and if “on one possible view of the facts there is evidence upon 
which a jury could properly come to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, then the
judge should the allow the matter to be tried by the jury.”  R v. Galbraith, [1981] 73
Crim. App. 124, 127 (Eng.) (second emphasis added). 
340. See supra note 337. 
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provides,341 and it did not obtain such leave,342 the trial judge’s ruling
would stand, the defendant would be acquitted,343 and the prosecution
would lose its case. Even if the prosecution obtained leave to appeal (or 
the statute authorizing the appeal did not require such leave), there
would be no guarantee the Court of Appeal, in what almost by definition 
would be a “close case,”344 would conclude the trial judge erred in ruling 
the defendant had no case to answer, reverse that ruling,345 and order
either a new trial or resumption of the initial trial.346  Therefore, even
with a right to appeal a trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer, police 
and prosecutors can never be certain—or for that matter, even reasonably 
sure—that they will get a “second bite at the cherry”347 if the trial judge
should rule that the defendant has no case to answer, and, consequently,
will have every incentive to put forth their best efforts to investigate the 
crime, and convict the defendant, from the outset. 
341. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 57(4) (requiring the prosecution to obtain leave 
to appeal from either the trial judge or the Court of Appeal).
342. As stated earlier, see supra note 76, in deciding whether to allow leave to
appeal, the Court of Appeal, and presumably also the trial judge, must “look rather more
widely at the interests of justice than simply . . . ask [itself] whether an appeal has a
realistic prospect of success, or some other test directed solely at the merits of the
appeal.”  R v. A., [2009] EWCA 2186, [8], [2009] 1 Crim. App. 21, at 283 (Eng.). 
343. In England, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 provides that the prosecution may
not inform the trial court that it intends to appeal unless it also informs the trial court that
it agrees that the defendant should be acquitted of the offense in question if it does not 
obtain leave to appeal.  See  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(8)–(9)(a).  It further 
provides that if leave to appeal is not obtained, the trial “judge or the Court of Appeal 
must order that the defendant . . . be acquitted.”  Id. § 58(12). See supra text 
accompanying notes 86–87. 
344. It would have been highly unlikely that the trial judge would have acceded to 
the defendant’s submission of no case to answer if the prosecution introduced evidence 
clearly sufficient to convict.  Moreover, if an appeal could be taken only with leave, it 
would be highly unlikely that such leave would have been given if the defendant clearly
was entitled to a ruling of no case to answer, that is, if the prosecution’s evidence was
undeniably insufficient to prove the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the 
fact that it was given strongly indicates that the question whether the defendant had a 
case to answer is a close one.
345. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 61(1). 
346. See id. § 61(4)(a), (b).
Indeed, the Court of Appeal could reverse the trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer
but still order that the defendant be acquitted if it concluded the defendant could not 
receive a fair trial if his initial trial were resumed or if a fresh trial were ordered.  Id. 
§ 61(4)(c), (5). Cf. R v. L., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1970, [36]–[37], [2009] 1 Crim. App.
16, at 242 (Eng.) (the Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge’s ruling quashing the 
indictment against the individual defendants, but nevertheless directed the acquittal of 
those defendants because, relying on the language contained in the original version of 
section 61(5), it found it would not be “in the interests of justice” to order a new trial). 
347. See generally Dennis, supra note 332. 
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2. Protecting the Power of the Jury to Acquit 
Against the Evidence 
One of the purposes of the rule against double jeopardy—indeed,
according to some legal scholars, the primary purpose348—is to protect 
the prerogative of the jury, acting “as the conscience of the community
in applying the law,”349 “to acquit against the evidence,”350 that is, to
find the defendant not guilty “even when its findings as to the facts, if
literally applied to the law as stated by the judge, would have resulted in 
a conviction.”351  A jury may exercise this power to “nullify” the law in
a particular case, or to engage in what in England is called “jury
equity,”352 for a variety of reasons,353 such as its belief that the conduct 
engaged in by the defendant should not be a crime,354 or its feeling that
the punishment for the crime in question is too severe.355 
348. Westen & Drubel, supra note 122, at 84. 
349. Id. at 130.
350. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 n.11 (1980) (quoting Westen, 
supra note 123, at 1063) (internal quotation marks deleted)). Accord Roberts, supra note
308, at 422. See also Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Double Jeopardy’s Asymmetric Appeal 
Rights: What Purposes Do They Serve?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 341, 358 (2002); Westen &
Drubel, supra note 122, at 129–30. 
351. 6 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 222, § 22.1(g). 
352. Roberts, supra note 308, at 422 & n.118. 
353. See generally  CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A
DOCTRINE (1998); 6 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 222, § 22.1(g). 
354. For example, a jury might be unwilling to convict a defendant of murder when, 
at the request of a terminally-ill individual, he intentionally killed that individual, e.g., 
Three Acquitted of Mercy Killing, TOWNSVILLE BULLETIN (Austl.), Oct. 24, 2001, at 16, 
available at 2001 WLNR 5392278 (reporting that a doctor who used a lethal injection to 
kill a terminally-ill patient, hours after the patient begged another doctor to end her 
suffering, was acquitted of murder by a jury), or assisted him in committing suicide.
CONRAD, supra note 353, at 149–50 (discussing two cases in which a jury acquitted
individuals charged with assisting a suicide).  See generally SHAI J. LAVI, THE MODERN
ART OF DYING: A HISTORY OF EUTHANASIA IN THE UNITED STATES 144–62 (2005).  Or, a
jury might acquit a battered wife charged with murder for intentionally killing her
abusive husband, even though several days had intervened since he last beat her and she
therefore did not have a valid claim of self-defense.  See Melissa Jenkins, Sniper Mother
Walks Free – Murder Acquittal Sets New Defence for Battered Wives, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(Sydney), Mar. 4, 2006, at 1, available at 2006 WLNR 3677321 (reporting that a jury
found a battered woman who laid in wait before shooting her husband to death not guilty
of either murder or manslaughter). See also Lorna Knowles, Features, Battered Tasha 
Dances Towards New Life, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Sydney), June 29, 2002, at 29, available at
2002WLNR 6118462 (reporting that the jury in a murder trial acquitted a battered woman 
who stabbed her de facto husband to death during an argument); CONRAD, supra note 
353, at 151–52. 
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At first glance, it would appear that allowing the prosecution to appeal
a trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer does not frustrate this policy
because a ruling of no case to answer ends the case, at least temporarily, 
favorably to the accused before the jury even has an opportunity to
consider the evidence. Nevertheless, a closer examination must be
undertaken because of two factors.  First, a defendant possesses what the
United States Supreme Court calls a “valued right to have his trial
completed by a particular tribunal,”356 and second, judges may be
entitled to engage in nullification of the law, that is, to dispense what
might be termed “judicial equity.”
After the commencement of trial, the prosecution sometimes may
believe the case is “going badly”357 for it, either because of its own 
mistakes, the trial judge’s adverse rulings, the unexpected strength of the 
defendant’s case, or a jury that appears sympathetic to the accused or 
hostile to the prosecution.  Rather than continue the trial to what it believes
will be an unfavorable conclusion, i.e., the acquittal of the accused, the
prosecution might prefer to have “another, more favorable opportunity to 
convict the accused”358 by starting the trial anew.  Doing so, however, 
would “deprive[] the defendant of his option to go to the first jury”359 
and infringe upon his interest in “being able, once and for all, to conclude 
his confrontation with society through the verdict of a tribunal he might 
believe to be favorably disposed to his fate.”360  Accordingly, in the United 
States, the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy361 bars retrial 
if the trial judge, without the defendant’s consent362 and in the absence
 355. CONRAD, supra note 353, at 147–49.  See also HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS 
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 306–12 (1966). 
356. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 36 (1978) (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684,
689 (1949)).
The Court in Crist stated that this interest of the defendant has “roots deep in the
historic development of trial by jury in the Anglo-American system of criminal justice.
Throughout that history there ran a strong tradition that once banded together a jury
should not be discharged until it had completed its solemn task of announcing a verdict.” 
Id. (footnote omitted).
357. Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 369 (1961). 
358. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484, 489 (1971) (plurality opinion) 
(quoting Gori, 367 U.S. at 369). 
359. Id.
360. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 514 (1978) (quoting id. at 484, 486). 
361. See supra text accompanying note 112. 
362. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676, 679 (1982) (holding a retrial is
constitutionally permissible following a mistrial declared at the request of the defendant,
except when the prosecution engaged in conduct “intended to ‘goad’ the defendant into
moving for [the] mistrial”); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607–08, 611 (1976)
(holding that a retrial is permissible following a mistrial declared at the request of, or 
with the consent of, the defendant, even if his request is necessitated by judicial or
prosecutorial error).
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of a “manifest necessity,”363 declares a mistrial,364 either sua sponte365 or 
at the request of the prosecution.366  In England, the Court of Appeal, more
than one hundred years ago, warned trial judges not to discharge a jury
“in order to allow the prosecution to present a stronger case on another 
trial,”367 and it may well be that if a trial judge fails to heed this admonition 
and discharges a jury so the prosecution can present a stronger case at a 
retrial, the judge at the retrial could stay the proceedings as an abuse of
the court’s process.368 
363. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824) (holding the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not preclude retrial when a trial 
judge, without the defendant’s consent, declares a mistrial because “there is a manifest 
necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated”).  See 
also Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862–64 (2010) (discussing “[t]he clearly
established Federal law’ in this area” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006));
Washington, 434 U.S. at 505–17 (discussing the meaning of “manifest necessity”). 
364. Washington, 434 U.S. at 507–08 (“At one extreme are cases in which a 
prosecutor requests a mistrial in order to buttress weakness in his evidence.  Although
there was a time when English judges served the Stuart monarchs by exercising a power 
to discharge a jury whenever it appeared that the Crown’s evidence would be insufficient 
to convict, the prohibition against double jeopardy as it evolved in this country was 
plainly intended to condemn this ‘abhorrent’ practice.” (footnote omitted)); United States 
v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 489 (1971) (plurality opinion) (“[T]here are situations where the 
circumstances under which the mistrial was declared may be such as to bar a future
prosecution.  One example is where a ‘judge exercises his authority to help the prosecution, at
a trial in which its case is going badly, by affording it another, more favorable opportunity to
convict the accused.’” (quoting Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 369 (1961))). 
365. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 487 (plurality opinion) (concluding the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibited retrial following the trial judge’s sua sponte
declaration of a mistrial to allow several government witnesses the opportunity to consult 
with attorneys about their privilege against self-incrimination). 
366. Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 735–37 (1963) (holding the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibited retrial following the trial judge’s 
declaration of a mistrial, at the prosecutor’s request and over the defendant’s objection,
because of the absence of a key government witness). 
367. R v. Lewis, [1909] 2 Crim. App. 180, 182 (Eng.) (commenting on a situation in
which the trial judge discharged the jury because the prosecution’s witnesses were not ready). 
368. A trial judge in England can discharge the jury before it reaches a verdict if 
there exists an “evident necessity,” see Winsor v. R, [1866] 1 Q.B. 289, 305 (Eng.); 4 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at 360, “that is, a high degree of need for such discharge.” 
ARCHBOLD, supra note 15, § 4-253.  The decision to discharge a jury is not subject to 
review, Lewis, [1909] 2 Crim. App. at 181; accord Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44 § 
57(2)(a) (Eng.) (providing that the prosecution has no right of appeal under the 
provisions of the Act in respect of “a ruling that a jury be discharged”), so that, 
ordinarily, the defendant can be retried.  See R v. Davison, [1860] 175 Eng. Rep. 1046,
(Cent. Crim. Ct.) 1048; 2 F. & F. 250, 254 (Pollock, C.B.) (concluding a defendant can
be retried when the trial judge in the first trial exercised his discretion and discharged the
jury); id.; 2 F. & F. at 255 (Martin, B.) (same); id.; 2 F. & F. at 255 (Hill, J.) (same). 
Accord  ARCHBOLD, supra note 15, § 4-262.  See generally id. §§ 4-253 to –263 
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A trial judge’s ruling that the defendant has no case to answer, like the 
discharge of the jury before it reaches a verdict, ends the trial prematurely 
because it terminates the proceedings before the jury has had an
opportunity to reach its own verdict based upon its own consideration of
the evidence introduced by the parties at trial.  It therefore could be
argued that allowing the prosecution to appeal such a ruling could, if the 
appeal succeeds, result in a new trial, before a new jury,369  and thus
deprive the accused of an opportunity to be acquitted by the original jury, 
one the accused may believe was favorably disposed towards him and
that might have found him not guilty even if it concluded the evidence 
proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  In other words, had the trial 
judge ruled correctly and held the defendant did have a case to answer,
the jury might nevertheless have acquitted him against the evidence.370 
(discussing the discharge of either individual jurors or the entire jury).  Although there
do not appear to be any cases on point, it would seem that if a trial judge disregarded the
warning of the Court of Appeal in Lewis and discharged the jury “in order to allow the
prosecution to present a stronger case on another trial,” Lewis, [1909] 2 Crim. App. at 
182, the defendant could, at his retrial, seek to have the trial judge exercise her 
discretionary power to stay the proceedings as an abuse of the court’s process.  R v.
Martin, [1998] A.C. 917 (H.L.) 926 (Lord Lloyd of Berwick) (appeal taken from Eng.)
(U.K.) (“[T]he categories of abuse of process, like the categories of negligence, are never 
closed.”).  See generally CHOO, supra note 148; ARCHBOLD, supra note 15, §§ 4-47 to – 
75. For such a power includes “a power to safeguard an accused person from oppression 
or prejudice,” id. § 4-54, “a formidable safeguard[, developed by the common law,] to 
protect persons from being prosecuted in circumstances where it would be seriously
unjust to do so.” AG of Trinidad and Tobago v. Phillip, [1995] 1 A.C. 396, 417 (P.C. 
1994) (appeal taken from Trinidad & Tobago) (U.K.).  Accord Hui Chi-Ming v. R,
[1992] 1 A.C. 34, 54–57 (P.C. 1991) (appeal taken from Hong Kong) (U.K.) (“The
doctrine of abuse of process and the remedy of refusal to allow a trial to proceed are well 
established. . . .  [A]n abuse of process . . . is . . . something so unfair and wrong that the 
court should not allow a prosecutor to proceed with what is in all respects a regular
proceeding.”); Connelly v. DPP, [1964] A.C. 1254  (H.L.) 1354 (Lord Devlin) (appeal
taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (“[T]he courts . . . [h]ave . . . an inescapable duty to secure fair
treatment for those who come or are brought before them[.]”); R v. Beckford, [1996] 1
Crim. App. 94, at 100–01 (Eng.) (stating that one of the “two main strands” for
exercising the jurisdiction to stay a proceeding for abuse of process is “where the court
concludes that it would be unfair for the defendant to be tried”); R v. Derby Crown Court 
ex parte Brooks, [1985] 80 Crim. App. 164–65, 168–69 (Q.B.) (Eng.) (“It may be an
abuse of process if . . . the prosecution have manipulated or misused the process of the 
court so as to deprive the defendant of a protection provided by the law . . . .”). 
369. Under the Criminal Justice Act of 2003, if the Court of Appeal allows the 
prosecution’s appeal of a ruling of no case to answer, it can order a new trial, Criminal
Justice Act, 2003, § 61(4)(b), which would have to be before a new jury if the original
jury was discharged. 
370. The defendant also could argue, more broadly, that by ruling he had no case to
answer the trial judge prevented him from being acquitted by the jury on the basis of the 
evidence that would have been presented at trial, i.e., at the end of a complete trial, the 
jury might have found the evidence insufficient to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  While the possibility that the jury would have acquitted the defendant 
based upon the insufficiency of the evidence certainly is more likely than the possibility
that it would have acquitted against the evidence (because the trial judge believed the 
80
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Such an argument is unpersuasive, however.  Aside from being highly 
speculative,371 in nearly all circumstances the defendant, by submitting 
at the close of the prosecution’s case that he had no case to answer, will
have asked the trial judge to end the case before the jury reached a
verdict.372  By doing so, he has shown his preference that the case end 
then and there, and he has deliberately elected “to forgo his valued right 
to have his guilt or innocence determined”373 by the particular jury.374 If 
the defendant believed that the jury would have acquitted him,
regardless of the evidence, he could have refrained from submitting that 
he had no case to answer and allowed the trial to run its course.  Having
chosen not do pursue that course, he cannot convincingly claim that 
allowing the prosecution to appeal the ruling of no case to answer
interfered with the policy of allowing the jury to acquit against the
evidence. 
It is possible, however, that a trial judge who rules that the defendant 
has no case to answer may actually be engaging in an act of “judicial”
nullification, or “judicial” equity, and acquitting the defendant against 
the evidence, that is, the trial judge is “acquit[ting] for reasons of 
evidence was insufficient and allowed the defendant’s submission of no case to answer), 
the response to this broader argument is the same as the response to the narrower 
argument discussed in the text, see infra text accompanying notes 371–72, and for that 
reason will not be discussed separately.  Nevertheless, allowing the prosecution to appeal
a ruling of no case to answer may create a dilemma for the accused at the close of the
prosecution’s case: should he submit he has no case to answer and risk losing any
advantages he may have gained at the trial if the trial judge accedes to his submission but 
the Court of Appeal reverses that ruling on appeal and orders a fresh trial, or should he 
refrain from submitting he has no case to answer (even though he believes such a 
submission would succeed) and take his chances with the jury.  ENG. LAW COMM’N,
CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 25, para. 6.15.  This dilemma gives rise to the 
risk that an accused will not make a submission of no case to answer when it would be in
his best interest to do so. Id. at para. 6.16. This dilemma is considered infra text 
accompanying notes 384–437. 
371. Because a jury that acquits a defendant does not explain its reasons for doing 
so, it is impossible to determine the frequency of jury acquittals against the evidence.
Nevertheless, one would expect such acquittals are relatively rare, and are limited for the 
most part to certain types of cases.  See supra note 354–55 and accompanying text. 
372. See supra text accompanying note 46, and supra note 47. 
373. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 93 (1978). 
374. Cf. id. at 93–94 (“[A] motion by the defendant [for mistrial] is deemed to be a 
deliberate election on his part to forgo his valued right to have his guilt or innocence 
determined before the first trier of fact. ‘The important consideration, for purposes of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to
be followed in the event of such error.’” (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 
609 (1976)). 
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personal conscience, irrespective of the defendant’s actual guilt.”375 One
therefore could maintain that allowing the prosecution to appeal rulings 
of no case to answer thwarts the policy of permitting “the judicial system 
to temper the legislature’s generalized standards of criminal responsibility 
with lenity in particular cases.”376 
Nevertheless, this argument, too, is unpersuasive.  At least three
reasons make it highly unlikely that a trial judge’s ruling of no case to
answer is actually an acquittal against the evidence, rather than what it 
purports to be, namely, a finding that the evidence introduced by
the prosecution failed to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  First, judges, unlike most individuals who serve on a jury, are 
professionals in the criminal justice system, and on a daily basis they are 
asked to supervise trials and apply the law in a neutral manner.  As a 
result, they are likely to view it as their professional obligation to follow 
the law,377 certainly much more so than would individual members of
the community who are thrust, perhaps unwillingly, into the role of a
juror on a one-time, or at most occasional, basis.378  Second, judges in
England are appointed to their positions,379 and for that reason a judge
would most likely conclude that she, unlike a jury, would not be acting 
as a representative of the community380 if, despite sufficient evidence of 
the defendant’s guilt, she were to acquit him against the evidence by
ruling that he had no case to answer.381  Finally, in most cases of jury 
375. Westen & Drubel, supra note 122, at 134. 
376. Id.
377. But see id. at 134 n.250 (asserting that in the United States “judicial acquittals 
against the evidence are apparently quite a common . . . phenomenon” in bench trials 
(citing DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE
WITHOUT TRIAL 149 (1966))).
378. See Juries Act, 1974, c. 23, §§ 1–10 (Eng.) (detailing, inter alia, the eligibility 
requirements for, and the manner of summoning, jurors in England). 
379. See supra note 298. 
380. See United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1960) (Friendly, J.)
(stating in a case involving an appointed judge that “the judge is hardly the ‘voice of the
community,’ even when he sits in the jury’s place”).
381. Although judicial acquittals against the evidence may be quite common in the 
United States, see supra note 377, it is almost certain that virtually all of these acquittals 
occur in bench trials, in which the judge is acting not as a neutral “referee,” but rather as 
the trier of fact.  Especially in those states in which trial judges are elected to their 
position by the voters in the community, see, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 35/2 (2010);
42 PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. § 3131(a) (Supp. 2011), a judge who acquits an individual in
a bench trial could be seen as doing so in her role as the “conscience of the community.”
See supra text accompanying note 349.  But see Maybury, 274 F.2d at 903 (Friendly, J.) 
(stating in a case involving an appointed judge that “the judge is hardly the ‘voice of the
country,’ even when he sits in the jury’s place”).  Moreover, one would expect that a trial 
judge would feel less constrained in acquitting against the evidence in a bench trial than 
in a jury trial (in which at the close of the prosecution’s case she would have to direct a 
verdict of not guilty, or in some jurisdictions enter a judgment of acquittal), because, in a 
bench trial, she is the only one who can “temper the legislature’s generalized standards 
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nullification, or jury equity, the prosecution’s evidence unequivocally
proves the defendant committed the crime in question.  In such situations, it
would seem that a judge who disagreed with the law in question, and 
who desired to acquit the accused against the evidence by finding the
accused had no case to answer, would be reluctant to do so, not only 
because of her professional obligations, but also because of the possible
ramifications stemming from what clearly would be an erroneous decision
based purely on her personal views.  These ramifications could include 
disciplinary action against her, or even her removal from office.382 Thus, 
because of the slimmest of possibilities that a trial judge’s ruling of no 
case to answer is actually an instance of the trial judge’s acquitting 
against the evidence, allowing the prosecution to appeal such a ruling 
does not frustrate the policy of allowing “the judicial system to temper
the legislature’s generalized standards of criminal responsibility with
lenity in particular cases.”383 
3. Preserving the Finality of Judgments
“The public interest requires finality in litigation, including criminal 
litigation, . . . so that life can move on.”384  This statement by the English 
of criminal responsibility with lenity in [the] particular case[],” Westen & Drubel, supra
note 122, at 134.  In contrast, a judge in a jury trial—even one elected by the voters in 
the community—would most likely believe that any decision to nullify the law, or
dispense equity, should be made by the true representatives of the community in the 
case—the jury.  In England, of course, judges are appointed, not elected.  See supra text 
accompanying note 298.  More importantly, an accused person in England cannot opt for
a bench trial, see supra note 296, which means that, except in rare situations, see, e.g., 
Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, §§ 43, 46 (Eng.) (providing that a trial judge can order
that a trial take place without a jury in serious or complex fraud cases, or when there is 
evidence that jury tampering will take, or has taken, place); see also Terrorism Act,
2000, c. 11, §§ 65(1), 75(1), sch. 9, pt. 1 (Eng.) (providing that certain offenses in 
Northern Ireland are to be tried by a judge sitting without a jury), the trier of fact in a 
criminal trial will be a jury, not the judge, thereby making it unlikely the judge would 
feel the need to step in, supercede the jury, and acquit against the evidence.
382. See supra text accompanying note 300. 
If the judge ruled a defendant had no case to answer following the presentation by the 
prosecution of evidence leaving no doubt it proved the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, the judge’s ruling could only be explained as either an act of judicial
equity or one of judicial incompetence.  Certainly a judge would be reluctant to enter a 
ruling that might be interpreted as showing she lacked the ability to be a judge. 
383. Westen & Drubel, supra note 122, at 134. 
384. ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 25, para. 4.8
(footnote omitted) (also stating that “there is virtue in putting a line under emotive and 
contentious events”).
 83
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Law Commission articulates what the Supreme Court of the United 
States has called “the primary purpose”385 served by the rule against
double jeopardy.386  By precluding the government from reprosecuting 
an acquitted individual for the same offense, the rule maintains the 
finality of judgments387 and protects the “integrity” of those judgments.388 
Once a person has been acquitted of a particular offense, the
government389 must respect that judgment in the future.  Even if it
disagrees with the result, it cannot bring a second prosecution against the 
same person for the same offense.390 A person acquitted of a crime,
along with his family and friends,391 therefore need not “live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity,”392 fearful that, despite the
acquittal, the government will subsequently haul him into court a second 
time and compel him to defend against the same charge.393  Without such a
385. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978). See also United States v. 
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128 (1980) (“It has been said that . . . ‘the’ ‘primary purpose’ 
of the [Double Jeopardy] Clause was ‘to preserve the finality of judgments’ . . . .”
(quoting Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978))). 
386. See also AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 
111, at 2–4 (discussing “the various interests in securing finality of decisions”); N.Z.
LAW COMM’N, REPORT 70, supra note 127, para. 14 (“The need to secure a conclusion of
disputes concerning status has long been recognised.  The status conferred by acquittal is 
one of particular importance.”). 
The doctrine of res judicata serves this purpose in civil cases.  That doctrine provides
that a final judgment based upon the merits of a claim precludes the plaintiff from 
instituting a second action against the same defendant for the same claim and, 
conversely, bars the defendant from subsequently raising a new defense to seek to defeat 
the enforcement of a judgment rendered against him in the action. See generally JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE  §§ 14.1–.8,
14.13 (4th ed. 2005). 
387. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 128; Crist, 437 U.S. at 33; Arizona v. Washington, 
434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977); United States v. 
Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion).  See also Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S.
147, 156 (1986); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975); ENG. LAWCOMM’N,
CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 25, paras. 4.8–4.10; N.Z. LAW COMM’N,
REPORT 70, supra note 127, para. 14. 
388. Scott, 437 U.S. at 92. 
389. See supra note 117. 
390. But see supra note 334, discussing the recent exceptions to the rule against 
double jeopardy in England and Australia for fresh and compelling evidence and for so-
called “tainted” acquittals.
391. ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 4.16 (“[T]here is
some value in protecting certain third party interests by finality of criminal
proceedings[,such as] the emotional and financial interests of an acquitted person’s 
family and dependants.”); AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER, 
supra note 111, at 3 (paraphrasing the English Law Commission and stating that “the
interests of finality also affect friends, family and others dealing with the person
concerned,” and that “[s]ome weight must be given to the emotional and financial
interests of these people”). 
392. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). 
393. Id.; ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 4.11 (quoting a 
“very senior judge” as stating it is “important to preserve the principle that a defendant 
84
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limitation, a person found not guilty of a crime could never be sure he 
was effectively acquitted, no matter how many times a trier of fact found 
him not guilty, for the government could continue to try him again and
again and again until it found a fact finder that would convict.
According absolute finality to a judgment of acquittal not only serves 
as an “antidote to distress and anxiety,”394 it also allows the acquitted 
defendant to consider the matter closed and to plan his future accordingly. 
In this “important sense[,] . . . finality as a value . . . impact[s] . . . individual 
liberty or autonomy.”395  In addition, according finality to a judgment of 
acquitted by a jury need not worry that he may have to undergo the trial process all over 
again”); ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 25, para. 4.9 
(“In a serious case the prospect of going through the trial process at some future date is
likely to cause great anxiety . . . .  At least some acquitted defendants will be prey to a constant
and persisting sense of doubt.”); AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION 
PAPER, supra note 111, at 3 (“[T]hose subject, or potentially subject, to any double 
jeopardy should not be subjected to the anxiety and distress occasioned by the fear that
he or she may have to undergo the admittedly stressful trial process all over again.”). 
394. ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 4.12.  Accord
AUSTRALIANMODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 111, at 3. 
395. ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 4.12.  Accord
AUSTRALIANMODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 111, at 3. 
The English Law Commission explained: 
In a liberal democracy, it is a fundamental political and social objective to
allow individuals as much personal autonomy as possible, to allow people the 
space to live their own lives and pursue their own visions of the good life.
Lack of finality in criminal proceedings impinges on this to a significant
degree, in that the individual, though acquitted of a crime, is not free thereafter 
to plan his or her life, enter into engagements with others and so on, if required 
constantly to have in mind that danger of being once more subject to a criminal
prosecution for the same alleged crime.
ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 4.12.  Accord  AUSTRALIAN
MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 111, at 3.
Professor Ian Dennis put it this way:
Fairness to the defendant— . . . an aspect of the state’s concern to treat all 
citizens with respect for their liberty and autonomy–results in a claim that final 
judgment of acquittal should represent a line drawn under the past.  The 
defendant should be able to get on with the rest of his life in a state of security
from further prosecution.  We might say that an acquitted person deserves a 
fresh start: that it would be unfair to deprive him of the right of self-
determination free of the restraints imposed by knowledge of the possibility of
further interference in his life through reopening of the acquittal.
Dennis, supra note 125, at 941.  See also Roberts, supra note 308, at 407 (“I surely have
a keen[] interest . . . in knowing whether my autonomy is vulnerable to the potentially
swingeing restrictions of criminal sanctions.”).
The English Law Commission acknowledged that “[r]educing the personal autonomy
of the individual may, of course, occasion distress and anxiety,” ENG. LAW COMM’N,
REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, ¶ 4.12, but it concluded that “that is not the only reason 
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acquittal “represents an enduring and resounding acknowledgement by
the state that it respects the principle of limited government and the 
liberty of the subject,”396 making “[t]he rule against double jeopardy . . .
a symbol of the rule of law”397 that “serves to emphasise commitment to 
democratic values.”398 
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 seeks to avoid contravening this policy 
underlying the protection against double jeopardy by providing that any
ruling by a trial judge that is subject to appeal is not effective 
immediately,399 and that even if the trial judge should immediately enter
a judgment of acquittal based upon that ruling, that judgment is to have 
no effect during the pendency of any appeal.400  A trial judge’s ruling of
no case to answer therefore does not become “final,” and the trial judge
cannot enter a final judgment in the case, until the period during which 
for valuing it,” id.,—“autonomy or liberty in this sense is to be valued for it own sake.” 
Id.
 396. ENG. LAWCOMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 4.17. 
397. Id.
398. Id. Accord  AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER, supra
note 111, at 3. 
The English Law Commission went on to explain: 
“Double jeopardy protection is very imperfectly expressed in terms of fairness 
to the accused . . . .  It is more illuminating to think of double jeopardy as 
forming one, significant strand of the limits on a state’s moral authority to 
censure and punish through criminal law.  A defendant is not pleading unfair 
treatment qua criminal accused when invoking the pleas in bar [autrefois 
acquit (a former acquittal) and autrefois convict (a former conviction)], but 
rather reminding the state—as the community’s representative, the community
in whose name the business of criminal justice is done—of the limits of its
power. . . . Defendants asserting double jeopardy protection act almost as 
private attorneys general, policing the boundaries of legitimacy in criminal law
enforcement, keeping state power in check for the benefit of all who value
democracy and personal freedom.  This is the special value of finality in
criminal proceedings, and the principal rationale underpinning double jeopardy
protection. The fundamental nature of the values at stake explains why
English law’s pleas in bar operate as near-absolute barriers to re-prosecution
whenever their conditions precedent are satisfied.”
ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 4.17 (quoting Paul Roberts,
Acquitted Misconduct Evidence and Double Jeopardy Principles, from Sambasivamto Z, 
[2000] CRIM. L.REV. 952, 954). Accord  AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION 
PAPER, supra note 111, at 3–4. 
399. The Act provides that “[t]he [judge’s] ruling is to have no effect whilst the 
prosecution is able to . . . inform[] the court that it intends to appeal,” Criminal Justice
Act, 2003, c. 44, § 58(3)–(4)(a)(i) (Eng.), which it can do either immediately “following
the making of the ruling,” id. § 58(4)(a), or following an adjournment granted by the 
court to allow the prosecution “to consider whether to appeal.” Id. § 58(4)(a)(ii).  If the 
prosecution properly informs the court it intends to appeal, the ruling continues to have 
no effect while the prosecution pursues the appeal, id. § 58(10), and in addition, “any
consequences of the ruling are also to have no effect.” Id. § 11(a). 
400. The Act provides that “the judge may not take any steps in consequence of the
ruling, and if he does so, any such steps are also to have no effect.” Id. § 58(11)(b)–(c). 
86
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the prosecution can inform the trial judge it intends to appeal the ruling 
expires without the prosecution’s having notified the trial judge of its 
intention to appeal,401 or if the prosecution informs the judge in a timely 
manner that it intends to appeal the ruling, either leave to appeal is
denied by the Court of Appeal,402 or if leave is granted, the Court of
Appeal upholds the trial judge’s ruling that the defendant had no case to
answer.403  Accordingly, until one of these events occurs, there is no
“final” judgment whose “integrity” must be maintained.404  Moreover, 
every criminal defendant charged by way of indictment knows at
the outset of his trial that, should the trial judge find at the conclusion of 
the prosecution’s case—or at any time thereafter—that the evidence
is insufficient to prove his guilt, that ruling will not at that time be final 
and will not immediately acquit him of the offense charged,405 and in 
401. See id. § 58(3)–(4). 
402. Because the prosecution must obtain leave to appeal, either from the trial judge 
or the Court of Appeal, id. § 57(4), a ruling of no case to answer would become “final” 
(i.e., the defendant would be acquitted of the offense in question) if, and when, both the 
trial judge and the Court of Appeal refuse to grant the prosecution leave to appeal. Id.§
58(8)–(9). For, pursuant to the terms of the required “acquittal agreement,” see supra
note 87 and text accompanying notes 86–87, undertaken by the prosecution as a
condition of taking the appeal, “the defendant . . . [must] be acquitted of [the] offence [in 
question] if [leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal is not obtained].”  Criminal Justice 
Act, 2003, § 58(8)–(9)(a). 
403. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, §§ 58(10)–(11), 61(1), (3), (7).
In fact, the ruling of no case to answer might not be final even after the Court of 
Appeal confirms the trial judge’s ruling.  For the Act provides that the prosecution can
appeal further following an adverse decision by the Court of Appeal. Criminal Appeal
Act, 1968, c. 19, § 33(1)–(2) (Eng.), as amended by Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 61(1),
(3)(i) (allowing either party, with leave from the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court 
of the United Kingdom, to appeal to the Supreme Court following an adverse ruling in
the Court of Appeal, provided, however, the Court of Appeal certifies “that a point of
law of general public importance is involved in the decision and it appears to the Court 
of Appeal or the Supreme Court (as the case may be) that the point is one which ought to 
be considered by the Supreme Court”). 
In addition to the situations mentioned in the text, a ruling of no case to answer can
also become “final” if, and when, the prosecution, after informing the trial judge that it 
intends to appeal, abandons that appeal “before it is determined by the Court of Appeal.” 
Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(8)–(9)(b). 
404. See supra text accompanying notes 387–88. 
405. Cf. Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 473 (2005) (“If, after a facially
unqualified midtrial dismissal of one count [because of the insufficiency of the
prosecution’s evidence], the trial has proceeded to the defendant’s introduction of
evidence [on another count of the indictment], the acquittal must be treated as final 
[under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment], unless the availability of
reconsideration has been plainly established by pre-existing rule or case authority 
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addition, that if the prosecution successfully appeals the ruling, his trial 
may be resumed,406 or he may subjected to a fresh trial for the same
offense.407  And because the state still prohibits the prosecution from
challenging a “final”408 judgment of acquittal based upon a ruling of no 
case to answer, it continues to acknowledge “that it respects the principle 
of limited government and the liberty of the subject.”409 
Nevertheless, some of the same interests of the defendant the rule 
against double jeopardy seeks to protect by precluding the government
from prosecuting an individual a second time for the same offense
following a “final” judgment of acquittal also exist when the trial judge 
“acquits” a defendant by ruling he has no case to answer but the
prosecutor has a right to appeal that ruling.  From the time the trial judge 
issues his ruling until his ruling either becomes “final”410 or is 
overturned on appeal,411 the “acquitted” defendant, and his family and 
friends,412 must live in a “state of anxiety and insecurity,”413 not knowing
whether he will have to undergo the ordeal of another, or further, trial
for the same offense. The “acquitted” defendant also will have to put his 
life on “hold” during this period; he will be unable to plan his future, and
his individual liberty and autonomy will thus be curtailed.414  How 
greatly these interests of the “acquitted” defendant will be affected will 
expressly applicable to midtrial rulings on the sufficiency of the evidence.” (emphasis
added)).
406. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 61(4)(a). 
407. Id. § 61(4)(b). 
408. An acquittal based upon a ruling of no case to answer is “final” when: (1) the 
prosecution does not inform the trial judge in a timely manner that it intends to appeal
and the judge directs the jury to find the defendant not guilty and then enters a judgment 
on that verdict; (2) the prosecution informs the trial judge in a timely manner that it 
intends to appeal the judge’s ruling but either fails to obtain leave to appeal or abandons 
the appeal before it is decided by the Court of Appeal; (3) the prosecution takes an 
appeal and the Court of Appeal upholds the trial judge’s ruling and no further appeal 
from that decision is taken; or (4) an appeal is taken from the Court of Appeal’s decision 
and the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom confirms the trial judge’s ruling.  Id. §
58(4), (8)–(9).
409. ENG. LAWCOMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 4.17.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 396–98. 
410. See supra note 408. 
411. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 61(1) (“On appeal . . . , the Court of Appeal 
may . . . reverse . . . any ruling to which the appeal relates.”).
412. See supra note 391 and accompanying text. 
413. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). 
414. See supra note 395 and accompanying text. 
In fact, his liberty may actually be restrained by his being held in custody by the state. 
E.g., R v. Thomas, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1682, [1] (Eng.).  See also KEOGH, supra note 
71, § 9.2.5 (concluding section 58(11)(b)–(c) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 means, 
among other things, the trial judge, as a consequence of the ruling of no case to answer,
cannot release the acquitted defendant on bail pending the appeal, “if that decision 
flowed from the judge’s view that there was no evidence against the defendant”). 
88
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depend largely upon the length of time involved.  A relatively short period 
will have only a minimal impact, while a lengthier period will have a far 
greater impact. 
The first determinant of the length of this period is the time during 
which the prosecution can consider whether to appeal the trial judge’s
ruling of no case to answer.  If the prosecution were allowed an extended 
period of time in which to decide whether to take an appeal, the
encroachment on the defendant’s interests could be quite severe. Take,
for example, a hypothetical statute allowing the prosecution two years
within which to appeal a trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer. For
up to two years the “acquitted” defendant and his family and friends 
would “live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity,”415 and the
defendant’s liberty and autonomy would be limited, because of the threat
of a new trial for the same offense hovering over them.416  The effect 
upon the “acquitted” defendant and his intimates of such an extended
period within which to appeal would be little different than it would be 
under a legal regime that did not recognize the rule against double 
jeopardy and did not bar the government from prosecuting an acquitted
defendant a second time for the same offense. 
In England, however, the rules adopted to implement the prosecution’s
right to appeal a trial judge’s ruling require the prosecution, as a general 
matter, to announce its decision to appeal no later than “the next
business day” after the ruling against which it wants to appeal;417 and, if
it wants the trial judge to grant leave to appeal, it must apply for such 
leave within the same time period.418  If the prosecution decides not to 
415. Green, 355 U.S. at 187. 
416. The anxiety and concern, and the curtailment of the defendant’s liberty and 
autonomy, produced by his not knowing whether the prosecution would appeal, could 
end earlier only if the prosecution decided to take an appeal, being replaced at that point 
by the anxiety and concern, and curtailment of liberty, brought about by his uncertainty
over whether the Court of Appeal would give leave to appeal, and if it did, by his 
uncertainty over whether the Court of Appeal would reverse the trial judge’s ruling and 
order a new trial. Id.
417. The prosecution must inform the court that it intends to appeal such a ruling 
either “immediately after the ruling,” Criminal Procedure Rules 2011, S.I. 2011/1709,
67.2(1)(a) (Eng.),  or following an adjournment “until the next business day,” Criminal
Procedure Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709, 67.2(2)(b) (Eng.), granted by the trial judge, 
upon the prosecution’s request made “immediately after the ruling.”  Criminal
Procedure Rules 2011, S.I. 2011/1709, 67.2(2)(a) (Eng.).  See supra text accompanying
notes 80–85. 
418. The prosecution must “apply orally, with reasons, immediately after the ruling
against which [it] wants to appeal,” Criminal Procedure Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709,
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appeal, the additional anxiety and concern imposed upon the defendant, 
and the limits on his liberty and autonomy, will have ranged from a 
matter of minutes to, at most, a few days.419  Such a short period of time 
is de minimis in this context.420  If, on the other hand, the prosecution 
decides to take an appeal, the defendant’s anxiety and concern will
continue while the appellate process runs its course; nevertheless, the
few minutes or days taken by the prosecution to make its decision to 
appeal will not add significantly to the overall period during which the 
defendant must live under the threat of a new trial. 
A legal system that allows the prosecution a longer period of time in 
which to decide whether to appeal, such as the twenty-eight days
permitted in New South Wales,421 gives rise to more concern because of 
its greater impact upon the interests of the “acquitted” defendant and his 
family and friends.  But, in this context, even twenty-eight days is a 
relatively short period.  Unlike a legal system that did not recognize the 
rule against double jeopardy, and in which the government could therefore 
reprosecute an acquitted individual for the same offense at any time in
the future, an “acquitted” defendant in England, and even one in New 
South Wales, would not have to “live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity,”422 nor would the limitations on his individual liberty and
autonomy be ongoing and of indeterminate length. 
The true impact upon an “acquitted” defendant’s interests of a
prosecution right to appeal a ruling of no case to answer will be in those 
cases in which the prosecution actually takes an appeal.423  The extent of 
that impact will depend upon how much time intervenes between the 
67.5(1)(a) (Eng.); but see R v. O., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 463, [34] (Eng.) (holding that, 
“[g]iven the extraordinary sequence of events on the previous day,” when the trial judge 
made the ruling in question, the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal on the day 
after the ruling was “sufficiently ‘immediate’ for the purposes of the criminal procedure 
rules), whether to appeal, it must “apply in writing . . . on the expiry of [that] time.” 
Criminal Procedure Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709, 67.5(1)(b) (Eng.). 
419. When the trial judge issues the ruling on a Friday, the prosecution normally
will have until the following Monday—the next business day—to decide whether to
appeal.  In addition, it is possible for the prosecution to obtain additional time within 
which to make its decision.  R v. H., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 483, [10]–[12] (Eng.)
(holding the court has power to grant a greater extension of time than “until the next
business day”).
420. Indeed, in most cases this will be a shorter amount of time than would have
been necessary to complete the defendant’s trial if the judge had not allowed his 
submission of no case to answer. 
421. Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001, § 107(3) (NSW) (Austl.) (also providing
that an appeal may be made after 28 days “with the leave of the Court of Criminal
Appeal”).
422. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957) (emphasis added). 
423. The analysis in the text proceeds under the assumption that the prosecution has 
only a short period of time within which to decide whether to appeal.
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prosecution’s decision to appeal and the appellate court’s final resolution 
of the case.
If, as in England, the prosecution must obtain leave to appeal the trial 
judge’s ruling of no case to answer424 and such leave is denied, the
defendant’s interests in finality are unlikely to be affected to a
significant extent. For it is probable that the decision to deny leave to 
appeal will come relatively quickly.  In the reported cases decided thus 
far in England425 in which the Court of Appeal has refused the
prosecution’s application for leave to appeal a trial judge’s ruling under
the Criminal Justice Act 2003,426 the Court of Appeal has made its
decision no later than 144 days after the trial judge’s ruling,427 with the
average length of time between the ruling and the denial being 67
days.428  While not de minimis, this relatively short period of time during 
424. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 57(4) (Eng.). 
425. As of Nov. 1, 2011. 
426. The Author has attempted to include all published opinions of the Court of 
Appeal involving applications for leave to appeal from a ruling by the trial judge, not
only those involving a ruling of no case to answer.  The Court of Appeal, however, has 
denied applications for leave to appeal without issuing an opinion explaining its reasons 
for doing so. E.g., Serious Organized Crime Agency v. French, [2011] EWHC (Admin)
10, [7] (Eng.) (noting that these proceedings originated after the Court of Appeal, in an
unreported decision, refused the prosecution leave to appeal the trial judge’s ruling that 
the defendants in a related case had no case to answer).  Moreover, it also is possible the 
Author’s research failed to discover some reported cases.
427. See CPS v. C., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 97, [1], [8], [18] (Eng.) (on Sept. 14, 
2009, the trial judge ruled the indictment should be stayed because to proceed would be 
an abuse of process, and on Feb. 5, 2010, the Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal). 
428. See R v. A.T., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 668, [3], [5], [7], [9] (Eng.) (on Jan. 29,
2009, the trial judge ruled certain defense evidence admissible, and the Court of Appeal 
denied the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal 42 days later, on Mar. 12, 2009); 
R v. B., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 99, [1], [21] (Eng.) (on Nov. 26, 2008, the trial judge 
refused the prosecution’s request to change the date set for trial, and the Court of Appeal 
denied the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal 55 days later, on Jan. 20, 2009); 
R v. A., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 2186, [1], [10]–[11], [2009] 1 Crim. App. 21, at 281, 283 
(Eng.) (on July 2, 2008, the trial judge ruled the defendant had no case to answer, and the 
Court of Appeal denied the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal 62 days later, on
Sept. 2, 2008); R v. O., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 463, [1], [35] (Eng.) (on Dec. 12, 2007,
the trial judge ruled he would direct the jury to disregard the bulk of the key prosecution
witness’s testimony, and the Court of Appeal refused the prosecution’s application for
leave to appeal 85 days later, on Mar. 6, 2008); R v. R., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 370, [1],
[32] (Eng.) (on Dec. 3, 2007, the trial judge ruled the prosecution could not call an expert 
medical witness, and the Court of Appeal refused the prosecution’s application for leave 
to appeal 81 days later, on Feb. 22, 2008); R v. B., [2007] EWCA (Crim) 2970, [2], [20], 
[21] (Eng.) (on July 19, 2007, the trial judge refused the prosecution’s requests to issue a 
witness summons to a key prosecution witness and then to adjourn the trial because that
witness was not present, and 106 days later, on Nov. 2, 2007, the Court of Appeal 
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which the “acquitted” defendant and his family and friends might suffer 
anxiety and concern, and the defendant endure limitations upon his liberty 
and autonomy, cannot be equated to the continuing state of uncertainty
that would arise under a legal system that did not recognize the rule 
against double jeopardy.
On the other hand, if the prosecution obtains leave to appeal, either 
from the trial judge429 or the Court of Appeal,430 the impact upon the
defendant’s interests could, at least theoretically, be quite severe.  For 
there is no specified period within which the Court of Appeal must
decide an appeal once leave to appeal has been granted.431  The greater 
dismissed the application for leave to appeal on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to 
entertain an application for leave to appeal under § 58 of the Criminal Appeal Act 2003 
because its provisions did not apply retroactively to this case); R v. Clarke, [2007] 
EWCA (Crim) 2532, [1], [20], [34], [2008] 1 Crim. App. 33, at 404, 407, 410 (Eng.) (on 
Sept. 18, 2007, the trial judge refused the prosecution’s request to adjourn the trial for a
period of up to four weeks because of the absence of a key prosecution witness, and the 
Court of Appeal denied the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal 21 days later, on
Oct. 9, 2007); R v. Thompson, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 2849, [1], [7], [39], [2007] 1 Crim.
App. 15, at 213, 214 (Eng.) (on Sept. 29, 2006, the trial judge quashed a count of the 
indictment and a week later, on Oct. 6, 2006, the Court of Appeal denied the
prosecution’s application for leave to appeal for lack of jurisdiction).
In two cases the Court of Appeal did not specify the date of the trial judge’s ruling, so 
the time it took for the court to deny the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal 
cannot be determined.  R v. T., [2011] EWCA (Crim) 1646 (Eng.); R v. O., [2006]
EWCA (Crim) 2047 (Eng.).
Only two of these cases involved rulings of no case to answer.  In one, the Court of 
Appeal took 62 days to deny leave to appeal, A., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 2186, [1], [10]–
[11], [2009] 1 Crim. App. 21, at 281, 283, and in the other, the Court of Appeal did not 
mention the date on which the trial judge made the ruling. O., [2006] EWCA (Crim) 
2047. 
429. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 57(4). E.g., F.B. v. R, 2010 EWCA (Crim)
1857, [1], [2010] 2 Crim. App. 35, at 424 (Eng.);  CPS v. Mattu, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 
1483, [1] (Eng.); R v. Y., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 10, [26], [2008] 1 Crim. App. 34, at 419 
(Eng.); R v. N.W., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 2, [1], [2009] 1 W.L.R. 965, 967 (Eng.); R v. 
K., [2007] EWCA (Crim) 491, [15], [2007] 2 Crim. App. 10, at 133 (Eng.); R v. J.G., 
[2006] EWCA (Crim) 3276, [2] (Eng.); R v. C., [2006] EWCA (Crim) 2132, [13] (Eng.).
If the prosecution seeks leave to appeal from the trial judge, it must do so either by
“apply[ing] orally, with reasons, immediately after the ruling against which [it] wants to 
appeal,” Criminal Procedure Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709, 67.5(1)(a) (Eng.), or, if it 
receives an adjournment to consider whether to appeal, see supra text accompanying 
notes 82–85, by “apply[ing] in writing” following the adjournment.  Criminal Procedure 
Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709, 67.5(1)(b) (Eng.).  The trial judge must decide whether to 
allow leave to appeal “on the day that the application for permission is made.”
Criminal Procedure Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709, 67.5(4) (Eng.).  Thus, when the 
trial judge allows leave to appeal, no significant time will have intervened between the
trial judge’s ruling, the application for leave, and the giving of leave.
430. The discussion in the text would also apply under a statute allowing the 
prosecution to appeal as a matter of right, that is, without first obtaining leave to appeal. 
431. The trial judge can order an expedited appeal after being informed by the 
prosecution that it intends to appeal.  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 59(1).  The Court of
Appeal (or the trial judge) may, however, subsequently reverse that decision.  Id.
§ 59(4). 
92
RUDSTEIN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2012 9:10 AM      
 
































[VOL. 13:  5, 2011] Retrying the Acquitted in England 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
the time period between the trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer and 
the Court of Appeal’s decision on the merits of the appeal, the longer the 
“acquitted” defendant and his family and friends must suffer the anxiety
and concern about whether the defendant will have to undergo a new 
trial for the same offense, and the longer the “acquitted” defendant’s
autonomy will be limited.  Nevertheless, based on the reported cases
decided thus far432 under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 by the Court of
Appeal in England, there does not appear to be significant cause for
concern. For from the reported cases it appears that the longest the 
Court of Appeal has taken to decide an appeal433 has been 386 days, or
just over one year,434 with the average being approximately 102 days, or 
nearly three and one-half months.435  Although one year cannot be deemed
The Court of Appeal often grants leave to appeal at the same time it issues its opinion 
on the merits of the appeal.  See R v. J.G., [2006] EWCA (Crim) 3276, [2] (Eng.) (“The 
absence of leave [to appeal granted by the trial judge] should not delay the proceedings 
of this court because the case can be listed as an application for leave with the appeal to 
follow immediately if leave was granted, or, as often happens, there may be what is, in 
effect, a combined hearing.”). E.g., R v. P., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 2895, [1], [32] 
(Wales); R v. F., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 2243, [5], [16] (Eng.); R v. S.H., [2010] EWCA
(Crim) 1931, [4], [44], [2011] 1 Crim. App. 14, at 185, 195 (Eng.); R v. W., [2010] 
EWCA (Crim) 927, [1], [42] (no jur. given); R v. M, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2848, [26]
(Eng.); R v. F., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1639, [1], [72] (Eng.); R v. Tilley, [2009] EWCA
(Crim) 1426, [1], [43], [2009] 2 Crim. App. 31, at 513, 522 (Eng.);  R v. L., [2008] 
EWCA (Crim) 1970, [7], [10], [36]–[37], [2009] 1 Crim. App. 16, at 233, 242 (Eng.). 
432. As of Nov. 1, 2011. 
433. Once again, the Author is including all appeals by the prosecution under
section 58 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 of a trial judge’s ruling, not only those 
involving a ruling of no case to answer.  See supra note 426. 
434. R v. S.H., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 1931, [1], [44], [64], [2011] 1 Crim. App. 14, 
at 184, 195, 201 (Eng.) (on July 13, 2009, the trial judge ruled the defendant had no case 
to answer, and the Court of Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeal and ordered a new 
trial on Aug. 3, 2010). 
435. See R v. Q., [2011] EWCA (Crim) 1584, [1], [20], [2011] 2 Crim. App. 25, at 
365, 369 (Eng.) (the trial judge ruled on Jan. 14, 2011, the defendant had no case to 
answer, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecution’s appeal 123 days later, on
May 17, 2011); R v. P., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 2895, [1], [32] (Wales) (the trial judge 
ruled on July 21, 2010, the defendant had no case to answer, and the Court of Appeal 
dismissed the prosecution’s appeal 113 days later, on Nov. 11, 2010); R v. F., [2010] 
EWCA (Crim) 2243, [2], [5], [16] (Eng.) (prior to trial, on June 16, 2010, the trial judge 
ruled the trial should not proceed because, on the basis of the evidence–a witness 
statement–the prosecution could not succeed, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the
prosecution’s appeal 93 days later, on Sept. 17, 2010); R v. B., 2010 EWCA (Crim)
1857, [1], [2010] 2 Crim. App. 35, at 424 (Eng.) (in one case, the trial judge on Apr. 23, 
2010, quashed the indictment because he did not believe the case should have been 
brought by the CPS, and 81 days later, on July 13, 2010, the Court of Appeal allowed the 
prosecution’s appeal and ordered a fresh trial before a different judge; in two other cases, 
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the trial judge on June 1, 2010, quashed the indictments, and 42 days later, on July 13, 
2010, the Court of Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeals and ordered fresh trials 
before a different judge); R v. W., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 927, [1], [42] (no jur. given) 
(the trial judge ruled on Oct. 9, 2009, the defendant had no case to answer, and 214 days
later, on May 11, 2010, the Court of Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeal and 
ordered a fresh trial); CPS v. L.R., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 924, [1], [2010] 2 Crim. App. 
9, at 64 (Eng.) (on Jan. 15, 2010, the trial judge stayed the proceedings as an abuse of 
process, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecution’s appeal 69 days later, on 
Mar. 25, 2010); R v. N.T., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 711, [9], [15], [2010] 2 Crim. App. 12, 
at 87, 89 (Eng.) (on Aug. 13, 2009, the trial judge stayed the proceedings as an abuse of 
process, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecution’s appeal 230 days later, on 
Mar. 31, 2010, for lack of jurisdiction); R v. M., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2848, [1], [26] 
(Eng.) (the trial judge ruled on Nov. 19, 2009, the defendants had no case to answer, and 
the Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecution’s appeal 12 days later, on Dec. 1, 2009); 
CPS v. C., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2614, [1] (Eng.) (on May 27, 2009, the trial judge 
refused to postpone the case to allow the prosecutor to seek instructions, and then 
entered an acquittal, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction
at a hearing on Sept. 8, 2009, 104 days later); R v. Thomas, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1682,
[1], [41], [46] (Eng.) (the trial judge ruled on May 19, 2009, the defendant had no case to
answer, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecution’s appeal 17 days later, on
June 5, 2009); R v. F., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1639, [1], [72] (Eng.) (on June 1, 2009, the 
trial judge stayed the proceedings on eight counts of the indictment as an abuse of
process, and the Court of Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeal 58 days later, on July
29, 2009); CPS v. Mattu, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1483, [1], [22] (Eng.) (on Nov. 3, 2008, 
the trial judge stayed the proceedings on two counts of the indictment as an abuse of
process, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecution’s appeal 232 days later, on 
June 23, 2009); R v. Tilley, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1426, [4]–[6], [46], [2009] 2 Crim. 
App. 31, at 512, 513–14, 522 (Eng.) (the trial judge ruled on Apr. 16, 2009, that the 
statute under which the defendant was charged did not encompass his conduct, and the 
Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecution’s appeal 95 days later, on July 20, 2009); R v. 
M.K., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 952, [1], [8], [21], [27], [30] (Eng.) (the trial judge ruled on
June 11, 2008, the defendant had no case to answer, and 324 days later, on May 1, 2009, 
the Court of Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeal and ordered a fresh trial); R v. B., 
[2009] EWCA (Crim) 644, [2]–[3], [42] (Eng.) (the trial judge ruled on Dec. 22, 2008,
the ABE (achieving best evidence) interview of the young complainant in a case 
involving various sex offenses with a child under the age of 13 was inadmissible as 
hearsay evidence, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecution’s appeal 80 days
later, on Mar. 12, 2009); R v. I., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 186, [2], [9], [16] (Eng.) (on Oct. 
7, 2008, the trial judge stayed the proceedings as an abuse of process, and 115 days later,
on Jan. 30, 2009, the Court of Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeal and ordered the 
proceedings resumed); R v. L., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1970, [6]–[7], [36]–[37], [2009] 1
Crim. App. 16, at 232, 233, 242 (Eng.) (the trial judge quashed the indictment on Jan. 29, 
2008, and 212 days later, on Aug. 28, 2008, the Court of Appeal allowed the
prosecution’s appeal in part, but nevertheless directed the acquittal of the defendants 
because it found it would not be in the interests of justice to order a new trial); R v. B., 
[2008] EWCA (Crim) 1524, [1], [23] (Eng.) (the trial judge ruled on Feb. 21, 2008, that 
evidence of a video identification of the defendant by the victim of a kidnapping and
robbery should be excluded, and 147 days later, on July 17, 2008, the Court of Appeal 
allowed the prosecution’s appeal and ordered that the trial be resumed); R v. F., [2008] 
EWCA (Crim) 1868, [1], [10], [12], [16] (Eng.) (the trial judge ruled on June 19, 2008, 
the defendant had no case to answer, and 28 days later, on July 17, 2008, the Court of 
Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeal and ordered a fresh trial); R v. N. Ltd., [2008] 
EWCA (Crim) 1223, [1], [10], [29]–[30], [2009] 1 Crim. App. 3, at 58, 60, 66–67 (Eng.)
(the trial judge ruled on Dec. 5, 2007, the defendant had no case to answer, and 186 days
later, on June 10, 2008, the Court of Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeal and 
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ordered a fresh trial); R v. B., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1144, [1], [11], [19] (Eng.)
(apparently on Apr. 23, 2008, the trial judge stayed the proceedings on one count of the 
indictment as an abuse of discretion, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the
prosecution’s appeal eight days later, on May 1, 2008); R v. Chi Kuen Chung, [2008] 
EWCA (Crim) 836, [1], [28] (Eng.) (the trial judge ruled on Nov. 28, 2007, the 
defendant had no case to answer, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecution’s
appeal 92 days later, on Feb. 28, 2008); R v. R., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 683, [4]–[5], [18]
(Eng.) (the trial judge ruled on Mar. 5, 2008, the defendant had no case to answer, and 14 
days later, on Mar. 19, 2008, the Court of Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeal and 
ordered a new trial); R v. R., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 619, [1], [13]–[14], [2008] 2 Crim.
App. 38, at 559, 562–63 (Eng.) (sometime after the defendant’s trial began on Jan. 7, 
2008, the trial judge ruled the defendant had no case to answer, and no more than nine
days later, on Jan. 16, 2008, the Court of Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeal and
ordered the trial be resumed); R v. H., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 483, [3], [34], [57]–[58] 
(Eng.) (the trial judge ruled on Oct. 4, 2007, before the jury was sworn, that under the 
prosecution’s evidence in its then form, the defendant did not have a case to answer, and
after the prosecution, at the judge’s invitation, offered no evidence, the judge entered 
verdicts of not guilty; 132 days later, on Feb. 13, 2008, the Court of Appeal allowed the 
prosecution’s appeal and reversed the judgment of the trial court but nevertheless 
concluded that the interests of justice would not be served by resuming the proceedings 
or ordering a new trial); R v. O.B., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 238, [1]–[2], [23] (Eng.) (on 
Jan. 18, 2008, the trial judge stayed the proceedings as an abuse of process, and 13 days
later, on Jan. 31, 2008, the Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecution’s appeal); R v. 
N.W., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 2, [1], [39] (Eng.) (the trial judge ruled on Apr. 27, 2007,
the defendants had no case to answer, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the
prosecution’s appeal 271 days later, on Jan. 23, 2008); R v. P., [2007] EWCA (Crim)
3484, [1]–[2], [13] (Eng.) (sometime after the defendant’s trial began on Nov. 27, 2006,
the trial judge ruled the defendant had no case to answer, and the Court of Appeal 
allowed the prosecution’s appeal on Oct. 12, 2007, 319 days after the commencement of
the trial); R v. C., [2007] EWCA (Crim) 3463, [1], [7], [9], [16] (Eng.) (the trial judge 
ruled on Oct. 4, 2007, that statements made by a domestic violence victim in an
emergency 999 call and to police officers investigating the call were inadmissible at trial, 
and the Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecution’s appeal 75 days later, on Dec. 18, 
2007); R v. O., [2007] EWCA (Crim) 3483, [1], [4], [14], [46] (Eng.) (the trial judge 
stayed the proceedings against the defendant on Sept. 21, 2007, as an abuse of process, 
and the Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecution’s appeal six days later, on Sept. 27, 
2007); R v. R., [2007] EWCA (Crim) 3312, [1], [8]–[9], [2008] 1 Crim. App. 26, at 358, 
359 (Eng.) (the trial judge ruled on Aug. 30, 2007, the defendant had no case to answer, 
and the Court of Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeal 77 days later, on Nov. 15, 
2007); R v. P., [2007] EWCA (Crim) 3216, [2], [24], [2008] 2 Crim. App. 6, at 69, 75
(Eng.) (the trial judge ruled on Oct. 10, 2007, the defendant had no case to answer, and
65 days later, on Dec. 14, 2007, the Court of Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeal 
and ordered a fresh trial); R v. M.K., [2007] EWCA (Crim) 3150, [1], [10], [17], [23]
(Eng.) (the trial judge ruled on Aug. 21, 2007, certain evidence inadmissible as hearsay,
and 105 days later, on Dec. 4, 2007, the Court of Appeal allowed the prosecution’s 
appeal and ordered a fresh trial); R v. A., [2007] EWCA (Crim) 2868, [1]–[2], [21] 
(Eng.) (the trial judge ruled on July 11, 2007, the defendant had no case to answer, and
the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal 146 days later, on Dec. 4, 2007); R v. P.S., 
[2007] EWCA (Crim) 2058, [2], [24], [61] (Eng.) (the trial judge ruled on Apr. 23, 2007, 
the defendants had no case to answer, and 80 days later, on July 12, 2007, the Court of 
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Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeal and ordered a fresh trial); R v. H., [2007] 
EWCA (Crim) 2056, [2], [32], [35] (Eng.) (on June 28, 2007, the trial judge gave his 
reasons for ruling the defendant had no case to answer, and 12 days later, on July 12, 
2007, the Court of Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeal and ordered the trial be
resumed); R v. C., [2007] EWCA (Crim) 1862, [1], [42], [60] (Wales) (the trial judge 
ruled on Apr. 25, 2007, the defendant had no case to answer, and 28 days later, on May
23, 2007, the Court of Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeal and ordered a fresh trial); 
R v. K., [2007] EWCA (Crim) 971, [1], [61], [65], [68], [2007] 2 Crim. App. 15, at 191, 
206, 207, 208 (Eng.) (on Feb. 21, 2007, the trial judge stayed the proceedings as an
abuse of process, and 37 days later, on Mar. 30, 2007, the Court of Appeal allowed the 
appeal and ordered the trial be resumed); R v. K., [2007] EWCA (Crim) 491, [1], [14],
[33]–[35], [2007] 2 Crim. App. 10, at 130, 133, 138 (the trial judge ruled on Feb. 26, 
2007, the defendant had no case to answer on two counts of an indictment, and the Court
of Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeal ten days later, on March 8, 2007); R v. 
Francis, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 3323, [1], [11]–[13], [2007] 1 Crim. App. 36, at 470, 472
(Eng.) (the trial judge ruled on Nov. 2, 2006, that as a matter of law the offense charged 
could not have been committed, and the Court of Appeal allowed the prosecution’s
appeal 49 days later, on Dec. 21, 2006); R v. J.G., [2006] EWCA (Crim) 3276, [1], [15]
(the trial judge ruled on Dec. 4, 2006, the defendant had no case to answer, and the Court 
of Appeal dismissed the prosecution’s appeal four days later, on Dec. 8, 2006); R v. 
Patel, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 2689, [18], [2007] Crim. App. 12, at 192, 196 (Eng.) (the 
trial judge ruled on Sept. 21, 2006, the defendant had no case to answer, and the Court of 
Appeal dismissed the prosecution’s appeal 34 days later, on Oct. 25, 2006); R v. C., 
[2006] EWCA (Crim) 2132, [1], [3], [7], [43], [45], [47] (Eng.) (the trial judge ruled on
Mar. 28, 2006, the Crown Court had no jurisdiction to try the offense with which the 
defendant was charged, and 122 days later, on July 28, 2006, the Court of Appeal 
allowed the prosecution’s appeal and ordered the trial be resumed); R v. J.S.M., [2006] 
EWCA (Crim) 2046, [1]–[2], [6]–[8] (jur. not given) (the trial judge ruled on Feb. 14, 
2006, the defendant had no case to answer, and the Court of Appeal allowed the 
prosecution’s appeal 149 days later, on July 13, 2006); CPS v. Morgan, [2006] EWCA
(Crim) 1742, [1]–[2], [8]–[12], [26] (Eng.) (the trial judge ruled on Mar. 7, 2006, that 
upon the agreed-upon facts, the defendant’s conduct did not constitute an offense, and
the Court of Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeal 129 days later, on July 14, 2006); 
CPS v. C.E., [2006] EWCA (Crim) 1410, [4]–[5], [14]–[16] (Eng.) (the trial judge ruled
on Apr. 26, 2006, that a video-taped interview of the complainant in a rape case was 
inadmissible hearsay, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal 28 days later, on
May 24, 2006); R v. D., [2006] EWCA (Crim) 1139, [1], [7]–[8], [18], [31]–[33], [2006] 
2 Crim. App. 24, at 350, 351, 353, 357–58 (Eng.) (the trial judge ruled on Mar. 7, 2006,
the cases should not proceed to trial because there was no basis on which a reasonable 
jury could convict the defendant of the offenses with which he was charged, and the 
Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal 70 days later, on May 16, 2006); R v. C., [2005] 
EWCA (Crim) 3533, [4], [6]–[7], [19], [24], [2006] 1 Crim. App. 28, at 434, 435, 438, 
439 (Eng.) (the trial judge ruled on Dec. 2, 2005, that because the prosecution would be 
unable to prove that the conduct alleged in four counts of an indictment occurred before 
the date of the repeal of the statute under which the defendant was charged, those four
counts could not be left to the jury, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal ten 
days later, on Dec. 15, 2005); R v. T., [2005] EWCA (Crim) 3511, [1], [7], [16], [18] 
(Eng.) (on Oct. 24, 2005, the trial judge quashed seven counts of an indictment on the 
ground they were defective in law, and 57 days later, on Dec. 20, 2005, the Court of 
Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeal and ordered the proceedings against the 
defendant be resumed).  See also R v. M.H., [2011] EWCA (Crim) 1508 (Eng.)
(although the opinion does not give the date on which the trial judge ruled the defendant 
had no case to answer, 224 days intervened between the date the Court of Appeal heard 
the prosecution’s appeal, Nov. 5, 2010, and the date it allowed the appeal and ordered a 
fresh trial, June 17, 2011). 
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de minimis insofar as it affects the defendant’s interests, it is at most a
In three cases the opinion does not give the date on which the trial judge issued the 
ruling in question, so the length of time between the judge’s ruling and the Court of 
Appeal’s decision in those cases cannot be determined.  R v. T., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 
630, [1] (Eng.); R v. M., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 2751, [1], [27] (Eng.) (although the 
opinion does not state when the trial judge issued his ruling that the child complainant
was not a competent witness, it does state the alleged crime occurred in Nov. 2007, so 
the time between the judge’s ruling and the decision of the Court of Appeal must have 
been much less than one year, as the Court of Appeal issued its opinion dismissing the 
appeal on Nov. 4, 2008); R v. Y., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 10, [1], [2008] 1 Crim. App. 34, 
at 413–14 (no jur. given). 
See also R v. A., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1034, [2], [17], [40], [2008] 2 Crim. App. 37, 
at 547, 550, 557 (Eng.) (in a court-martial proceeding, the assistant judge advocate, on
Dec. 13, 2007, directed an acquittal on one of two charges and stayed the second charge 
as an abuse of process, and 155 days later, on May 16, 2008, the Court of Appeal 
dismissed the prosecution’s appeal, taken pursuant to provisions of military law that 
mirror sections 58–61 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, for want of jurisdiction). 
The Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland has taken an average of approximately 118 
days to decide a prosecution appeal taken under the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland)
Order, 2004, SI 2004/1500 (N. Ir. 9) arts. 16–20, 26–31, which adopts provisions in 
Northern Ireland tracking those of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.  R v. S.R., [2011] 
NICA (Crim) 49, [1], [4]–[5] (shortly after Nov. 18, 2010, the trial judge stayed the 
proceedings as an abuse of process, and approximately 120 days later, on Mar. 23, 2011, 
the Court of Appeal in Nothern Ireland allowed the prosecution’s appeal); R v. McNally, 
[2009] NICA (Crim) 3, [1]–[2], [24]–[25] (on May 2, 2008, the trial judge stayed the 
proceedings on several counts of an indictment as an abuse of process, and 249 days
later, on Jan. 6, 2009, the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland allowed the prosecution’s 
appeal); R v. Jamison, [2008] NICA (Crim) 32, [1], [3] (on Oct. 18, 2007, the trial judge
stayed the proceedings as an abuse of process, and 210 days later, on May 15, 2008, the 
Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland dismissed the prosecution’s appeal on the ground  it 
did not have jurisdiction); R v. McCann, [2008] NICA (Crim) 25, [4], [21], [24], [26]–
[27] (the trial judge ruled on June 4, 2008, the defendants had no case to answer on three 
counts of the indictment, and five days later, on June 9, 2008, the Court of Appeal in 
Northern Ireland allowed the prosecution’s appeal and ordered that the charges contained 
in the three counts be considered by the jury); R v. Courtney, [2007] NICA (Crim) 6, 
[1]–[2], [35], [2007] N.I. 178, 179, 193 (the trial judge ruled on Nov. 28, 2006, the 
defendant had no case to answer, and 58 days later, on Jan. 26, 2007, the Court of
Appeal in Northern Ireland allowed the prosecution’s appeal and ordered a new trial); R
v. A.B., [2007] NICA (Crim) 18, [1], [3], [41] (on Dec. 12, 2006, the trial judge stayed 
the proceedings as an abuse of process, and the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland
allowed the prosecution’s appeal 101 days later, on Mar. 23, 2007); R v. Murray, [2006] 
NICA (Crim) 33, [1], [5], [26], [28]–[29] (on May 26, 2006, the trial judge stayed the 
proceedings as an abuse of process. and the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland allowed 
the appeal 46 days later, on July 11, 2006); R v. Grindy, [2006] NICA (Crim) 10, [1],
[2006] N. Ir. L.R. 290, 292 (on Dec. 15, 2005, the trial judge stayed the proceedings as 
an abuse of process, and the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland dismissed the appeal 96 
days later, on Mar. 21, 2006).  In one case, the opinion does not give the date on which 
the trial judge issued the ruling in question, so the length of time between that ruling and
the Court of Appeal’s decision cannot be calculated.  R v. Quinn, [2011] NICA (Crim) 
19. 
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slight impingement upon those interests and certainly is not akin to the 
“continuing state of anxiety and concern”436 that is the concern of the
rule against double jeopardy.437 
It therefore seems that although some of the same interests of the
defendant the rule against double jeopardy seeks to protect are adversely
affected by the delays introduced by allowing the prosecution to appeal a
trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer, the delays that have thus far
436. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957) (emphasis added). 
437. A decision by the Court of Appeal confirming the trial judge’s ruling of no
case to answer may not in fact be “final,” because the prosecution can, with leave from
either the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, take a further 
appeal to the Supreme Court.  Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, c. 19, § 33(1), (2) (Eng.).  The 
prosecution must seek leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the 
decision of the Court of Appeal (or, if later, the date on which the court gives reasons for
its decision), id. § 34(1)–(1A), and if the Court of Appeal refuses to give leave to appeal, 
the prosecution has 28 days from the date of the refusal to seek leave to appeal from the 
Supreme Court. Id. § 34(1). A defendant who was successful in the Court of Appeal 
therefore will be in limbo over whether he must undergo a new trial for up to five 
additional periods: first, a period of up to 28 days (or longer if the Court of Appeal gave
the reasons for its decision after it announced that decision) during which the prosecution 
can seek leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal; second, if the prosecution seeks leave 
to appeal from the Court of Appeal, the period during which the Court of Appeal is 
deciding whether to give such leave; third, if the prosecution seeks leave to appeal from 
the Court of Appeal but that court refuses such leave, up to an additional 28 days during
which the prosecution can seek leave to appeal from the Supreme Court; fourth, if the 
prosecution seeks leave to appeal from the Supreme Court, the period of time during
which the Supreme Court is deciding whether to give such leave; and finally, if either the
Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court gives leave to appeal, the period of time it takes 
for the Supreme Court to decide the case on the merits.  Although the additional period 
during which trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer is still not final could be an 
extremely lengthy period that could seriously affect the defendant’s interests, such 
appeals are likely to be rare.  For leave to appeal cannot be granted unless the Court of 
Appeal certifies “that a point of law of general public importance is involved in the 
decision and it appears to the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court (as the case may be)
that the point is one which ought to be considered by the Supreme Court.” Id. (emphasis
added). The typical case involving a ruling of no case to answer is unlikely to involve a 
“point of general public importance,” and therefore would not be the proper subject for
further appeal by the prosecution.  Indeed, the only situation in which the relevant 
standard is likely to be met is one in which the trial judge based his ruling on the so-
called first prong of Galbraith—that is, when the trial judge ruled “there [was] no
evidence that the crime alleged has been committed by the defendant,” R v. Galbraith,
[1981] 73 Crim. App. 124, 127 (Eng.), more specifically, when the trial judge concluded,
over the protest of the prosecution, the crime with which the defendant was charged
required a particular element, and then ruled there was no evidence introduced by the 
prosecution of such element.  The question whether the crime in question actually
requires the element at issue could be one of “general public importance.”  In the run-of-
the-mill case, then, even if the prosecution seeks certification from the Court of Appeal,
it will not receive it and no further appeal of the trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer 
will be allowed.  Indeed, between April 4, 2005, the effective date of the provisions 
allowing prosecution appeals of a ruling of no case to answer, see supra note 77, and 
November 1, 2011, neither the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, nor, before its
creation, the House of Lords, has decided an appeal from a decision of the Court of 
Appeal involving a prosecution appeal of a ruling of no case to answer.  
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occurred in England under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 have not been 
of such an extent as to cause grave concern. 
4. Preventing Harassment 
Another purpose of the rule against double jeopardy “is to prevent the 
harassment of the accused by repeated prosecution for the same matter.”438 
If the government could retry an individual for the same offense
following his acquittal, that power “could be used illegitimately by ill-
intentioned state servants.”439  In the absence of a rule against double
jeopardy, it is possible that “the police, unhappy at [an individual’s]
being found not guilty, would unfairly pursue the person in order to try
to bring about a second trial,”440 or a “disgruntled prosecutor”441 who 
believed a fact finder erroneously acquitted a guilty individual could 
harass and oppress that individual by bringing a second prosecution for 
the same offense, or by continuing to investigate him for the same
offense in the hope of finding new evidence implicating him in the 
crime.442  Even if the defendant were acquitted again at the second trial, 
or if the police or prosecutor did not find any new evidence of the
acquitted individual’s guilt and did not charge him a second time for the 
same offense, they may be satisfied with having forced the individual to
undergo additional embarrassment, anxiety, concern, and perhaps expense 
arising from the second trial or the continued investigation.
Without any safeguards in place, allowing the prosecution to appeal a 
trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer could open the door to
 438. N.Z. LAW COMM’N, REPORT 70, supra note 127, para. 12. See also N.S.W.
LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 207, para. 2.8 (“The development of the 
principle [of double jeopardy] has gone beyond prohibiting multiple punishment for the 
same offence, to adopting practices to prevent undue prolongation of the criminal 
process. To allow otherwise is to risk harassment of an accused, who is, after all 
presumed innocent.”). 
439. ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 4.14 (emphasis 
deleted).
440. SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOME AFFAIRS, THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULE, supra
note 27, para. 19. 
441. Thompson v Mastertouch T.V. Service Pty. Ltd. (No. 3), (1978) 38 FLR 397,
408 (Fed. Ct. Austl.) (Deane, J., with Smithers & Riley, JJ., agreeing). 
442. See SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOME AFFAIRS, THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULE, 
supra note 27, para. 19. See also FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 3–4 (“The main rationale
of the rule against double jeopardy is that it prevents the unwarranted harassment of the
accused by multiple prosecutions.”); AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION 
PAPER, supra note 111, at 2 (one of the policies underlying the rule against double 
jeopardy is “the protection of citizens from harassment by the State”).
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harassment of the individual who benefitted from the trial judge’s ruling.
An unscrupulous prosecutor, upset at the trial judge’s ruling and bent on
harassing the individual who would otherwise be acquitted of the offense 
with which he was charged, could appeal the judge’s ruling even though 
she believed the appeal had little chance of success.443  By doing so, the
prosecutor would force the individual to continue to defend himself
against a charge that a judge had already found to be unsubstantiated. 
Even if the prosecutor failed in convincing the appellate court to
overturn the trial judge’s ruling and the case ended at that point with the 
acquittal of the accused, the prosecutor would have forced the accused to 
undergo the anxiety, distress, and perhaps expense of the appellate 
process. On the other hand, if the unscrupulous prosecutor succeeded in 
convincing the appellate tribunal that the trial judge erred in ruling the 
defendant had no case to answer, the defendant might be compelled to
undergo either a second trial for the same offense,444 or the resumption 
of his original trial for that offense.445  Even if the prosecutor failed to 
convict the individual at this second, or resumed, trial, she will have 
forced him to undergo the “heavy personal strain,”446 of a second trial, or
further proceedings in the first trial, thereby frustrating the rule against 
double jeopardy’s purpose of preventing the government from harassing 
an individual through repeated trials for the same offense. 
The appeal process authorized by the Criminal Justice Act 2003,
however, contains a significant safeguard for individuals who benefit 
from a trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer, and for that reason is 
unlikely to open the door to government harassment.  The Act provides 
that the prosecution can appeal a ruling of no case to answer only after
obtaining leave to appeal from either the trial judge or the Court of
Appeal.447  It can be expected that both the trial judge and the Court of
443. Allowing the prosecution to appeal a ruling of no case to answer does not give
rise to an opportunity for the police to harass the “acquitted” defendant by trying to find
new evidence against him.  For any inculpatory evidence unearthed by the police
following the trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer would be meaningless to the
prosecution unless it succeeded in obtaining a fresh trial of the accused.  Moreover, 
because the only issue in the prosecution’s appeal would be whether the evidence
already presented in the prosecution’s case in chief was, as a matter of law, sufficient to 
prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, any newly-discovered evidence 
could in no way enhance the prosecution’s chances of winning its appeal.  Thus, the fact 
the prosecution was appealing a trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer would not 
provide any incentive to the police to continue their investigation of the accused.  Indeed,
it would seem the police would not want to waste their time further investigating an 
individual whom a judge had already “acquitted.” 
444. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 61(4)(b) (Eng.). 
445. Id. § 61(4)(a).
446. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977) (quoting
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion)). 
447. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 57(4). 
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Appeal would be unwilling to grant leave to appeal if there existed the 
slightest hint the prosecution sought to appeal merely to harass the 
“acquitted” defendant.448  This provision therefore provides significant
protection for the accused against government harassment, as the
prosecution cannot merely on its own initiative, and without any judicial
oversight, appeal a particular ruling of no case to answer.  Moreover, 
because the prosecution must seek leave to appeal from the trial judge 
either “immediately after the ruling against which [it] wants to appeal,”449 
or, if it receives an adjournment to consider whether to appeal, following 
the adjournment450 (which generally should be only “until the next business 
day”451), and because generally the trial judge must decide whether to
allow leave to appeal “on the day that the application for permission is
made,”452 no significant time will intervene between the trial judge’s
ruling of no case to answer and the denial of leave by the trial judge. 
And although it may take a bit longer for the Court of Appeal to deny an 
application for leave to appeal,453 any harassment of the defendant by the
prosecution from merely seeking to appeal will be relatively minor. 
Moreover, even if an unscrupulous prosecutor successfully masked 
her intention of gaining a second trial for the purpose of harassing the 
“acquitted” individual and managed to obtain leave to appeal, a second
trial would be dependent upon the Court of Appeal’s finding that the 
trial judge erred in ruling the defendant had no case to answer.454  Unlike
the situation in a legal system that did not recognize the rule against
448. If the prosecution’s evidence were clearly insufficient to prove the accused’s 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the appeal were attempted to be taken merely to 
harass the accused, it is almost certain that neither the trial judge nor the Court of Appeal
would grant leave to appeal.  Moreover, as stated earlier, see supra notes 76 and 342, in
deciding whether to grant leave to appeal, the Court of Appeal, and presumably also the 
trial judge, must “look rather more widely at the interests of justice than simply . . . ask
[itself] whether an appeal has a realistic prospect of success, or some other test directed 
solely at the merits of the appeal.”  R v. A., [2009] EWCA 2186, [8], [2009] 1 Crim. 
App. 21, at 283 (Eng.). 
449. Criminal Procedure Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709, 67.5(1)(a) (Eng.). 
450. Criminal Procedure Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709, 67.5(1)(b) (Eng.). 
451. Criminal Procedure Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709, 67.2(2)(b) (Eng.).  But see R 
v. H., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 483, [10]–[12] (Eng.) (holding that the court has the power 
to grant a greater extension of time than “until the next business day”).
452. Criminal Procedure Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709, 67.5(4) (Eng.).
453. See supra notes 425–28 and accompanying text. 
454. And also finding the defendant could receive a “fair trial” if the Court of
Appeal ordered his initial trial be resumed or that a fresh trial take place.  Criminal 
Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 61(5) (Eng.). 
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double jeopardy, a second trial could not be brought merely at the whim
of the prosecution. The existence of such oversight makes it probable
that appeals taken by the prosecution merely for the purpose of obtaining 
a second trial to harass the “acquitted” individual would be weeded out 
and the “acquitted” individual would not have to undergo a second trial 
for the same offense. 
It is true, of course, the prosecution might not care if it obtains a
second trial.  Its motive may be to harass the “acquitted” individual by
forcing him to undergo the anxiety and expense of the appellate process.
Even if the prosecution managed to obtain leave to appeal, the anxiety
and expense an individual would be forced to undergo during the 
appellate process pales in comparison to the anxiety and expense he
would be forced to undergo at a second trial for the same offense.455 
5. Minimizing the Distress and Trauma of the     
Trial Process
Another raison d’être for the rule against double jeopardy is to prevent
“the state with all its resources and power [from] . . . mak[ing] repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting 
him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal.”456  As explained by noted
English scholar Glanville Williams, it would be “hard on the defendant 
if, after he has at great cost in money and anxiety secured a favorable
verdict from a jury on a particular issue, he must fight the battle over 
again.”457 
As these statements indicate, defending against a criminal charge can
be a “grueling”458 process for a person.  In the absence of legal aid, it can 
place a heavy financial burden on an individual.459  Those who can
455. See supra text accompanying notes 470–75. 
456. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).  Accord Pearce v The Queen
(1998) 194 CLR 610, 614 (Austl.) (McHugh, Hayne & Callahan, JJ.); id. at 636 (Kirby, 
J.). See also  ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 25, paras. 
4.6–.7 (noting the effects also extend to the individual’s family, the witnesses, and the 
victim); ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 4.3; N.Z. LAW COMM’N,
REPORT 70, supra note 127, paras. 12–13. 
457. WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 164.  Williams was writing about a subsequent 
prosecution for a different offense, but one arising out of the same facts as the first. As 
the English Law Commission pointed out, though, “clearly the principle also applies to 
true autrefois cases.”  ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 25, 
para. 4.6 n.14. 
458. N.Z. LAWCOMM’N, REPORT 70, supra note 127, para. 13. 
459. See, e.g., Susan Chandler, Free Ryan Defense Could Get Expensive If Mistrial 
Declared, Rerun Would Be Costly, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 30, 2006, at Business 1, available at
2006 WLNR 7238109 (stating the defense costs in the fraud trial of former Illinois
Governor George H. Ryan stood at $10 million as of November of 2005, and noting the 
defendant’s lead lawyer bills at the rate of $750 per hour); Junior Gotti: They’re 
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afford it nearly always retain an attorney to represent them.460  In addition, 
they frequently hire an investigator to help locate witnesses and find 
evidence favorable to their defense, and they may employ experts and
other specialists to assist in the preparation of their case and perhaps to
testify in their behalf at the trial.  Even in cases in which the accused is
entitled to legal aid, “the financial burden can still be felt by the accused
in other substantial ways, for example, the disruption to normal
employment or business.”461 
The stress of defending oneself in a criminal prosecution also can 
affect an individual both emotionally and physically.  A criminal charge 
generally causes embarrassment to the accused, and it may cause his
friends, neighbors, colleagues, and even relatives to disapprove of him,
be suspicious and distrustful of him, and perhaps even shun him.
Additionally, an accused who has a family and will likely be concerned 
about the effect the pending charge—and possible conviction—will have 
on his family life or employment, or both.  Perhaps even more importantly, 
the individual will be concerned about his impending trial and the 
possibility that he will be convicted and punished, sentenced perhaps to 
a lengthy term of incarceration.  These concerns may exact not only a
psychological toll on the accused, but a physical one as well.462 
Moreover, “[t]his distress is not confined to the defendant.  His or her 
family also suffers . . . .”463 
Breaking Me, CNN.COM, Mar. 14, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/03/14/gotti. 
retrial.ap/index.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2006) (after a second jury deadlocked on 
charges alleging John “Junior” Gotti, the son of a late mob boss, arranged a brutal
beating of an individual, and after the trial judge set the date for a third trial, Gotti’s
lawyer said Gotti is struggling financially to fight the charges and told the judge Gotti 
needed time to borrow money to pay his attorneys).
As discussed earlier, see supra note 265, regulations that recently took effect in
England re-introduced a means test for cases tried in the Crown Court, which means that
far fewer individuals will be entitled to a legal aid attorney at no cost to themselves than
were eligible for such aid as in the recent past.
460. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“[T]here are few 
defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can to 
prepare and present their defenses.”).
461. N.S.W. LAWREFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 207, para. 2.12. 
462. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530 (1975). 
463. ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 25, para. 4.7
(noting that “witnesses on both sides, including the alleged victim” also suffer).  See also
N.Z. LAW COMM’N, REPORT 70, supra note 127, para. 13 (“[T]he process of a criminal 
trial is . . . a process which may have been grueling for all involved and even hideous . . . 
for the victim, the accused, witnesses and their families.”).
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This “‘heavy personal strain’”464 inevitably accompanies any criminal
charge, as does the expense that must be borne by one who is not
entitled to legal aid.465  The rule against double jeopardy, however, is
intended, in part, to minimize the expense, distress, and trauma to an 
individual accused of a crime by confining it, in most cases,466 to that
arising from a single trial.467 Once an individual is acquitted, or
convicted,468 he need never again have to undergo the “distress and
trauma of the trial process”469 for the same offense.  However, allowing 
the prosecution to appeal a trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer
could frustrate this purpose, because, at a minimum, the defendant must
endure the rigors of the appellate process before the trial judge’s ruling
of no case to answer can take effect and he can be formally acquitted,
and at the extreme, by being compelled to undergo a second trial for the 
same offense if the prosecution succeeds in its appeal. 
In those cases in which the prosecution decides to appeal the trial
judge’s ruling of no case to answer, the “acquitted” defendant will have 
to “defend” himself in the appellate court.  In the absence of legal aid, he 
“is likely to carry an enormous burden if, in addition to defending
himself or herself at trial, the additional expense of an appeal . . . is to be 
borne.”470  Even if the “acquitted” defendant receives legal aid for the
appeal,471 he may bear a severe financial burden during the pendency of
the appeal because of the continued disruption to his employment or 
business.472 
464. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977) (quoting
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion)). 
465. But see Prosecution of Offences Act, 1985, c. 23, § 16(2)(b), (6) (Eng.) 
(providing that a criminal defendant who is “tried on indictment and acquitted” is
entitled to be reimbursed “an amount as the [trial] court considers reasonably sufficient 
to compensate him for any expenses properly incurred by him in the proceedings”). 
466. See supra note 334. 
467. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661 (1977).  Accord Smalis v.
Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 143 n.4 (1986); Breed, 421 U.S. at 529–30. 
Professor Dennis states this purpose of the rule against double jeopardy is based upon
“the state’s duty of humanity to its citizens, which is an aspect of the liberal imperative 
to treat all citizens with dignity and respect.”  Dennis, supra note 125, at 940. 
468. See supra note 129 and text accompanying notes 126–31. 
469. ENG. LAWCOMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 25, para. 4.7.
470. N.S.W. LAWREFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 207, para. 2.12. 
471. In England, the “acquitted” defendant might be entitled to legal aid on appeal. 
Access to Justice Act, 1999, c. 22, §§ 12(2)(a), 14(1) (Eng.); id. Sch. 3, §§ 1(1), 2(1); 
Criminal Defence Service (General) (No. 2) Regulations 2001, No. 10 (as amended).  In 
addition, he might be entitled to a “costs order,” Prosecution of Offences Act, 1985, c. 
23, § 16(4A) (Eng.), in “such amount as the court considers reasonably sufficient to
compensate him for any expenses incurred by him in the proceedings.” Id. § 16(6). 
472. N.S.W. LAWREFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 207, para. 2.12. 
Some defendants in England have had to wait over six months while the prosecution’s 
appeal of a trial judge’s ruling was pending.  R v. M.H., [2011] EWCA (Crim) 1508
104
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Nevertheless, one must remember the trial judge’s ruling of no case to
answer ended the defendant’s trial (at least for the moment) before the 
defendant presented his case and the appellate proceedings can be viewed, 
in effect, as a substitute for the remainder of his trial.  During the
pendency of the appeal, the accused will not have to face the stress, 
embarrassment, and expense of the remainder of his trial.  And while he 
still must “defend” himself in the appellate court, doing so under these 
circumstances may be less stressful and embarrassing than defending 
himself at trial, because the trial judge has already ruled in his favor and 
(Eng.) (the Court of Appeal heard the prosecution’s appeal on Nov. 5, 2010, but did not 
decide the case until June 17, 2011, 224 days later, when it upheld the appeal and 
ordered a fresh trial); R v. S.H., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 1931, [1], [44], [64], [2011] 1
Crim. App. 14, at 184, 195, 201 (Eng.) (the trial judge ruled on July 13, 2009, the 
defendant had no case to answer, and 386 days later, on Aug. 3, 2010, the Court of 
Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeal and ordered a fresh trial); R v. W., [2010] 
EWCA (Crim) 927, [1], [42] (no jur. given) (the trial judge ruled on Oct. 9, 2009, the 
defendant had no case to answer, and 214 days later, on May 11, 2010, the Court of 
Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeal and ordered a fresh trial); R v. N.T., [2010] 
EWCA (Crim) 711, [9], [15], [2010] 2 Crim. App. 12, at 87, 89 (Eng.) (on Aug. 13, 
2009, the trial judge stayed the proceedings as an abuse of process, and the Court of
Appeal dismissed the prosecution’s appeal 230 days later, on Mar. 31, 2010, for lack of
jurisdiction); CPS v. Mattu, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1483, [1], [22] (Eng.) (on Nov. 3, 
2008, the trial judge stayed as an abuse of process two counts of the indictment, and the 
Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecution’s appeal 232 days later, on June 23, 2009); R
v. M.K., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 952, [1], [8], [21], [27], [30] (Eng.) (the trial judge ruled
on June 11, 2008, the defendants had no case to answer, and the Court of Appeal 
reversed that ruling and ordered a new trial 324 days later, on May 1, 2009); R v. L., 
[2008] EWCA (Crim) 1970, [6]–[7], [36]–[37], [2009] 1 Crim. App. 16, at 232, 233, 242 
(Eng.) (the trial judge quashed the indictment on Jan. 29, 2008, and 212 days later, on
Aug. 28, 2008, the Court of Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeal in part, but 
nevertheless directed the acquittal of the defendants because it found it would not be in 
the interests of justice to order a new trial); R v. N.W., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 2, [1], [39]
(Eng.) (the trial judge ruled on Apr. 27, 2007, the defendants had no case to answer, and
the Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecution’s appeal 271 days later, on Jan. 23, 2008); 
R v. P., [2007] EWCA (Crim) 3484, [1]–[2], [13] (Eng.) (sometime after the defendant’s
trial began on Nov. 27, 2006, the trial judge ruled the defendant had no case to answer,
and the Court of Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeal on Oct. 12, 2007, 319 days
after the commencement of the trial). See also R v. McNally, [2009] NICA (Crim) 3, 
[1]–[2], [24]–[25] (on May 2, 2008, the trial judge stayed the proceedings on several
counts of an indictment as an abuse of process, and 249 days later, on Jan. 6, 2009, the 
Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland allowed the prosecution’s appeal); R v. Jamison,
[2008] NICA (Crim) 32, [1], [3] (on Oct. 18, 2007, the trial judge stayed the proceedings 
as an abuse of process, and 210 days later, on May 15, 2008, the Court of Appeal in
Northern Ireland dismissed the prosecution’s appeal on the ground it did not have 
jurisdiction).
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concluded that the prosecution did not prove its case.473  On the other  
hand, the appellate process is likely to last longer than it would have 
taken to complete the defendant’s trial,474 so whatever stress and
embarrassment the appellate process produces will last longer than that 
which would have resulted from the completion of the defendant’s trial. 
In addition, the appeal may be more expensive for the defendant than 
would the completion of the trial.  On balance, then, one might reasonably 
conclude that the trauma and distress, and perhaps also the financial
cost, of the appellate process that has replaced that which would have
resulted had the trial judge concluded the defendant did have a case to
answer and allowed the trial to continue until the jury reached a verdict
will to some extent have increased the overall trauma and distress of the 
criminal process.475 
Moreover, if the appellate court orders a new trial because it finds the 
trial judge erred in ruling the defendant had no case to answer, the 
defendant will be compelled to undergo the anxiety, embarrassment, and 
perhaps expense of a second trial for the same offense,476 thus frustrating 
one of the fundamental purposes of the rule against double jeopardy.  It
is true, of course, the rule against double jeopardy does not in all
circumstances preclude a second trial for the same offense.  A second
trial for the same offense is permissible, for example, when the trial
judge in the defendant’s first trial discharges the jury, i.e., declares a
mistrial,477 either at the request of the defendant or with his consent,478 or 
473. The defendant will of course be worried about having to undergo a new trial, 
or the resumption of his original trial, and his life may be put on “hold” during the 
pendency of the appellate process.  Those concerns were discussed earlier. See supra
text accompanying notes 384–437. 
474. See cases cited supra note 435.  As of November 1, 2011, the appellate process (in
all appeals by the prosecution under section 58 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003) has
taken between four days, R v. J.G., [2006] EWCA (Crim) 3276, [1], [15] (the trial judge 
ruled on Dec. 4, 2006, the defendant had no case to answer, and the Court of Appeal 
dismissed the prosecution’s appeal on Dec. 8, 2006), and 386 days, R v. S.H., [2010]
EWCA (Crim) 1931, [1], [44], [64], [2011] 1 Crim. App. 14, at 184, 195, 201 (Eng.) (the
trial judge ruled on July 13, 2009, the defendant had no case to answer, and the Court of 
Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeal and ordered a fresh trial on Aug. 3, 2010), to 
complete.
475. See N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 207, para. 2.13 (“If, 
in fact, there were no mistake, and, ultimately, an appeal court were to find the original
verdict of acquittal sound, then the accused has faced an unnecessary emotional and 
financial burden.”). 
476. Or, alternatively, the resumption of his initial trial.  See Criminal Justice Act,
2003, c. 44, § 61(4)(a) (Eng.).
477. A new trial also is permissible, in most circumstances, when a convicted
defendant successfully appeals her conviction. See supra note 334. The justification for
allowing retrial in this situation and the reasons for distinguishing the situation involving 
a prosecution appeal of a trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer are discussed infra text 
accompanying notes 535–36. 
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regardless of the defendant’s consent, because of the jury’s inability to 
reach a verdict479 or some other valid reason.480  In each of these situations,
though, the defendant’s trial ended without a decision, and it can be 
persuasively argued that the needs of justice require the defendant 
undergo a second trial for the same offense so the question of his guilt or
innocence can be resolved one way or the other.481  In addition, when the
478. See supra notes 334 & 362. 
479. ARCHBOLD, supra note 15, § 4-440; United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 
579, 580 (1824) (holding a retrial is constitutionally permissible following a mistrial 
brought about by a deadlocked jury).
480. A trial judge in England can discharge the jury before it reaches a verdict if 
there exists an “evident necessity,” Winsor v. R, [1866] 1 Q.B. 289, 305 (Eng.); 4 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at 360, “that is, a high degree of need for such discharge,” 
ARCHBOLD, supra note 15, § 4-253.  The decision to discharge a jury is not subject to 
review, R v. Lewis, [1909] 2 Crim. App. 180, 181 (Eng.); accord Criminal Justice Act,
2003, § 58(2)(a) (providing that the prosecution has no right of appeal under the 
provisions of the Act in respect of “a ruling that a jury be discharged”), so, ordinarily, 
the defendant can be retried.  R v. Davison, [1860] 175 E.R. 1046 (Eng. Cent. Crim. Ct.) 
1048; 2 F. & F. 250, 254 (Pollock, C.B.) (concluding a defendant can be retried when the 
trial judge in the first trial exercised his discretion and discharged the jury); id.; 2 F. & F.
at 255 (Martin, B.) (same); id.; 2 F. & F. at 255 (Hill, J.) (same).  Accord  ARCHBOLD, 
supra note 15, § 4-262.  The same rule holds forth in the United States. Perez, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) at 580 (holding the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not
preclude retrial when a trial judge, without the defendant’s consent, declares a mistrial
because “there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would 
otherwise be defeated”); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505, 516 (1978) (holding 
retrial is constitutionally permissible following a mistrial brought about by a “manifest 
necessity”).
481. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 463 (1973) (recognizing the public 
has an “interest . . . in seeing that a criminal prosecution proceed to verdict, either of
acquittal or conviction”).
With respect to the situation involving a hung jury, there is an additional
consideration. If a jury verdict, whether a conviction or acquittal, requires unanimity, or 
in some circumstances the agreement of a specified number, such as 10 members of a 
12-person jury, see Juries Act, 1974, c. 23, § 17(1) (Eng.) (“[T]he verdict of a jury in
proceedings in the Crown Court or the High Court need not be unanimous if—(a) in a
case where there are not less than eleven jurors, ten of them agree on the verdict; and (b) 
in a case where there are ten jurors, nine of them agree on the verdict.”), precluding a
retrial when the jury cannot meet the requirements for a verdict, for example, when it is 
split 9-3 in favor of conviction, or 8-4 in favor of acquittal, would actually change the 
requirements for a verdict to say, in effect, a jury reaches a verdict of not guilty
whenever a sufficient number do not agree to convict.  While some may prefer that rule, 
it has never been the law in Anglo-American legal systems.  Moreover, although “fault” 
can sometimes be attributed to one party or the other when a mistrial is declared before
the case is sent to the jury—in the sense that the prosecution (or defense) engaged in 
some (mis)conduct that gave rise to the request for a mistrial (or to the judge’s sua
sponte declaration of a mistrial)—neither party can be “faulted” for the jury’s inability to 
reach a verdict.
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defendant sought to have the jury discharged, or consented to its
discharge, it is by no means unfair to allow him to be tried anew for the 
same offense, for he himself sought to end his trial, or at least consented
to have his trial end, before its completion.482  Indeed, in seeking or
agreeing to have the jury discharged because error infected the trial, the
defendant most likely contemplated he would be subject to a new trial.483 
The above reasoning does not apply, however, when a trial judge 
erroneously ends a defendant’s trial by ruling the defendant has no case
to answer. First, unlike the case involving the discharge of the jury (i.e., 
the declaration of a mistrial), when a trial judge rules the defendant has 
no case to answer, there is a decision in the case: the trial judge has
concluded the prosecution failed to prove its case and the defendant
should be acquitted. The charges against the defendant will not stand 
unresolved if retrial is not permitted.  Second, although the defendant is 
“responsible” for the trial judge’s ruling—in the sense he made the 
submission on which the judge’s ruling was based—by making that 
submission the defendant, unlike in the situation in which he asks for or 
consents to a mistrial because of some error in the proceedings, seeks to
end the trial with a decision on his guilt or innocence.484  He did not
want a new trial, nor did he contemplate a new trial would take place if
the judge acceded to his submission; rather, he desired the case to end 
then and there with his acquittal, and believed that if the judge acceded
to his submission, it would do so.
If the trial judge erred in ruling the defendant had no case to answer,485 
that is not the defendant’s fault.  So why should he have to “pay” for it 
by undergoing a new trial?486  As pointed out earlier, although the judge
in a common law system plays a neutral role in the trial, he “is more
482. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607–08 (1976). 
483. See id. at 608. 
The trial court in granting the mistrial most certainly also contemplated that the
defendant would be retried.  United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978) (“When a 
trial court declares a mistrial, it all but invariably contemplates that the prosecutor will 
be permitted to proceed anew notwithstanding the defendant’s plea of double 
jeopardy.”). 
484. Compare Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 96 (“[T]he defendant elected to seek termination
of the trial on grounds unrelated to guilt or innocence. This is scarcely a picture of an 
all-powerful state relentlessly pursuing a defendant who had either been found not guilty
or who had at least insisted on having the issue of guilt submitted to the first trier of 
fact.” (emphasis added)); id. at 98–99 (“[B]y deliberately choosing to seek termination of
the proceedings against him on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the 
offense of which he is accused, suffers no injury cognizable under the Double Jeopardy
Clause if the [g]overnment is permitted to appeal from such a ruling of the trial court in
favor of the defendant.” (emphasis added)).
485. See supra note 292. 
486. N.S.W. LAWREFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 207, para. 2.13. 
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closely allied with the government than with the accused,”487 and in
England, is appointed488 and paid489 by the state.  Why should that same
state, as represented by the prosecution, be entitled to haul an individual 
into court a second time and compel him to undergo the “grueling”490 
ordeal of a second trial, because one of its own actors erred?  As one 
judge put it, “[i]f the [trial] judge makes a mistake and the accused is 
acquitted, then the setting aside of the verdict may involve the accused
in the emotional ordeal of going through it all again, although the
mistake was something over which he had no control.”491 
One therefore must conclude that allowing the prosecution to appeal a 
judge’s ruling of no case to answer, and if successful, to try the defendant 
again for the same offense, frustrates the double jeopardy rule’s purpose 
of limiting the expense, distress, and trauma to an individual accused of
a crime to that arising from a single trial. 
6. Conserving Scarce Prosecutorial and Judicial Resources
Prohibiting the government from retrying an individual for the same 
offense following an acquittal also conserves limited prosecutorial and 
judicial resources. It prevents a prosecutor from expending additional 
time, money, and effort investigating and prosecuting a person for the
same offense again and again until he achieves the desired result—a
conviction.492 Similarly, it keeps prosecutors from tying up courtrooms, 
487. FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 298. 
488. See supra note 298. 
489. See supra note 299. 
In England, there are certain circumstances under which the state can remove a judge
from office. See supra note 300. 
490. N.Z. LAWCOMM’N, REPORT 70, supra note 127, para. 13. 
491. R v Jessop, [1974] Tas SR 64, 87 (Crim. App.) (Austl.) (Chambers, J., dissenting). 
492. Cf. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (the State of Missouri charged an
individual with robbing each of six participants in a poker game and after he was tried
and acquitted of robbing one participant the State tried him for robbing a second 
participant); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958) (after the defendant was tried and
acquitted of robbing three individuals at a tavern, the State of New Jersey tried him for
robbing a fourth person who had been robbed in the same incident).  See also Ciucci v.
Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958) (per curiam) (in separate indictments, the State of Illinois 
charged an individual with murdering his wife and three children and tried him three 
separate times, first for the murder of his wife, then for the murder of one of his
daughters, and finally for the murder of his son—gaining a conviction in each trial—
until it obtained the sentence it wanted, the death penalty).
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judges, and court personnel in successive attempts to convict an individual 
for the same offense.493 
This policy is frustrated by allowing the prosecution to appeal rulings
of no case to answer.  In the absence of a right to appeal, a trial judge’s
ruling of no case to answer would end the case, forcing the prosecution 
to move on to its next case without “imposing further on scarce financial
and court resources.”494  In England, however, whenever the prosecution 
exercises its right to appeal a ruling of no case to answer, it will expend 
additional time, money, and effort on a case that has already been
“decided.” Given the limited resources available to prosecutors, this
means that a prosecutor seeking to appeal a ruling of no case to answer
will have to divert time and other resources from cases that have not yet 
been tried.495  If the prosecution succeeds in its appeal of the ruling of no 
case to answer and obtains a new trial,496 or is allowed to resume the
initial trial,497 it will have to divert further resources from untried cases 
to undertake the prosecution at that new, or resumed, trial.  The reduced 
amount of time, effort, and money expended on some of these untried 
cases might result in acquittals that would otherwise have been—or at
least should have been—convictions, perhaps resulting in dangerous 
criminals going free.  Moreover, if the prosecution fails in its appeal,
 493. FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 4.
 494. N.S.W. LAWREFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 207, para. 2.28. 
495. In addition to, or perhaps instead of, diverting resources from untried case, the 
prosecution might divert resources from cases that have been appealed.  Some of these 
appeals might have been taken by a convicted defendant who is attacking her conviction,
see Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, c. 19, § 1(1)–(2) (Eng.); e.g., R v. Oxley, [2009] EWCA 
(Crim) 2134, [1] (Eng.), or sentence, see Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, § 9(1); e.g., R v. 
Jones, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2035, [1] (Eng.), or both, e.g., R v. Pomfrett, [2009] 
EWCA (Crim) 1939, [1]–[2] (Eng.).[2008] 1 Crim. App. 34, at 413–14.  Others may
have been taken by the prosecution and might involve the claim that the sentence 
imposed upon a convicted defendant was too lenient, see Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 
33, § 36(1) (Eng.); e.g., AG’s Reference No. 52 of 2009 (Tiffany), [2009] EWCA (Crim)
2125, [15] (Eng.), or a challenge to a ruling made by a trial judge, see Criminal Justice 
Act, 2003, c. 44, §§ 57(1), 58(1)–(2), 74(1) (Eng.), such as one staying a prosecution 
because of an abuse of process, e.g., R v. K., [2007] EWCA (Crim) 971, [1], [2007] 2
Crim. App. 15, at 191 (Eng.), or one excluding crucial prosecution evidence as hearsay.
E.g., R v. B., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 644, [2]–[3] (Eng.); R v. Y., [2008] EWCA (Crim)
10 [1], [2008] 1 Crim. App. 34, at 413–14 (jur. not given).  The diversion of resources 
from appeals, like the diversion of resources from untried cases discussed in the text, 
could result in acquittals—here, by the appellate court, see Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, c.
19, § 2(3) (Eng.)—in cases in which the Court of Appeal would otherwise have, or at 
least should have, rejected the appeals and affirmed the defendants’ convictions, and this 
could result in dangerous criminals going free.  Such a diversion of resources also could 
result in the Court of Appeal’s upholding unduly lenient sentences imposed on convicted 
defendants, leading to their release into the community at an earlier date than they might 
otherwise have been released.
496. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 61(4)(b). 
497. Id. § 61(4)(a).
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either by not obtaining leave to appeal498 or on the merits,499 or if it 
succeeds in its appeal but the resultant new (or resumed) trial ends in the 
acquittal of the accused, the prosecution’s diversion of its limited
resources will have been for nought.500 
Allowing the prosecution to appeal a ruling of no case to answer also
diverts limited judicial resources.  Instead of dealing with pending
appeals—some of which might involve incarcerated individuals convicted 
at trials infected with legal error and whose appeals ultimately will be 
granted—judges on the Court of Appeal will be hearing appeals on rulings
of no case to answer.  Similarly, when the Court of Appeal reverses a
trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer and orders a new trial, or the 
resumption of the defendant’s trial, the trial court might have to delay 
other trials so it can conduct the retrial, or resume the initial trial–other 
trials that could involve a guilty defendant who is free in the community
on bail, or an innocent person being held in custody awaiting trial. 
7. Reducing the Risk of an Erroneous Conviction
Prohibiting a new trial of an individual following his acquittal for the 
same offense prevents the government from attempting to persuade a 
second fact finder of the individual’s guilt “after having failed with the 
first.”501  In doing so, it reduces the risk of an erroneous conviction. 
498. See id. § 57(4), (8)–(9). 
499. The same would be true if the Court of Appeal reverses the trial judge’s ruling
but nevertheless orders the defendant’s acquittal because it concludes the defendant 
could not receive a fair trial if it ordered either the resumption of his trial or a fresh trial. 
See id. § 61(4)(c), (5).
500. Of course, it is impossible to determine the ramifications of the prosecution’s 
decision to spend its limited resources on appealing a ruling of no case to answer, rather
than on untried cases.  But even if it were possible, it would still be difficult, if not
impossible, to say whether the appeal, if successful, achieved an overall benefit for society.
To illustrate, assume the prosecution obtained one additional burglary conviction in a 
given time period because of its successful appeal of a trial judge’s ruling of no case to 
answer. At first glance, one would conclude that society gained by the prosecution’s
expenditure of resources to appeal the trial judge’s ruling.  But would one maintain that
position if, during the same time period, the prosecution expended resources to appeal,
unsuccessfully, three other rulings of no case to answer in prosecutions for various 
property offenses, and because of its expenditure of resources on the four appeals,
diverted time, effort, and money from a rape trial that resulted in the defendant’s
acquittal (and release into the community) that, with the infusion of more time, effort,
and money, would otherwise have resulted in a conviction and the incarceration of a 
dangerous individual? 
501. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975). 
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Indeed, Professor Martin L. Friedland asserts that the increased chances
of convicting an innocent person at a second trial for the same offense 
“is at the core of the problem.”502  As the Supreme Court of the United 
States recognized in Green v. United States,503 if the government were
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an 
offense, it would “enhanc[e] the possibility that even though innocent he 
may be found guilty.”504  The risk of erroneously convicting an innocent
person would increase for several reasons.  First, the fact that an individual 
accused of a particular offense could face additional trials for the same 
offense, even after being acquitted, might induce an innocent person to 
forgo a trial entirely and plead guilty before his first trial even begins.505 
Second, multiple prosecutions would permit the government to use the 
first trial as a “dry run,”506 allowing it the opportunity to “hon[e] its trial
strategies and perfect[] its evidence”507 in light of what it learned at the
first trial about the weaknesses of its case508 and the strengths509 and 
weaknesses of the defendant’s case.510  For instance, the government
 502. FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 4.
503. 355 U.S. 184 (1957). 
504. Id. at 188. Accord Pearce v The Queen, (1998) 194 CLR 610, 614 (Austl.) 
(McHugh, Hayne & Callinan, JJ.); id. at 636 (Kirby, J.).  See also  ENG. LAW COMM’N,
CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 25, para. 4.5; N.Z. LAW COMM’N, REPORT 70, 
supra note 127, para. 15 (quoting id.); AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION 
PAPER, supra note 111, at 2. 
505. FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 4.
506. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 (1970). 
507. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982). 
508. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128 (1980); United States v. 
Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 105 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (1978); United States v. Wilson, 420 
U.S. 332, 352 (1975). 
509. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 128. 
510. Professor Friedland writes that at a second trial the defendant
may be at a greater disadvantage than he was at the first trial because he will 
normally have disclosed his complete defence at the former trial.  Moreover, 
he may have entered the witness-box himself.  The prosecutor can study the 
transcript and may thereby find apparent defects and inconsistencies in the 
defence evidence to use at the second trial. 
FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 4.  See also ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 
156, supra note 25, para. 4.5 (“[B]ecause there has already been one trial at which the 
defence has shown its hand, the prosecution may enjoy a tactical advantage at a second 
trial; and this will increase the likelihood of a conviction, whether the defendant is guilty
or innocent.”); ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 7.65 (“[A]t a
retrial witnesses will have had a dry run, tactics will have been revealed and weaknesses 
in the prosecution case will have been spotted and possibly plugged.”); N.Z. LAW
COMM’N, REPORT 70, supra note 127, para. 15 (quoting id.); Poulin, supra note 170, at 
977 (“[R]eprosecution after the government presents its evidence and the fact finder
acquits the defendant, creates the risk that the prosecution will marshal its resources in 
the second proceeding to correct the deficiency in its case and, possibly, convict an 
innocent defendant.”). Cf. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 504 n.14 (1978) 
(quoting Judge Leventhal’s description in Carsey v. United States, 392 F.2d 810, 813–14 
(D.C. Cir. 1967) (concurring opinion), of how some of the Government’s witnesses 
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could “‘supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first 
proceeding.’”511  Third, if multiple prosecutions were permitted, the
government, with its vastly superior resources, could wear down the
defendant—financially,512 emotionally, and physically513—and obtain a
conviction “through sheer governmental perseverance.”514  Finally, “[i]f 
it is accepted that juries do on occasion return perverse verdicts of guilty
[that is, verdicts ‘contrary to the evidence,’515] the chance that a
particular defendant will be perversely convicted must increase if he or 
she is tried more than once.”516  In sum, as Professor Akhil Reed Amar 
subtly changed their testimony over the course of four trials so it became more favorable
to the Government); Ashe, 397 U.S. at 447 (in a prosecution for robbing a participant in a 
poker game, following the defendant’s acquittal of robbing another participant, the 
government conceded that when the prosecutor lost the first trial, “‘he did what every
good attorney would do–he refined his presentation in light of the turn of events at the 
first trial’”); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 465–66 (1958) (in a prosecution for 
robbing a person at a tavern, following the defendant’s acquittal of robbing three other 
individuals at the tavern, the government altered its presentation of proof by calling only
the witness who had testified most favorably to it in the first trial).
It is true that in a second trial for the same offense “the defence may equally be in a
position to adapt their case to the prosecution strategy appropriately.”  Dennis, supra
note 125, at 939.  As discussed in the text, however, the defendant’s resources pale in
comparison to those of the government, see supra text accompanying notes 263–66, and 
the defendant might be financially, emotionally, and physically worn out after the first 
trial.  See infra text accompanying notes 512–13.  The defendant might therefore decide 
to plead guilty before the retrial because of his inability to undergo the burden of a 
second trial. Cf. text accompanying note 495.  Even if he opts to go to trial a second
time, any knowledge of the government’s evidence and its strategy he may have gained
at the first trial is likely to be of less value to him than the information gained by the
government at the first trial.  For example, if the government discovered a particular 
weakness in its own case, it is likely that it could do much more to eliminate that
weakness (e.g., locate and interview witnesses or conduct forensic tests) than the 
defendant could do if he identified a particular weakness in his own case.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 263–66.  Moreover, the fact the defendant gained information about 
the government’s evidence or strategy does nothing to prevent a perverse verdict of 
guilty in his second trial. See infra text accompanying notes 515–16. 
511. Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 11 (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978)).
512. See supra text accompanying notes 459–61.  But see  ENG. LAW COMM’N,
CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 25, para. 4.5 (asserting that “[i]n England and
Wales, lack of financial resources is not usually a serious problem for defendants in
criminal cases because of the availability of legal aid”).
513. See supra text accompanying notes 462. 
514. Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 41.  See also FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 4 (“In many cases
an innocent person will not have the stamina or resources effectively to fight a second
charge”).
515. BLACK’S, supra note 64, at 1697. 
516. ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 25, 
para. 4.5 (footnote omitted) (defining a “perverse verdict of guilty” as “a guilty verdict 
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and Jonathan L. Marcus so eloquently put it, “[i]f you play with something 
long enough, you are likely to break it; and if the government is allowed
to prosecute an innocent defendant enough times and disregard all
acquittals, eventually it is likely to convict an innocent (by hypothesis) 
person.”517 
Permitting the prosecution to appeal a trial judge’s ruling of no case to 
answer will frustrate this purpose of the rule against double jeopardy.518 
where there was nothing in the trial process, save the result, that could raise a ground of
appeal—a case which would fall only into the category formerly described as ‘lurking
doubt’ cases”).
517. Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy After Rodney King, 
95 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31 n.158 (1995).  See also Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE 
L.J. 262, 278 n.74 (1965) (attempting to illustrate the point through a mathematical 
equation). But see Roberts, supra note 308, at 398 (“[A]n argument about the risk of
wrongful conviction appears to rest on empirical propositions. But it does not.  The 
empirical foundations of the argument are unknown, and probably unknowable.”).
Professor Roberts asserts that “in our current state of ignorance about the factors 
predicting wrongful conviction, we have no reason to be confident that successive 
retrials would materially increase the global risk of convicting the innocent. . . ,” and he 
rhetorically asks “[i]f the jury at the first trial correctly acquitted an innocent defendant 
on the evidence, could a second (or third) jury, as presumptively rational fact-finders, not 
be counted on to acquit again (and again)?” Id. at 399–400. The answer to that question
may well be “No.”  Professor Roberts’s implied affirmative answer would be correct if
the government in the second trial presented precisely the same evidence, in virtually the 
same manner, as it did in the first trial.  But that is unlikely to happen.  For, after losing 
the first case, the prosecutor most likely would do “‘what every good attorney would do–
. . . refine[] his presentation in light of the turn of events at the first trial.’” Ashe v. 
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970). Ashe provides an excellent example of why the 
government has an increased chance of conviction in a second trial.  There, the
government prosecuted an individual for robbing a participant in a poker game.  The 
government’s identification testimony at trial was weak—only one of its four witnesses 
identified the accused in court as one of the robbers—and the jury acquitted the accused. 
After the acquittal, the government tried the individual for the robbery of one of the other 
participants in the poker game.  At the second trial it elicited stronger identification
testimony from three of the witnesses who had testified at the first trial and further
refined its case by declining to call the robbery victim whose identification testimony at 
the first trial had been negative. Id. at 439–40. See also Arizona v. Washington, 434 
U.S. 497, 504 n.14 (1978) (quoting Judge Leventhal’s description in Carsey v. United
States, 392 F.2d 810, 813–14 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (concurring opinion), of how some of the
Government’s witnesses subtly changed their testimony over the course of four trials so 
that it became more favorable to the Government); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 
465–66 (1958) (in a prosecution for robbing a person at a tavern, following the
defendant’s acquittal of robbing three other individuals at the tavern, the government 
altered its presentation of proof by calling only the witness who had testified most 
favorably to it in the first trial).  Professor Roberts also does not sufficiently take into 
account the effect multiple trials can have on the defendant—financially, emotionally,
and physically, see supra text accompanying notes 459–62–and the realistic possibility
that the government will obtain a conviction “through sheer . . . perseverance.”  Tibbs, 
457 U.S. at 41. 
518. See N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 207, para. 2.6
(“[T]he ultimate consequence of allowing an appeal from a directed verdict of acquittal
may be a retrial.  The accused’s position in that event is unlikely to be exactly the same
as it was at the original trial, and, in fact, more likely to be prejudiced in comparison 
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Whenever the prosecution, acting in good faith, brings an individual to 
trial on a criminal charge, it believes it has sufficient evidence to prove
the individual’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.519  In trials that run their
course, the prosecution may learn its belief was wrong when the jury
returns its verdict—that is, the jury may find the evidence lacking and
therefore acquit the defendant—but, absent a right of appeal, the rule 
against double jeopardy prevents the prosecution from strengthening its 
case and bringing a second prosecution against the acquitted individual 
for the same offense.520  When, however, a trial judge rules at the close
of the prosecution’s case that the defendant has no case to answer, the 
prosecution learns at an earlier stage of the proceeding that its evidence
may not be as strong as it initially believed.  Yet, allowing the prosecution
to appeal the judge’s ruling may result in the prosecution’s being able to 
retry the “acquitted”521 defendant for the same offense.522  And certainly 
if it succeeds in its appeal and obtains a new trial,523 it will not merely
present the same evidence that initially resulted in a trial judge’s finding 
of no case to answer.524  For even if the appellate court were correct and 
the prosecution did present a case for the defendant to answer, the
prosecution will have been put on notice that, at least in the eyes of a
trained, professional judge, its case against the defendant was not a
with the earlier position.”); Poulin, supra note 170, at 977 (“Th[e] risk [that the 
prosecution will convict an innocent defendant] is most acute when either the court or 
the jury has assessed the prosecution’s case and found it wanting.”). 
519. See  STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-3.9 (a) (1993) (“A prosecutor
should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal
charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction.”). 
520. But see Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, §§ 75–86 (Eng.) (allowing the 
government, under certain circumstances, to retry a previously-acquitted individual for
certain serious offenses when “there is new and compelling evidence against the
acquitted person”). 
521. See supra text accompanying notes 50–53, 60–61. 
522. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 61(4)(b). 
523. As opposed to the Court of Appeal’s ordering a resumption of the initial trial. 
See id. § 61(4)(a). 
524. The only exception might be when the trial judge ruled the defendant had no 
case to answer on the basis of the so-called
first limb of Galbraith, (that is, on the basis that the Crown has not adduced 
any evidence of one or more elements of the offence—a ruling on a point of
law) as distinct from the second (namely that the evidence adduced is such that 
a jury could not properly convict on it—a ruling based on the court’s view of 
the evidence).
ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 1.19 (footnote omitted) 
(referring to R v. Galbraith, [1981] 73 Crim. App. 124, 127 (Eng.)).  See supra text 
accompanying notes 50–53. 
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particularly strong one, and it “presumably will be spurred to greater 
efforts in gathering and presenting proof of guilt”525 at the defendant’s
second trial. Moreover, if the trial judge explained in detail his reasons 
for finding the prosecution’s case insufficient,526 the prosecution will 
have a road map pinpointing the areas in which it needs to strengthen its 
case at the retrial.527  It may, for example, attempt to strengthen its case 
against the defendant by presenting additional evidence on a particular 
factual issue;528 or it may work with a witness so the witness comes 
across more credibly while testifying at the second trial than she did at 
the first trial; or perhaps it will refrain from calling a particular witness 
whose testimony at the first trial was confused or somewhat contradictory.529 
In effect, it will treat the first, aborted, trial as a “dress rehearsal”530 for
the second trial. And this is true even though the defense did not put on 
its case at the first trial.  As the English Law Commission explained, 
the defence may have tested [the prosecution’s evidence] in cross-examination.
In doing so the defence may have revealed some or all of its strategy, although
it will not have begun to present its case.  It may also have provided the 
prosecution witnesses who have given evidence with a “dry run.”  Accordingly,
in these ways the defence would be disadvantaged at a retrial by facing a
prosecution potentially better prepared.531 
It is true that “[r]etrials are a routine feature of the trial process”532 in 
England, occurring most frequently after a convicted defendant successfully 
appeals his conviction, or after the trial judge discharges the jury
(declares a mistrial) in the defendant’s initial trial, either because the 
525. Poulin, supra note 170, at 977. 
526. E.g., R v. Courtney, No. 03/039229, slip op. at [14–17] (Belfast Crown Ct., 
Nov. 28, 2006) (quoted in R v. Courtney, [2007] NICA (Crim) 6, [4], [2007] N.I. 178, 
181–83).
527. Professor Poulin concludes that, “if it is accompanied by a statement of
reasons, a judicial determination of inadequacy will be a more effective spur to the 
prosecution [to correct the deficiency in its case] than [would] a general verdict of not
guilty.”  Poulin, supra note 170, at 977. 
528. Cf. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 439–40 (1970) (at the defendant’s second
trial for armed robbery, the prosecution elicited stronger identification testimony from 
three of the witnesses who had testified at the defendant’s first trial and declined to call 
the robbery victim whose identification testimony at the first trial had been negative). 
529. Cf. id.; Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 465–66 (1958). 
530. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 749 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part). See also Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 518
(1990) (“Multiple prosecutions . . . give the State an opportunity to rehearse its
presentation of proof.”), overruled by Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993). 
531. ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158, supra note 25, para. 6.3 
(stating, however, that, “[c]onversely, the defence will have available for cross-
examination on the retrial an additional version of events from prosecution witnesses on
the basis of which it may be able to mount a challenge to witnesses’ reliability, based on
inconsistencies in their various accounts”).
532. Id. at para. 6.6.
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jury could not reach a verdict or because of an error that infected the
trial. Moreover, retrials are permitted in these situations533 even though 
the prosecution is likely to have an additional advantage over the
defendant at the second trial.534  One could argue, then, that the fact that
the prosecution will be able to strengthen its case at a retrial following 
the prosecutions’s successful appeal of a trial judge’s ruling of no case to
answer should not be a reason for prohibiting the prosecution from 
taking such appeals.  Such reasoning is flawed, however.  Merely because 
the legal system sometimes allows the prosecution to enjoy an additional
advantage over the defendant at a retrial does not mean it should always
permit it to do so.  One must remember that the prosecution’s ability to 
strengthen its case at a retrial raises a concern because it increases the
possibility of an innocent person being convicted.  Furthermore, each of 
the situations mentioned above in which retrials are common is
distinguishable from the situation in which a retrial follows the reversal 
of a trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer.
When a convicted defendant appeals his conviction on the ground that
error infected his trial, he is the one asking that the case against him not
end with the judgment entered upon the jury’s verdict of guilty,535 and at
the time of taking his appeal, he would be quite content if the Court of 
Appeal overturned his conviction and granted him a new trial, despite 
533. See supra note 334. 
534. See supra text accompanying notes 506–14. 
The extent of the additional advantage may depend upon the stage at which the
defendant’s first trial ended.  The prosecution is likely to have learned very little about 
the defense case, or any weaknesses in its case, when the first trial ended before the
prosecution began presenting its evidence.  As a general matter, though, it is likely the 
prosecution will have learned significantly more about the defense strategy and evidence, 
and perhaps about any weaknesses in its own case, when the initial trial was aborted
before the presentation of the defense case, that is, when the trial judge halted the trial 
during, or immediately following the completion of, the prosecution case.  For even
when the trial was halted before the defense presented its case, the prosecution may have
learned something about the defendant’s strategy.  See supra text accompanying note 
531. Of course, it is likely the prosecution is going to gain the most if the first trial ran 
its course, that is, after both the prosecution and the defense fully presented their cases, 
as in the situations of a hung jury or a successful defense appeal of a conviction.
535. See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326–27 (1970); United States v. Ball, 163
U.S. 662, 671–72 (1896).  See also United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465–66 (1971) 
(“Corresponding to the right of an accused to be given a fair trial is the societal interest
in punishing one whose guilt is clear after he has obtained such a trial.  It would be a 
high price indeed for society to pay were every accused granted immunity from
punishment because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the 
proceedings leading to conviction.”). 
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the additional advantages the prosecution might have at a second trial. 
That certainly is not the case when the prosecution appeals a trial judge’s
ruling of no case to answer.  Should the Court of Appeal allow the appeal
and order a new trial, the defendant will be forced to surrender a
ruling favorable to him (i.e., no case to answer), and one that, absent the 
appeal, would have forever ended the case against him for that offense,536 
and in addition, he may be forced to undergo a second trial at which he 
is likely to be at a significant disadvantage.  In short, while it may be fair 
to retry a convicted defendant who seeks to overturn his conviction and 
obtain a new trial, it may well be unfair to compel a defendant who has 
benefitted from the trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer to give up 
that favorable judgment and undergo a new trial. 
When a jury, after hearing all the evidence in the case, is unable to 
reach a verdict, there is no decision in the case—the defendant has been
neither acquitted nor convicted.  Moreover, neither party can be blamed
for the jury’s inability to reach a decision.  Under such circumstances, it
can be persuasively argued that the needs of justice require the defendant 
to undergo a second trial for the same offense so the case against him
can be resolved one way or the other.537  Prohibiting a retrial in such
situations would, in effect, eliminate the requirement that a prescribed
number of jurors agree upon a “not guilty” verdict before a defendant 
can be acquitted.538  Unlike the case of a hung jury, however, when a
trial judge rules the defendant has no case to answer, there is a decision 
in the case–the trial judge has concluded the prosecution failed to prove 
its case and the defendant therefore should be acquitted.539  Furthermore,
as explained earlier,540 even if the trial judge erred in ruling the
defendant had no case to answer, that error can be attributed to an agent 
of the state—the trial judge.541  Clearly, the error was not the defendant’s
fault, and he should not have to “pay” for it by being forced to undergo a 
new trial.542 
Finally, the discharge of the jury (declaration of a mistrial) during the 
defendant’s initial trial because of some error that infected the trial—like 
the situation involving a deadlocked jury, but unlike the situation
involving a ruling of no case to answer—ends that trial without a 
536. See supra text accompanying notes 53, 60–61. 
537. See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824) (holding a 
retrial is constitutionally permissible following a mistrial brought about by a deadlocked 
jury). See also Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862-64 (2010); Arizona v. Washington, 
434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978). 
538. See supra note 481. 
539. See supra text accompanying notes 53, 60–61. 
540. See supra text accompanying notes 485–91. 
541. See supra text accompanying notes 297–99. 
542. N.S.W. LAWREFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 207, para. 2.13. 
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decision having been reached on the defendant’s guilt or innocence.  For
that reason it can be argued that the interests of justice compel that the
case against the defendant be resolved one way or the other.543 
Moreover, when the trial judge discharges the jury at the request of the 
defendant, or with his consent, the defendant in nearly all circumstances
contemplates being tried again.544  Indeed, in most situations in which 
the defendant moves for the discharge of the jury, he wants a retrial
because he believes the error that gave rise to his motion would increase
the chances he will be convicted at the first trial and would in any event 
necessitate a retrial following a successful appeal.545  As explained
earlier, this is not true when a defendant submits he has no case to 
546answer.
Thus, although retrials in criminal cases occur with some frequency in
the English legal system, such retrials should be limited to those situations 
in which a convicted defendant successfully appeals his conviction or
those in which there was no decision in the case, either because of a 
“hung” jury or the midtrial discharge of the jury because of error that
infected the trial. Such a limitation will keep to a minimum the number 
of cases in which the additional advantages enjoyed by the prosecution 
at a retrial could lead to the conviction of an innocent person.
8. Maintaining the Public’s Respect for, and Confidence           
in, the Legal System
The rule against double jeopardy also “protect[s] . . . the legal system
itself.”547  As Professor Friedland explains, “[b]y preventing harassment 
and inconsistent results, the rule assists in ensuring that court 
543. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 463 (1973) (recognizing that the 
public has an “interest . . . in seeing that a criminal prosecution proceed to verdict, either
of acquittal or conviction”).
544. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 608 (1976). 
The trial court in granting the mistrial most certainly also contemplated the defendant
would be retried.  United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978) (“When a trial court 
declares a mistrial, it all but invariably contemplates that the prosecutor will be permitted 
to proceed anew notwithstanding the defendant’s plea of double jeopardy.”). 
545. See Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 608, 610. 
546. See supra text accompanying note 484. 
547. FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 4.  See also N.Z. LAW COMM’N., REPORT 70, supra
note 127, para. 14 (“A consequence of the rule against double jeopardy is protection of
the administration of justice itself.”).
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proceedings . . . ‘command the respect and confidence of the public.’”548 
The public would almost certainly lose respect for the legal system if the
government were allowed to try an individual repeatedly for the same 
offense, despite repeated acquittals.  In most cases, the public would
perceive the multiple prosecutions as government harassment.549  In
addition, if the government ultimately obtained a conviction after a 
previous acquittal, the inconsistent verdicts could affect the public’s
confidence in the accuracy of the legal system and dilute the moral force 
of the criminal law550 because it would “leave[] people in doubt whether 
innocent men are being condemned.”551  Professor Paul Roberts explains
it in these terms:
[C]riminal conviction and punishment can only hope to be legitimate for as long
as political authorities abide by the terms of the criminal justice deal [that has 
been struck (or that has evolved) in England and Wales, allowing jury verdicts 
to be set aside to accommodate successful defence appeals against convictions, 
but not authorizing governments to invalidate jury acquittals.]  If governments 
could accept or reject acquittal verdicts much as it suited them, criminal
proceedings would soon be exposed as a sham trial of guilt, and jury acquittal
would lose its current practical and symbolic meaning.  Public confidence in
jury verdicts generally would be undermined, and government would have
assumed an ominously authoritarian jurisdiction.552 
Although Professor Roberts focuses upon acquittals rendered by a
jury, allowing the prosecution to appeal trial judges’ rulings of no case
to answer can have a similar effect on the community’s respect for, and 
confidence in, the legal system.  Members of the community may view
the prosecution’s right to appeal a ruling of no case to answer as a tool 
the government can use to disassemble what would otherwise be an
acquittal,553 and they may ultimately conclude the government is not
always bound by an acquittal with which it disagrees and that citizens 
are not adequately protected.  This would be especially true if significant
numbers of rulings of no case to answer are overturned by the appellate
court.554  Moreover, the more rulings of no case to answer the appellate
 548. FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 4 (quoting Connelly v. DPP, [1964] A.C. 1254
(H.L.) 1353 (Lord Devlin) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.)). 
549. See N.Z. LAWCOMM’N, REPORT 70, supra note 127, para. 14. 
550. Id.
551. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
552. Roberts, supra note 308, at 411. 
553. Absent a prosecution right of appeal, a trial judge who rules the defendant has 
no case to answer would order the jury to acquit the defendant.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 50–53, 60–61. 
554. The Author’s research disclosed that as of November 1, 2011, the prosecution
appealed twenty-four rulings of no case to answer pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act 
2003, and the Court of Appeal reversed fifteen of those rulings.  Compare R v. S.H.,
[2010] EWCA (Crim) 1931, [2], [44], [2011] 1 Crim. App. 14, at 184, 195 (Eng.) 
(reversing the trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer); R v. W., [2010] EWCA (Crim)
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927, [1], [42] (no jur. given) (same); R v. M.K., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 952, [1], [8], [21],
[27], [30] (Eng.) (same); R v. F., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1868, [1], [10], [12], [16] (Eng.)
(same); R v. N. Ltd., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1223, [1], [10], [29]–[30], [2009] 1 Crim. 
App. 3, at 58, 60, 66–67 (Eng.) (same); R v. R., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 683, [4]–[5], [18]
(Eng.) (same); R v. R., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 619, [1], [13]–[14], [2008] 2 Crim. App. 
38, at 559, 562–63 (Eng.) (same); R v. P., [2007] EWCA (Crim) 3484, [1]–[2], [13]
(Eng.) (same); R v. R., [2007] EWCA (Crim) 3312, [1], [8]–[9], [2008] 1 Crim. App. 26, 
at 358, 359 (Eng.) (same); R v. P., [2007] EWCA (Crim) 3216, [2], [24], [2008] 2 Crim. 
App. 6, at 69, 75 (Eng.) (same); R v. P.S., [2007] EWCA (Crim) 2058, [2], [24], [61]
(Eng.) (same); R v. H., [2007] EWCA (Crim) 2056, [2], [32], [35] (Eng.) (same); R v. 
C., [2007] EWCA (Crim) 1862, [1], [42], [60] (Wales) (same); R v. K., [2007] EWCA 
(Crim) 491, [1], [14], [33]–[35], [2007] 2 Crim. App. 10, at 130, 133, 138 (same), and R 
v. J.S.M., [2006] EWCA (Crim) 2046, [1]–[2], [6]–[8] (jur. not given) (same), with R v. 
Q., [2011] EWCA (Crim) 1584, [1], [20], [2011] 2 Crim. App. 25, at 365, 369 (Eng.)
(dismissing the prosecution’s appeal of the trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer); R v.
P., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 2895, [1], [32] (Wales) (same); R v. M., [2009] EWCA (Crim)
2848, [1], [26] (Eng.) (same); R v. Thomas, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1682, [1], [41], [46]
(Eng.) (same); R v. Chi Kuen Chung, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 836, [1], [28] (Eng.) (same);
R v. N.W., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 2, [1], [39] (Eng.) (same); R v. A., [2007] EWCA 
(Crim) 2868, [1]–[2], [21] (Eng.) (same); R v. J.G., [2006] EWCA (Crim) 3276, [1], [15]
(same), and R v. Patel, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 2689, [18], [2007] Crim. App. 12, at 192, 
196 (Eng.) (same). See also R v. M.H., [2011] EWCA (Crim) 1508, [2], [50] (Eng.) (in
a case involving charges of causing the death of a motorist by driving while uninsured 
and driving while unlicensed, the Court of Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeal of a 
ruling by the trial judge, on an agreed factual basis, that “as a matter of law a jury could 
not be directed that . . . the defendant was a cause of the motorist’s death”); R v. F., 
[2010] EWCA (Crim) 2243, [1]–[4], [16] (Eng.) (the Court of Appeal dismissed the 
prosecution’s appeal of the trial judge’s pretrial ruling that as a matter of law the agreed
facts in the case were insufficient to prove the defendant’s guilt); R v. Tilley, [2009] 
EWCA (Crim) 1426, [4]–[6], [46], [2009] Crim. App. 31, at 512, 513–14, 522 (Eng.)
(the Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecution’s appeal of the trial judge’s ruling that 
the statute under which the defendant was charged did not encompass his conduct); R v. 
H., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 483, [3], [34], [57]–[58] (Eng.) (the Court of Appeal allowed 
the prosecution’s appeal and reversed the trial judge’s ruling, made before the jury was 
sworn, that under the prosecution’s evidence in its then form, the defendant did not have
a case to answer; but the Court of Appeal nevertheless concluded that the interests of 
justice would not be served by resuming the proceedings or ordering a new trial); R v.
Francis, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 3323, [1], [11]–[13], [2007] 1 Crim. App. 36, at 470, 472
(Eng.) (the Court of Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeal of the trial judge’s ruling 
that as a matter of law the offense charged could not have been committed); CPS v.
Morgan, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 1742, [1]–[2], [8]–[12], [26] (Eng.) (the Court of Appeal 
allowed the prosecution’s appeal of the trial judge’s ruling that upon the agreed-upon
facts, the defendant’s conduct did not constitute an offense); R v. D., [2006] EWCA 
(Crim) 1139, [1], [7]–[8], [18], [31]–[33], [2006] 2 Crim. App. 24, at 350, 351, 353, 
357–58 (Eng.) (the Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecution’s appeal of the trial 
judge’s ruling that the cases should not proceed to trial because there was no basis on
which a reasonable jury could convict the defendant of the offenses with which he was 
charged); R v. C., [2005] EWCA (Crim) 3533, [4], [6]–[7], [19]. [24], [2006] 1 Crim. 
App. 28, at 434, 435, 438, 439 (Eng.) (the Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecution’s 
appeal of the trial judge’s ruling that, because the prosecution would be unable to prove 
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court reverses, the more likely the public will question the legal ability
of its trial judges. Perhaps more importantly, many may ask: If trial
judges keep getting it “wrong” in the important matter of whether the 
prosecution’s evidence is sufficient to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, are they likely to be getting it “right” on other “less 
important” issues that arise in a trial, such as evidentiary rulings, that
could ultimately lead to the conviction of innocent individuals or the
acquittal of guilty people?  Questions could also arise about the legal 
ability of the appellate court judges if cases in which they reverse the 
trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer and order a new,555 or resumed,556 
trial ultimately result in the jury’s acquitting the accused.557 
It is true, of course, that in those cases in which the appellate court 
reverses the trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer and the jury ultimately
convicts the accused, members of the community might conclude that
the existence of a prosecution right to appeal prevented a miscarriage of 
justice that would have resulted in the acquittal of a factually guilty
individual,558 and may thereby gain confidence in the legal system. 
Indeed, absent a prosecution right of appeal, acquittals in cases involving 
serious offenses can give rise to anger and frustration in the community
that the conduct alleged in four counts of an indictment occurred before the date of the 
repeal of the statute under which the defendant was charged, those four counts could not 
be left to the jury).
The Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland has decided two cases involving the 
prosecution’s appeal of a trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer under the Criminal 
Justice (Northern Ireland) Order, 2004, SI 2004/1500 (N. Ir. 9) arts. 16–20, 26–31, which 
adopts provisions in Northern Ireland tracking those of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.  It 
reversed the trial judge’s ruling in both of those cases.  R v. McCann, [2008] NICA
(Crim) 25, [4], [21], [24], [26]–[27]; R v. Courtney, [2007] NICA (Crim) 6, [1]–[2],
[35], [2007] N.I. 178, 179, 193. 
555. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 61(4)(b) (Eng.). 
556. Id. § 61(4)(a).
557. Of course, no inconsistency necessarily exists between a finding the 
prosecution presented a case for the defendant to answer and a jury’s subsequent verdict 
acquitting the defendant.  For in determining whether the prosecution’s case is sufficient
to convict, the trial judge must take the prosecution’s evidence “at its highest,” R v. 
Galbraith, [1981] 73 Crim. App. 124, 127 (Eng.), and, in addition, she normally makes 
her ruling before hearing the defense case.  See supra text accompanying notes 45–46.
The jury, on the other hand, must consider both the defense case and the credibility of 
the witnesses. Thus, the jury might disbelieve some testimony that, if believed, would 
have proven the prosecution’s case; or, despite the sufficiency of the prosecution’s 
evidence, the jury might nevertheless find the defendant not guilty after hearing the 
defendant’s evidence, including perhaps the defendant’s own testimony.  Members of the 
public, however, may not make these distinctions.  Rather, they may well reason that 
because the jury acquitted the defendant, which is what the trial judge initially did by
ruling the defendant had no case to answer, the appellate court must have been wrong
when it overturned the trial judge’s initial ruling.
558. See supra text accompanying notes 316–20. 
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at large,559 and can cause the public, or a large segment of it, to lose faith 
in the criminal justice system.560  But such cases are likely to be rare.
For it is a “reasonable assumption . . . that the more serious the charge,
the less likely the [trial] judge would be to intervene and direct a verdict
where there is credible evidence to be put to the jury.”561  Perhaps more
559. The New South Wales Law Reform Commission recognized this fact when it 
stated in its report on directed verdicts of acquittal that “understandable community
outrage . . . would result in the event of a worst case occurring, the acquittal by manifest 
error of an accused charged with an extremely serious offence, without an opportunity
for the jury to deliberate properly upon the evidence or for the Crown to appeal the 
acquittal.”  N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 207, para. 3.5. 
However, for the reason stated in the text, see infra text accompanying note 561, the 
Commission concluded that “[s]uch a scenario . . . is very unlikely.”  N.S.W. LAW 
REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 207, para. 3.5 (also noting that a senior public 
defender stated that “in his experience it is very rare for a judge to direct a verdict in a 
murder case”).
The acquittal by a jury of an individual whom the public perceives to be guilty often 
gives rise to public outrage and, at least in the short-term, a loss of public confidence in 
the legal system.  Although not involving a court-ordered acquittal, the case involving 
former American football player O.J. Simpson in his 1995 trial for the murders of his ex-
wife Nicole Brown Simpson and her friend Ronald Goldman, see “Not Guilty,” Simpson 
Free After Acquittal, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 4, 1995, at 1, available at 1995 WLNR
2139224, illustrates this point.  The jury’s acquittal of Simpson led to severe criticism 
and gave rise to a lack of faith in the criminal justice system among large segments of
the American public.  See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Civil Rights Left Imprint on 1995, 
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 31, 1995, Sunday Reader, at 1J (stating that “White 
Americans, shocked at the verdict, viewed [the acquittal of O.J. Simpson] as a
compelling example of power and money influencing justice and black jurrors’
sympathy for a black defendant”) available at 1995 WLNR 5257522. See also Stan
Grossfeld, Locked in on the Hoop, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 10, 2008, Sports at 1 (stating 
the not guilty verdict in Simpson’s murder trial “polarized American along racial lines”), 
available at 2008 WLNR 23663142; Ashley Powers & Harriet Ryan, Simpson Saga
Takes New Turn with Robbery Sentencing, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2008, Business, page 
unavailable (stating that Simpson’s acquittal of murder “polarized Americans”),
available at 2008 WLNR 23432381.  Other jury acquittals have led to similar outrage 
amongst the public. See, e.g., Angry Callers Flood Times Switchboard, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 
30, 1992, at 23, available at 1992 WLNR 3978211 (reporting that shortly after the 
announcement of the verdict acquitting four white Los Angeles police officers on 
charges brought in connection with the videotaped beating of Rodney King, an African-
American motorist, “callers from across the country flooded the Los Angeles Times 
switchboard-most with angry comments on the outcome”); Richard A. Serrano, Violence
Follows Acquittals, Jury Decision in L.A. Beating Case Spurs Outrage, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Apr. 30, 1992, at 1A, available at 1992 WLNR 1590071 (reporting on riots 
that followed the acquittals of four white police officers on charges brought in
connection with the videotaped beating of Rodney King, an African-American motorist, 
and quoting the mayor of Los Angeles as saying, inter alia, “Today, the system failed 
us.”).
560. See supra text accompanying notes 321–25. 
561. N.S.W. LAWREFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 207, para. 3.5.
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importantly, though, “[a]n obvious result of the rule against double 
jeopardy is that occasionally guilty persons will escape punishment,”562 
and members of the community might well recognize this fact and
accept it as an “inevitable [part of the] system of justice.”563  On balance,
then, it seems the negative effect on the community’s respect for, and 
confidence in, the legal system of allowing the prosecution a right to 
appeal a trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer outweighs any positive 
effect it may have, and therefore will frustrate this purpose of the rule 
against double jeopardy.
C. Balancing the Need for a Prosecution Right to Appeal        
Rulings of No Case to Answer Against the Policies            
Underlying the Rule Against Double Jeopardy 
In evaluating the wisdom of allowing the prosecution to appeal a trial 
judge’s ruling of no case to answer, one must weigh the need for such
appeals against the policies underlying the rule against double jeopardy.564 
The only viable argument in favor of allowing the prosecution to appeal
a ruling of no case to answer is that such appeals will enhance the
accuracy of the outcome of criminal proceedings by allowing an
appellate tribunal to correct erroneous rulings of no case to answer,565 
and in doing so, will prevent some “miscarriage[s] of justice”566 by making 
it “more likely that a guilty defendant will be convicted.”567 
Nevertheless, the weight to be accorded this factor in the balancing 
process must be reduced significantly because prosecution appeals of
rulings of no case to answer sometimes may lead to miscarriages of
justice of the opposite kind—the conviction of an individual who in fact 
is innocent. Such wrongful convictions can result from the dilemma a 
defendant might face at the close of the prosecution’s case if the 
prosecution can appeal a ruling of no case to answer when that ruling 
involved the trial judge’s assessment of the strength of the prosecution’s 
case568 (as opposed to one involving a finding that “there [was] no
evidence that the crime alleged [was] committed by the defendant”569). 
562. FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 4.
563. Id.
564. See supra text accompanying notes 231–32. 
565. See supra text accompanying notes 316–26. 
566. N.S.W. LAWREFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 207, para. 2.15. 
567. ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158, supra note 25, para. 3.19 
(also stating that, “[c]onversely, the outcome is no less likely to be accurate if an appeal
is unsuccessful.”).
568. See  ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, paras. 7.68, 7.70, 
7.77. 
569. R v. Galbraith, [1981] 73 Crim. App. 124, 127 (Eng.). 
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The English Law Commission explained: 
The dilemma for the defence would be that if it makes a submission of no case 
[to answer], and is successful, there is a danger that the prosecution will appeal
and there will be a retrial.  In the interim, the prosecution case might improve.
The prosecution might seek and obtain more evidence to shore up the 
weaknesses exposed first time round.  The defence’s case might deteriorate.  Its
witnesses might become unavailable.  The prosecution evidence might have
appeared tenuous at the initial trial because of a particularly effective cross-
examination of one or more of the Crown’s witnesses.  There is no guarantee 
that this will be repeated at the retrial.  The defence, in making the decision 
whether or not to make a submission [of no case to answer], would bear in mind
that the prosecution has a weak case, and, therefore, that there is a realistic
prospect that the jury will acquit, particularly in light of the way the trial has 
gone thus far.570 
This dilemma creates “the danger of wrongful conviction,”571 because
of the “real risk that defendants might not make a submission of no case
[to answer], when they should.”572  The English Law Commission reasoned: 
For a discussion of the two bases for a ruling of no case to answer, see supra text 
accompanying notes 50–53. 
570. ENG. LAWCOMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158, supra note 25, paras. 6.15. 
After receiving comments on its consultation paper, the English Law Commission, in 
its Report on Double Jeopardy and Prosecution Appeals, did not accept the arguments 
that sought to “diminish the dilemma for the defence,” stating, first, that “[t]he fact that 
the defence has other difficult choices to make is not a sufficient argument for adding to 
that burden.”  It also rejected the arguments
suggest[ing] that there is no particular disadvantage to a defendant in being
required either (i) to make a submission and to face a retrial after an appeal; or 
(ii) to forgo a submission and give evidence for fear that an appealed ruling of
no case would deprive the defendant of the chance of an acquittal by a jury in a 
trial which is going well.
ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, para. 7.65.  The Law Commission 
explained that these arguments 
fail to take any, or any sufficient, account of the fact that trials are organic 
unpredictable events, each one of which has its own momentum, or feel, 
deriving from the particular interplay of is cast of characters on a particular 
occasion.  The progress made by the defence in one trial may well not be 
repeated at a retrial.  It is a truism, recognised by most experienced
practitioners, that the high point of the defence case is invariably at the close of 
the prosecution case.  This is quite apart from the obvious fact that at a retrial 
witnesses will have had a dry run, tactics will have been revealed and 
weaknesses in the prosecution case will have been spotted and possibly
plugged.
Id.
 571. ENG. LAWCOMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158, supra note 25, para. 6.17. 
572. Id. at para. 6.16. See also ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 25, 
para. 7.52 (stating that a prosecution right of appeal with respect to a ruling of no case to 
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If the law relating to submissions of no case [to answer] is right, it secures
accuracy of outcome, in that the defendant who makes a successful submission 
of no case [to answer] will be rightly acquitted, when there is a risk that, absent
a submission of no case, he or she would be wrongly convicted by the jury.573 
Such wrongful convictions would be most likely to occur in cases 
involving a defendant who belongs to an unpopular group or one that is 
subject to discrimination, cases in which the defendant raises an
unsavoury defense, and in cases turning on identification testimony.574 
To be weighed on the other side of the balance are the policies 
underlying the rule against double jeopardy.  One of those policies is
concerned with the increased risk of an erroneous conviction if the 
government can prosecute an individual a second time for the same 
offense. In addition to wrongful convictions resulting from the dilemma 
discussed above, wrongful convictions are likely to result because of the 
appellate court’s reversal of a “correct” ruling of no case to answer— 
that is, one in which the defendant in fact did not commit the crime in 
question575—and a new trial at which the jury will erroneously convict
the accused. An erroneous conviction may occur because the prosecution 
almost certainly will present a stronger case at the fresh trial ordered by 
the appellate court than it did in the initial trial.  As a result, the chances 
the jury may erroneously convict the factually-innocent defendant increase
significantly,576 thereby frustrating one of the principle purposes577 of the
rule against double jeopardy.
answer “might . . . be a disincentive to the making of a submission even if it might
succeed.”).
573. ENG. LAWCOMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158, supra note 25, para. 6.16
574. See id. at para. 6.14 (explaining that the ability of the defendant to submit there 
is no case to answer is an important safeguard, protecting the accused from a jury’s
perverse verdict of guilty, and that “[t]his might be particularly important where the 
defendant belongs to a group which is unpopular or subject to discrimination, or where 
the nature of the defence is unsavoury; also pointing out that “[i]n identification cases, 
experience has shown that juries may easily be persuaded by honest but mistaken
witnesses”). 
The English Law Commission also believed that “[q]uite apart from the danger of 
wrongful conviction, a defendant who did not make a submission of no case out of fear
of a prosecution appeal would be disadvantaged even if the jury acquitted,” because “[i]f 
a defendant is to be acquitted, it is procedurally fairer that he or she be acquitted earlier 
rather than later, as he or she is then bearing the burden of prosecution for a shorter 
period.” Id. at para. 6.17 (also noting that an earlier acquittal “saves resources, both in 
terms of money and court time,” and that “[t]he longer and more complicated the case, 
the greater the saving of public funds in not having issues for the distance which should 
have been excluded at an early stage.”).
575. In its Consultation Paper on Prosecution Appeals Against Judges’ Rulings, the 
English Law Commission acknowledged that “appellate courts . . . can make mistakes.” 
Id. at para. 3.19 n.21 (nevertheless concluding that, for purposes of its analysis, it was
“reasonable to suppose that generally the appeals process works, in the sense of 
correcting errors at first instance and not overturning correct first instance decisions.”).
576. See supra text accompanying notes 501–46. 
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Significant weight should be accorded this factor in the balancing
process. For in England, as in the United States, society has always
deemed the erroneous conviction of an innocent person more harmful 
than the erroneous acquittal of a guilty person.578  As Sir William
Blackstone, perhaps the most important commentator on the English 
common law, wrote nearly 250 years ago, “the law holds, that it is better 
that ten guilty persons escape, than one innocent suffer.”579 
Aside from increasing the risk of an erroneous conviction, allowing 
the prosecution to appeal a ruling of no case to answer and obtain a fresh
trial also frustrates the double jeopardy protection’s policy of minimizing
the distress and trauma of the trial process resulting from the defendant’s
being compelled to undergo a second trial for the same offense through 
no fault of her own and after she has already, in effect, been found not 
guilty of that offense.580  Additionally, allowing the prosecution to appeal a
ruling of no case to answer and, if successful, to retry the accused will 
frustrate the rule against double jeopardy’s policy of conserving scarce 
prosecutorial and judicial resources.581  And, at least to some extent, it 
also might cause the public to lose respect for, and confidence in, the
criminal justice system.582
 577. As stated earlier, see supra text accompanying note 502, Professor Friedland
maintains that the increased chances of convicting an innocent individual at a second 
trial for the same offense “is at the core of the problem.”  FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 4. 
578. To put it another way, “[i]n a criminal case, . . . [society] do[es] not view the 
social disutility of convicting an innocent men as equivalent to the disutility of acquitting 
someone who is guilty.”  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). 
For this reason, see id. at 363 (opinion of the Court) (“The reasonable-doubt standard
. . . , is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error.”), 
a person can be convicted of a criminal offense only if the prosecution proves her guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Woolmington v. DPP, [1935] A.C. 462 (H.L.) 481–82 
(Viscount Sankey) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.); WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 42–43; 
Winship. 397 U.S. at 364.  A lower standard of proof, such as a preponderance of the 
evidence, would undoubtedly result in more factually-guilty defendants being convicted, 
but at the expense of a significant increase in the number of convictions of factually-
innocent defendants. 
579. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *358. Accord Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,
325 (1995) (quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[It is] a
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent 
man than to let a guilty man go free.”)).
580. See supra text accompanying notes 456–91. 
581. See supra text accompanying notes 492–500. 
582. See supra text accompanying notes 548–63. 
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On balance, then, one can reasonably conclude that the extent to which 
allowing the prosecution to appeal a trial judge’s ruling of no case to
answer frustrates several policy interests underlying the rule against
double jeopardy outweighs the benefits of allowing such appeals, and
that Parliament made an unwise choice in voting to allow such prosecution 
appeals.
VI. CONCLUSION
In England, a trial judge’s ruling that a defendant has no case to 
answer on a charge against him traditionally resulted in the defendant’s
acquittal of that charge and, because of the plea of autrefois acquit and
the inability of the prosecution to appeal the judge’s ruling, a final
disposition of the charge in his or her favor.  The Criminal Justice Act
2003 now permits the prosecution to appeal a ruling of no case to answer,
and if successful in its appeal, to obtain a fresh trial of the defendant for 
the same offense—or, if possible, the resumption of the initial trial.  This 
significant change in the law was intended to enhance the accuracy of 
the outcome of criminal proceedings by allowing an appellate tribunal to
correct an erroneous ruling of no case to answer by the trial judge,
thereby preventing a guilty defendant from being acquitted and freed
because of the trial judge’s error.  While this is a laudable goal, it will
not be achieved without significant costs.  Allowing the prosecution to
take such appeals will not only increase the number of erroneous 
convictions, that is, the number of factually-innocent individuals who are
wrongly convicted, but will also compel some individuals to undergo the 
burdens of a second trial for the same offense despite the trial judge’s 
finding that the prosecution failed to introduce sufficient evidence to 
prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Moreover, the appeals process
and second trials will require the expenditure of scarce prosecutorial and 
judicial resources on cases that have, in effect, already been decided.
Finally, permitting the prosecution to appeal rulings of no case to answer
may, to some extent, cause the public to lose respect for, and confidence
in, the criminal justice system.
Thus, even if the rule against double jeopardy does not directly
prohibit the prosecution from appealing a trial judge’s ruling of no case 
to answer when a successful appeal would require a new (or resumed)
trial for the same offense, many of the policies underlying the protection 
against double jeopardy are frustrated. When weighed against the benefits 
of allowing the prosecution to appeal a ruling of no case to answer, it
seems Parliament made an unwise decision in deciding to extend appeal 
rights to the prosecution. 
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